In re: The Zuercher Trust of 1999

FILED MAR 22 2017 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK 2 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. NC-15-1174-KuBS ) 6 THE ZUERCHER TRUST OF 1999, ) Bk. No. 3:12-bk-32747 ) 7 Debtor. ) ______________________________) 8 ) MONICA HUJAZI, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* 11 ) E. LYNN SCHOENMANN, Chapter 7 ) 12 Trustee; WIN WIN ALEXANDER ) UNION, LLC, ) 13 ) Appellees. ) 14 ______________________________) 15 Argued and Submitted on January 19, 2017 at San Francisco, California [16] Filed – March 22, 2017 [17] Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the Northern District of California 19 Honorable Hannah L. Blumenstiel, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 20 Appearances: Bradley Kass of Kass & Kass Law Offices argued for appellant Monica Hujazi; Thomas F. Koegel of 21 Crowell & Moring LLP argued for appellee E. Lynn Schoenmann, Chapter 7 Trustee; Elsa Horowitz of 22 Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP argued for appellee Win Win Alexander Union, LLC. [25] 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Before: KURTZ, BRAND and SPRAKER,** Bankruptcy Judges. 2 INTRODUCTION 3 On remand from a prior appeal of the bankruptcy court’s 4 order approving the sale of two apartment buildings, the 5 bankruptcy court found (for the second time) that the purchaser – 6 Win Win Alexander Union, LLC – was a good faith purchaser within 7 the meaning of § 363(m).1 Monica Hujazi, the former principal of 8 the debtor, now appeals from the bankruptcy court’s second good 9 faith finding. 10 Because that finding was not clearly erroneous, We AFFIRM. 11 FACTS 12 Most of the relevant facts pertaining to the bankruptcy 13 court’s sale order are set forth in this Panel’s prior decision, 14 Zuercher Trust of 1999 v. Kravitz (Zuercher Trust of 1999), 2014 15 WL 7191348 (Mem. Dec.) (9th Cir. BAP Dec. 17, 2014). There is no 16 need to reiterate most of those facts. Indeed, Hujazi’s opening 17 appeal brief adopted our prior factual recitation as her own. 18 To briefly recap, the bankruptcy court entered on June 10, 19 2013, an order authorizing Peter Kravitz as chapter 11 trustee to 20 sell an apartment building on Union Avenue to Win Win based on [22] ** 23 Hon. Gary A. Spraker, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation. [1] Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 25 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 , and 26 all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. All "Civil Rule" references are to 27 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 2 1 its initial credit bid of $2.7 million.2 The sale order further 2 authorized Kravitz to sell a second apartment building on 3 Alexandria Avenue to Vista Investment Group, LLC or its designee 4 for $6.8 million and also confirmed and authorized Win Win as the 5 backup purchaser of the Alexandria property based on its credit 6 bid of $4.5 million “in the event that the sale of the Alexandria 7 Property to Vista fails to close.” Additionally, the sale order 8 included a finding that both Win Win and Vista qualified as good 9 faith purchasers for purposes of § 363(m). Ultimately, Kravitz 10 consummated the sale of both properties to Win Win. 11 We issued our decision in the prior sale order appeal on 12 December 17, 2014. In that decision, we held: (1) the bankruptcy 13 court’s § 363(m) good faith finding was not clearly erroneous 14 based on the record available to the bankruptcy court at the time 15 the sale order was entered; (2) the bankruptcy court’s good faith 16 finding under § 363(m) precluded us from considering any of 17 appellant’s other issues challenging the sale and seeking 18 reversal of the sale order; (3) one lingering good faith issue 19 existed, which arose from appellant’s argument that certain post20 sale-order events evidenced the bad faith of Kravitz, Win Win and 21 Vista; and (4) consistent with our precedent, the lingering good 22 faith issue only could be properly addressed on remand to the 23 bankruptcy court. 24 Roughly two months after our remand, on February 19, 2015, 25 the bankruptcy court held a status conference to discuss the [2] In the current appeal, appellee chapter 7 trustee E. Lynn 28 Schoenmann has appeared as Kravitz’s successor in interest. [3] 1 Panel’s remand. None of the parties have provided a transcript 2 of the status conference, so we don’t know specifically what was 3 said at the status conference. In any event, the court entered 4 an order the day after the status conference requiring the 5 Zuercher Trust or Hujazi, within thirty days, to file a motion 6 for relief from or reconsideration of the sale order to address 7 the good faith issue this Panel had remanded for consideration.3 8 Hujazi timely filed her motion for reconsideration or 9 relief. Hujazi asserted that Kravitz unilaterally decided not to 10 sell the Alexandria property to Vista for $6.8 million and 11 instead unilaterally and without court approval sold the 12 Alexandria property to Win Win based on its backup credit bid of 13 $4.5 million, thereby causing a loss to the estate of 14 $2.3 million. Hujazi maintained that the Alexandria sale to 15 Win Win contravened the court’s sale order because the sale order 16 permitted the trustee to sell the Alexandria property to Win Win 17 only if Vista refused to close. According to Hujazi, because 18 Kravitz backed out of the sale to Vista (as opposed to Vista 19 backing out), Kravitz was required to obtain a new or revised 20 sale order. Hujazi complained that it made no sense that Kravitz [3] The bankruptcy court interpreted our December 2014 decision [22] as recognizing a lingering good faith issue only with respect to 23 the sale of the Alexandria property, so it stated in its February 20, 2015 order that any motion asking for relief from or 24 reconsideration of the bankruptcy court’s prior good faith ruling should “address the [m]ovant’s concerns as to the sale of the 25 Alexandria Property only.” Hujazi’s appeal brief does not 26 contain any argument challenging this ruling of the bankruptcy court, so we decline to address it. See Christian Legal Soc'y 27 Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 , 487–88 (9th Cir. 2010); Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140 , 1149 n.4 (9th 28 Cir. 2010). [4] 1 could not deliver clear title to Vista but could turn around and 2 deliver clear title to Win Win. Hujazi contended that fraud, 3 collusion and unfair advantage among Kravitz, Win Win and Vista 4 were demonstrated by the fact that Win Win turned around and 5 resold the Alexandria property to Vista for $6.8 million – the 6 same price Vista had agreed to purchase the property from Kravitz 7 for. 8 To support her arguments, Hujazi relied on declarations that 9 Kravitz and Win Win had filed with this Panel in the sale order 10 appeal. However, Hujazi did not present any new evidence. 11 Moreover, the record suggests that Hujazi never requested any 12 discovery regarding the post-sale-order events, either before or 13 after this Panel’s remand. Nor did she ever file a motion 14 seeking an extension of time in order to conduct discovery. 15 Kravitz and Win Win both opposed the motion and filed 16 declarations offering explanations why the Kravitz-Vista sale 17 fell through, why no further court approval was necessary for 18 Kravitz to consummate the backup sale to Win Win and why Win Win 19 could and did resell the property to Vista for $6.8 million. 20 The court held a hearing on Hujazi’s motion on May 7, 2015. 21 After considerable discussion with the parties regarding what 22 could be inferred from the declarations submitted, the bankruptcy 23 court reaffirmed its prior good faith finding in light of the 24 evidence submitted regarding post-sale-order events. On that 25 evidence, the bankruptcy court found there was no fraud, 26 collusion or unfair advantage. The court further found that the 27 Kravitz-Vista sale could not close because a number of 28 unanticipated issues arose, and neither party was willing or able [5] 1 to bear the additional risk and expense associated with the 2 unanticipated issues. According to the court, in compliance with 3 the terms of the sale order, Kravitz then sold to Win Win based 4 on its backup bid because Win Win was willing to bear, and did 5 bear, the risks and costs of the unforeseen contingencies. The 6 court rejected Hujazi’s arguments that Kravitz unilaterally was 7 unwilling to close the Vista sale and that the sale order did not 8 authorize Kravitz to close the Alexandria sale with Win Win as 9 the backup bidder unless Vista unilaterally and voluntarily 10 refused to close. As the court put it, Hujazi’s reading of this 11 aspect of the sale order was “so stilted and impractical and 12 inconsistent with decades of [bankruptcy] practice, as to be 13 mind-boggling, quite frankly.” Hr’g Tr. (May 7, 2015) at 14 33:12-14. 15 The bankruptcy court additionally found that the net 16 recovery to the bankruptcy estate resulting from either the Vista 17 sale or the Win Win sale was exactly the same. In fact, Hujazi 18 conceded this point during argument. Finally, the court found 19 that there was nothing nefarious about Win Win’s resale of the 20 Alexandria Property to Vista for $6.8 million. Rather, Win Win 21 wanted to resell the property as soon as possible so that it 22 could retire the debt it owed to East West Bank, and Win Win was 23 able to resell the property to Vista because Win Win could and 24 did assume a significant amount of additional expense and risk to 25 resolve the unforeseen contingencies, which had prevented the 26 Kravitz-Vista sale from closing. 27 The bankruptcy court entered its order denying Hujazi’s 28 motion on May 8, 2015, and Hujazi timely appealed. [6] 1 JURISDICTION 2 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(N). Subject to the standing analysis set 4 forth below, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 . 5 ISSUES 6 1. Does Hujazi have standing to appeal? 7 2. Did the bankruptcy court clearly err when it reaffirmed its 8 original good faith finding pursuant to § 363(m)? 9 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 10 We review appellate standing issues de novo. Menk v. 11 LaPaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 903 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). 12 The bankruptcy court’s good faith determination resolved a 13 question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous 14 standard. Adeli v. Barclay (In re Berkeley Delaware Court, LLC), [15] 834 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2016); Thomas v. Namba 16 (In re Thomas), 287 B.R. 782, 785 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). A finding 17 of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is illogical, 18 implausible, or without support in the record. Retz v. Samson 19 (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). 20 The bankruptcy court’s reaffirmation of its good faith 21 finding relied in part on its interpretation of its prior sale 22 order. “We accord substantial deference to the bankruptcy 23 court's interpretation of its own orders and will not overturn 24 that interpretation unless we are convinced it amounts to an 25 abuse of discretion.” Rosales v. Wallace (In re Wallace), [26] 490 B.R. 898, 906 (9th Cir. BAP 2013). 27 We also review for an abuse of discretion Hujazi’s argument 28 that the bankruptcy court should have postponed the hearing on [7] 1 the good faith issue in order to give Hujazi additional time to 2 conduct discovery. See Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764 , 783 3 (9th Cir. 2002); Hasso v. Mozsgai (In re La Sierra Fin. Servs., 4 Inc.), 290 B.R. 718, 726 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). 5 The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion only if it 6 applied an incorrect legal rule or its findings of fact were 7 illogical, implausible or without support in the record. United 8 States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 9 DISCUSSION 10 1. Appellate Standing Issue 11 Appellees argue that Hujazi lacks standing to appeal. Only 12 a “person aggrieved” has standing to appeal, which means that the 13 appellant must be “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” 14 by the order on appeal. Fondiller v. Robertson 15 (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 16 Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs., Inc. (In re Cheng), 308 B.R. 17 448, 455 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff'd, 160 Fed.Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 18 2005). 19 According to appellees, Hujazi is not directly and adversely 20 affected pecuniarily because neither the Zuercher Trust 21 bankruptcy nor Hujazi’s personal bankruptcy have any realistic 22 chance of concluding with surplus estates. Absent surplus 23 estates, debtors typically lack standing to appeal orders 24 affecting the size of the bankruptcy estate. In re Fondiller, [25] 707 F.2d at 442 . Hujazi posits that the ultimate outcome of the 26 bankruptcy cases depends in part on the outcome of the myriad 27 appeals she has taken from the bankruptcy court’s orders. 28 We need not parse the parties’ complex appellate standing [8] 1 question, which arguably would require us to predict the likely 2 end results of various litigation and two bankruptcy cases. 3 Instead, we rely on other facts to conclude that Hujazi has 4 standing to appeal. Namely, because Hujazi is personally liable 5 on the Alexandria and Union loans as a codebtor, she has an 6 ongoing personal stake in the sale of the properties which 7 secured those loans and how those sales affected her personal 8 liability. Cf. Zuercher Trust of 1999 v. Schoenmann 9 (In re Zuercher Trust of 1999), 2016 WL 721485 , at *7 (Mem. Dec.) 10 (9th Cir. BAP Feb. 22, 2016) (holding that Hujazi’s codebtor 11 status gave her standing to appeal a different sale order). 12 In this Panel’s 2014 decision in the sale order appeal, we 13 noted that Hujazi was a codebtor on the Alexandria and Union 14 loans. See 2014 WL 7191348 , at *1. In addition, Hujazi made 15 this same point during the post-remand hearing on her motion for 16 relief or reconsideration. The appellees never challenged 17 Hujazi’s assertion of codebtor status. 18 We acknowledge that Hujazi might receive a discharge in her 19 personal bankruptcy case, which in theory would end her personal 20 liability for the Union and Alexandria loans. Even so, whether 21 she ultimately will receive that discharge is debatable. The 22 deadline for objecting to her discharge has been continued from 23 time to time and currently is not set to expire until April 21, 24 2017. Furthermore, given Hujazi’s pending appeal concerning the 25 order for relief entered in her personal bankruptcy case and 26 given her aggressive opposition to the chapter 7 trustee’s 27 efforts to administer her personal bankruptcy estate, it is not 28 hard to imagine that she might never receive a discharge. [9] 1 In short, we conclude for appellate standing purposes that 2 Hujazi is directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the 3 bankruptcy court’s denial of her post-remand motion for relief or 4 reconsideration. 5 2. Reaffirmation of the Good Faith Finding 6 We should not and will not revisit the legal question of 7 what generally constitutes good faith under § 363(m). This 8 Panel’s prior decision in the sale order appeal, 2014 WL 7191348 , 9 ably addressed that issue and its legal analysis is law of the 10 case. See generally Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. 11 Fraschilla (In re Fraschilla), 235 B.R. 449, 454 (9th Cir. BAP 12 1999) (explaining doctrine and its exceptions), aff'd, 242 F.3d 13 381 (9th Cir. 2000) (table). 14 As explained in our prior decision, we remanded for 15 consideration of the factual issue of whether post-sale-order 16 events evidenced any fraud, collusion or grossly unfair advantage 17 over other bidders that would justify reconsideration of the 18 bankruptcy court’s June 2013 good faith finding. 19 In their respective briefs and declarations filed in 20 opposition to Hujazi’s post-remand motion, Kravitz and Win Win 21 offered detailed explanations: (1) why Kravitz’s sale to Vista 22 fell through; (2) why no further court approval was necessary for 23 Kravitz to consummate the backup sale to Win Win; and (3) why Win 24 Win could and did resell the property to Vista for $6.8 million. 25 Kravitz explained in his declaration that he attempted to 26 close the sale to Vista for roughly six weeks, but that a number 27 of unexpected issues arose when he attempted to procure title 28 insurance for the sale. For instance, he could not find any [10] 1 title insurer who was willing to issue a policy before the appeal 2 period ended or while the Zuercher Trust’s appeal from the sale 3 order was pending. Also, notwithstanding the sale free and clear 4 of liens and other interests language in the sale order, the 5 title insurers were unwilling to issue a policy unless certain 6 lien notices issued by the City of Los Angeles were released. In 7 addition, Kravitz learned during his closing attempts that a 8 $225,000 withholding tax was going to be incurred as a result of 9 the cash sale to Vista and would need to be paid out of escrow. 10 Vista maintained that these and other sale costs were the 11 responsibility of the seller, but the estate had inadequate funds 12 to satisfy them. According to Kravitz, as a result of his 13 inability to resolve these unexpected issues, Vista declined to 14 close. 15 As explained by both Kravitz and Win Win, Win Win was 16 willing and able to close notwithstanding these additional 17 issues. Win Win agreed to move forward with the sale even though 18 no title insurance policy could be obtained. Also, because the 19 sale to Win Win was based on a credit bid and was not a cash 20 sale, the $225,000 withholding tax would not accrue. 21 Win Win also explained that it was motivated to close its 22 purchase from Kravitz and its sale to Vista because it needed to 23 retire the debt it owed to East West Bank. In fact, as Win Win 24 maintained, it would have been significantly better off if the 25 Kravitz-Vista sale had closed. In order for Win Win to close its 26 purchase from Kravitz and its sale to Vista, it had to assume a 27 number of additional risks and costs that it would not have 28 incurred if the Kravitz-Vista sale had closed. [11] 1 In contrast, Kravitz’s $4.3 million sale to the backup 2 bidder Win Win (in lieu of closing its $6.8 million sale to 3 Vista) did not diminish the estate’s benefits from the sale or 4 increase its burdens. The estate still received all of the 5 benefits it bargained for before obtaining court approval. As 6 Kravitz stated: 7 Fortunately for the estate, by selling Alexandria to Win-Win as the back-up bidder, I was able to preserve 8 the tremendous benefit to the estate that I had negotiated under the original bid procedure terms. 9 Specifically, Win-Win paid both $50,000.00 fees to the estate for a total of $100,000.00 cash; Win-Win agreed 10 to cap its post-petition administrative claims (estimated to be $1.2 million as of the sale date) to 11 no more than $50,000.00 and subject to my right to object to such claims; Win-Win removed all its secured 12 liens from the Alexandria and Union properties resulting in the removal of $15 million in secured 13 claims against the estate; and Win-Win’s claims against the estate were reduced to unsecured claims of 14 approximately $5.3 million (down from the $15 million plus in secured claims). [15] 16 Kravitz Decl. (April 17, 2015) at ¶ 6. 17 As for the $2.5 million difference in sale price between the 18 aborted Vista sale and the completed Win Win sale, Kravitz 19 pointed out that all of the gross sale proceeds lost would have 20 been paid to Win Win on account of its secured claim and thus the 21 estate did not lose any net sale proceeds. 22 The findings of the bankruptcy court reflect that it 23 credited the declaration testimony the parties presented and that 24 it found Kravitz’s and Win Win’s explanations of the post-sale25 order events credible. Also, the court inferred from those 26 explanations that there was no fraud, collusion or grossly unfair 27 advantage taken by or between Kravitz, Win Win or Vista. 28 Hujazi presented no controverting evidence. In essence, she [12] 1 asked the court to reject the appellees’ explanations and to 2 infer bad faith from the bare outline of the post-sale-order 3 events. Assuming without deciding that the bankruptcy court 4 could have inferred bad faith as Hujazi urged, the court’s choice 5 not to do so was not clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of 6 Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are 7 two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice 8 between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). Put another way, we 9 cannot say that the bankruptcy court’s renewed finding of good 10 faith with respect to the Alexandria sale was illogical, 11 implausible or without support in the record. 12 Hujazi also argued that bad faith was apparent because 13 Kravitz’s backup sale to Win Win contravened the sale order. But 14 the bankruptcy court rejected this argument, reasoning that 15 Hujazi’s interpretation of the sale order was overly restrictive 16 and impractical. According to the bankruptcy court, Kravitz’s 17 sale to the backup bidder was contemplated by and in full 18 compliance with the sale order. 19 The sale order in relevant part provided as follows: 20 Win Win is confirmed as the back-up purchaser of the Alexandria Property in the event that the sale of the 21 Alexandria Property to Vista fails to close. In such event, Win Win or its designee is confirmed as the 22 purchaser, and the Trustee is authorized to sell and transfer to Win Win the Alexandria Property pursuant to 23 the terms, including the original purchase price of $4,500,000, as set forth in the Motion. If Vista fails 24 to close its purchase of the Alexandria Property, such back-up sale can be consummated without further order 25 of this Court, but the parties may lodge an amended order if and/or as necessary. [26] 27 Sale Order (June 10, 2013) at ¶ 5. 28 We give significant deference to the bankruptcy court's [13] 1 interpretation of its own orders. In re Wallace, 490 B.R. at 906 2 (citing Marciano v. Fahs (In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 35 (9th 3 Cir. BAP 2011)). Hujazi has not offered any reasoned argument 4 why it was an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to 5 interpret the sale order in the manner it did, nor are we aware 6 of any such argument. In sum, we hold that the bankruptcy court 7 did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the backup sale 8 to Win Win was in compliance with the sale order. 9 3. Denial of Additional Time for Discovery 10 Hujazi also argues on appeal that the bankruptcy court 11 should have extended the reconsideration motion proceedings to 12 permit additional time for discovery. Hujazi never filed a 13 motion requesting an extension of time; however, the bankruptcy 14 court apparently denied Hujazi’s oral request for more time at 15 the February 2015 post-remand status conference. 16 In order to determine whether bankruptcy courts have abused 17 their discretion in denying requests for more time to conduct 18 discovery, we typically look at all relevant facts and usually 19 focus on the following four considerations: (1) whether lack of 20 diligence necessitated the request; (2) whether the continuance, 21 if granted, would have satisfied the stated need for the 22 continuance; (3) the impact of the continuance on the court and 23 the adverse parties and (4) whether the requesting party was 24 prejudiced by the denial. In re La Sierra Fin. Serv., Inc., [25] 290 B.R. at 726 ; see also United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954 , 26 956 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, [27] 791 F.2d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1985). 28 However, we need not look at those factors in order to [14] 1 uphold the bankruptcy court’s denial here. We cannot and will 2 not disturb a denial of a continuance sought for purposes of 3 discovery unless the appellant has made the “‘clearest showing’ 4 of actual and substantial prejudice.” Martel v. County of Los 5 Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 6 Under Martel, Hujazi’s speculation that, if she had been 7 given additional time to take some unspecified discovery, she 8 might have uncovered some evidence tending to support her 9 unsubstantiated allegations of bad faith is patently insufficient 10 to meet her heavy burden of proof. Id. at 996-97 . Moreover, 11 Hujazi’s lack of diligence by not requesting any discovery on the 12 good faith issue either before or after our remand and her 13 failure to file a written motion requesting a continuance for 14 discovery purposes further bolster our conviction that Hujazi has 15 not made the requisite showing of prejudice.4 [4] 17 Nearly two years elapsed between the entry of the bankruptcy court’s June 2013 sale order and the May 2015 hearing 18 on Hujazi’s motion seeking reconsideration of the good faith issue. During that entire time, Hujazi knew or should have known 19 that the bankruptcy court’s § 363(m) good faith finding was a 20 substantial and likely fatal impediment to her obtaining appellate review of the sale order. Hujazi also has known, since 21 at least August 2013, that the Kravitz-Vista sale never closed and that the backup sale to Win Win took place. And Hujazi 22 further has known, since at least March 2014, that an affiliate of Vista’s – Alex Court LLC – purchased the Alexandria property 23 from Win Win for $6.8 million. Yet there is nothing in the 24 record indicating that Hujazi ever made any effort to propound discovery to flesh out her theory why the post-sale-order events 25 evidenced bad faith. There are a number of procedures that Hujazi potentially could have employed at various times between 26 March 2014 and May 2015 to collect evidence regarding the good faith issue. See, e.g., Rules 2004, 7027, 9014(c). We express [27] no opinion as to which of these discovery devices Hujazi 28 appropriately could have utilized. It suffices for us to say (continued...) [15] 1 Consequently, there is no ground to reverse the bankruptcy 2 court’s denial of Hujazi’s oral request for additional time to 3 conduct discovery. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 6 bankruptcy court’s post-remand good faith finding was not clearly 7 erroneous, and we AFFIRM its order denying Hujazi’s post-remand 8 motion for relief or reconsideration. [4] (...continued) 28 that Hujazi attempted none of them.