United States v. Jerrol Bluford

PER CURIAM: * Jerrol Bluford pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and to two counts of using and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). He was sentenced to a total of 552 months of imprisonment. Bluford contends that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea to, and sentencing him for, the § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) offenses. He asserts that his § 1951(a) offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c) because they lack the necessary level of force for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(A), and § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Bluford maintains that the factual basis in support of his guilty plea to the § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) offenses, which relied on the § 1951(a) robberies as the predicate crimes of violence, is legally insufficient. Applying United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 672-79 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert, filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259), in which we rejected a Johnson-based challenge to the substantively identical 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), we recently held that Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B). United States v. Davis, No. 16-10330, 677 Fed.Appx. 933, 936, 2017 WL 436037, *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 81, 2017) (unpublished). 1 Therefore, Bluford’s claim is foreclosed. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lynch v. Dimaya, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 31, 195 L.Ed.2d 902 (2016), regarding whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson, we are bound by our own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme *427 Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [*] Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. [1] While unpublished opinions are not prece-dential, they are persuasive. See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that unpublished decisions issued after January 1, 1996, are not controlling precedent but may be considered persuasive authority).