Carlos D. Staten v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 19 2017, 10:43 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK Indiana Supreme Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals and Tax Court collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Randy M. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill Chandra K. Hein Fort Wayne, Indiana Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carlos D. Staten, April 19, 2017

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A03-1611-CR-2612

v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 02D06-1605-F2-11

Bradford, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1611-CR-2612 | April 19, 2017 Page 1 of 7

Case Summary [1] Appellant-Defendant Carlos D. Staten and Danette Sanchez began dating in

2014 and had one child together, but by April of 2016 were no longer in a

relationship. On the morning of April 10, 2016, Sanchez was in her home

when Staten entered, locked the door, and confronted her about talking to

somebody on her telephone. Staten punched Sanchez in the face with his fist

several times, eventually knocking her to the ground, and continued to punch

her as he sat on her back. Staten also punched Sanchez seven to ten times in

the face as he sat on her chest and pinned her arms down with his knees. At

some point, Staten kicked Sanchez in the face, breaking one of her teeth.

Sanchez eventually shot a gun in Staten’s direction, causing him to flee. [2] Following a jury trial, Staten was found guilty of several charges and eventually

sentenced for Level 5 felony battery and for being a habitual offender. Staten

contends that Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) failed to

produce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction or to rebut his claim of self-

defense. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Staten and Sanchez began dating in 2014 and had one child together, but by

April of 2016 were no longer involved. On April 10, 2016, at approximately

10:40 a.m., Sanchez was allowing her car to warm up outside her Fort Wayne

home when Staten came from the rear of the home, locked the front door, and

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said, “[b]****, let me see your phone. I know you’re talking to somebody.” Tr.

p. 62. When Sanchez told Staten that she was “not about to do this with him

right now[,]” he jumped on her and began to hit her in the face with his fist. Tr.

p. 62. Staten punched Sanchez in the face “[t]oo many [times] to count[,]” and

when she was knocked to the ground, sat on her back while examining her

telephone and continuing to punch her. Tr. p. 63. [4] Apparently after seeing a picture sent to Sanchez by a male friend, Staten told

her to get up and then “body slam[med]” her on her son’s swing. Tr. p. 64.

Sanchez was now on her back, and Staten sat on her chest, held her arms down

with his knees, and continued to punch her in the face seven to ten times.

Staten told Sanchez to crawl into the bedroom, and, when she began to crawl

on her hands and knees, kicked her back down to the floor. Sanchez “kind of

like army crawled” into the bedroom. Tr. p. 65. When Sanchez asked Staten

to stop and told him that she loved him, he said that she did not love him,

grabbed her by the hair, and kicked her in the mouth, breaking off more than

half of one tooth. Staten briefly left the bedroom, giving Sanchez the

opportunity to retrieve a gun that was under the pillows. When Staten

returned, Sanchez fired once in Staten’s direction, and he fled. Sanchez

sustained a quarter-inch laceration on her lower lip that did not heal for a

month; was unable to see out of her right eye for several weeks; and had bruises

on her arms, ears, and head. Staten kicked out one of Sanchez’s front teeth,

which could not be fixed at the hospital. Staten’s beating of Sanchez caused her

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pain of between eight and nine on a scale from one to ten, with ten being the

highest. [5] On May 10, 2016, the State charged Staten with Level 2 felony burglary, Level

3 felony criminal confinement, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony domestic

battery, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor interference

with the reporting of a crime. On June 15, 2016, the State amended the

charging information to include a habitual offender enhancement. On

September 19, 2016, the State dismissed the burglary charge. On October 5,

2016, following jury trial, the jury found Staten guilty of battery, domestic

battery, and intimidation and found him to be a habitual offender. On

November 4, 2016, the trial court sentenced Staten to five years of

incarceration, with two suspended to probation, and enhanced his sentence by

six years due to his habitual offender status. The trial court vacated Staten’s

convictions for domestic battery and intimidation.

Discussion and Decision I. Sufficiency of the Evidence [6] Staten contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction for Level 5 felony battery. When reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, we neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility.

Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995). We look only to the evidence

of probative value and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which

support the verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1611-CR-2612 | April 19, 2017 Page 4 of 7

value from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant

was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v.

State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993). [7] In order to convict Staten of Level 5 felony battery on Sanchez, the State was

required to establish that he “knowingly or intentionally … touche[d her] in a

rude, insolent, or angry manner [when t]he offense results in serious bodily

injury” to Sanchez. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c), -1(g)(1). In challenging his

conviction, Staten argues that the central evidence presented at trial was

unreliable and insufficient to support his convictions. [8] Staten points to many alleged inconsistencies in Sanchez’s testimony and

suggests several other possible scenarios that he claims are consistent with the

physical evidence. Sanchez testified unequivocally that Staten was the person

who caused her rather extensive injuries by beating her with his fist and kicking

her. The jury was entitled to credit Sanchez’s testimony, and it did so. It is

well-settled that a criminal conviction may rest upon the testimony of a single

witness, even if uncorroborated. See, e.g., Slaughter v. State, 531 N.E.2d 185, 186

(Ind. 1988) (“A conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony

of a single witness.”). Staten’s argument is nothing more than an invitation to

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

II. Self-Defense [9] Staten also argues that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his claim of self-

defense. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise

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criminal act. Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997). The defense is

defined in Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(c): “A person is justified in using

reasonable force against another person to protect the person or a third person

from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful

force.” [10] When a person raises a claim of self-defense, he is required to show three facts:

(1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and

(3) he had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm. Wallace v. State,

725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). Once a person claims self-defense, the State

bears the burden of disproving at least one of these elements beyond a

reasonable doubt. Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),

trans. denied. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly,

by affirmatively showing the person did not act in self-defense, or by relying

upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the State has met its

burden is a question of fact for the factfinder. Id. The trier of fact is not

precluded from finding that a person used unreasonable force simply because

the victim was the initial aggressor. Birdsong, 685 N.E.2d at 45. [11] If a person is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if

no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State

beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ind. 2002).

The standard on appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to

rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of

the evidence claim. Id. at 801. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the

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credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to

support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. [12] Staten suggests that the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that

Sanchez pulled her gun on him at the beginning of the altercation and that any

injuries he inflicted upon her were in self-defense. We disagree, to say the least.

As mentioned, the jury was entitled to believe Sanchez’s testimony that Staten

was the initial aggressor, and it did. As with Staten’s previous argument, this

claim is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will

not do. [13] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.

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