Billie K. Hoots v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any May 25 2017, 9:42 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Victoria L. Bailey Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Lyubov Gore Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Billie K. Hoots, May 25, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A04-1611-CR-2539 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Clayton A. Appellee-Plaintiff. Graham, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G07-1609-CM-37942

Bailey, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1611-CR-2539 | May 25, 2017 Page 1 of 6

Case Summary [1] Billie K. Hoots (“Hoots”) appeals his conviction for Public Intoxication, as a

Class B misdemeanor,1 raising for our review the sole issue of whether there

was sufficient evidence of intoxication to sustain the conviction. [2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On September 26, 2016, at around 3 a.m., Megan Ridley (“Ridley”) was

leaving her job as an emergency department nurse at Eskenazi Hospital in

Indianapolis. Earlier that night, Ridley had been the nurse who performed an

initial check-in of Hoots into the emergency department at the hospital. [4] As Ridley got into her car, she saw Hoots walking nearby in the parking lot, but

lost sight of him. Soon thereafter, Ridley heard her car’s rear driver-side door

open, and saw Hoots standing outside her car. Frightened, Ridley accelerated

her car and pulled away from the parking space. [5] Ridley called Deputy Tony Matthews (“Deputy Matthews”), a member of the

security force at Eskenazi Hospital. Deputy Matthews went to the location

Ridley specified in her call and found Hoots standing in the parking lot.

1 Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1611-CR-2539 | May 25, 2017 Page 2 of 6 [6] Hoots did not alert to Deputy Matthews’s approach until he tapped Hoots on

the shoulder. Deputy Matthews asked Hoots to consent to a pat-down search,

and Hoots agreed to the search. Deputy Matthews handcuffed Hoots and

performed a search. Soon after this, other security officers arrived, including

Deputy Zachary Dodson (“Deputy Dodson”), who issued Miranda advisements

to Hoots. Hoots indicated that he understood his rights, and, in response to

questions from the officers, stated that he had been a patient at the hospital but

was discharged, and had consumed too much methamphetamine. Hoots was

then arrested. [7] On September 26, 2016, the State charged Hoots with Unauthorized Entry into

a Vehicle and Public Intoxication, each as Class B misdemeanors. [8] On November 3, 2016, a jury trial was conducted. Upon Hoots’s motion, the

trial court entered a directed verdict in Hoots’s favor on the charge of

Unauthorized Entry of a Motor Vehicle.2 The jury subsequently found Hoots

guilty of Public Intoxication. Hoots was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment,

with ninety days suspended to probation. [9] This appeal ensued.

2 I.C. § 35-43-4-2.7(d).

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Discussion and Decision [10] Hoots’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence of

intoxication to sustain his conviction. Our standard of review for such

challenges is well settled:

This court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id. at 1028–29.

Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). [11] To convict Hoots of Public Intoxication, as charged, the State was required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoots was in a public place or place of

public resort in a state of intoxication caused by Hoots’s use of a controlled

substance, namely, methamphetamine, and that Hoot’s conduct was harassing,

annoying, or alarming to Ridley. See I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4); App’x Vol. 2 at 18.

Hoots contends that there was insufficient evidence of his intoxication based

upon the nature of the testimony offered by Deputies Matthews and Dodson.

In the absence of appropriate testimony or other evidence establishing

intoxication, Hoots argues, the only other evidence of his intoxication was his

own nonjudicial post-Miranda admission of methamphetamine use, which was

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insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under the doctrine of corpus

delecti. [12] Concerning Deputies Matthews’s and Dodson’s testimonies as insufficient to

sustain the conviction, Hoots argues that the record is “devoid of any evidence

regarding Hoots’s reflexes” or “impaired attention”; that there was no evidence

that Hoots had “watery or bloodshot eyes,” smelled of methamphetamine, or

had failed a field sobriety test. (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) However, it is sufficient

that an officer testifies that it was his opinion “that, based upon his training and

experience,” a defendant was intoxicated. Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135,

142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “The State need not present separate proof of

impairment of action, impairment of thought, and loss of control of faculties to

establish an individual’s intoxication.” Id. Rather, the defendant’s condition is

to be considered “as a whole,” and impairment of any one of the foregoing

abilities is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. [13] Here, Deputy Matthews testified that when he encountered Hoots, Hoots “was

just kind of standing there in almost a daze.” (Tr. at 74.) Deputy Matthews

acknowledged that Hoots was compliant with instructions and indicated that he

understood his Miranda rights, but, when Deputy Matthews asked Hoots why

he was in a parking lot instead of waiting at the Emergency Room entrance for

his ride, Hoots stated that “he couldn’t really remember.” (Tr. at 77.) Deputy

Matthews further testified on cross-examination that he had both training and

experience in identifying intoxicated persons, that Hoots’s “actions were out-of-

sorts,” and that Hoots “showed a level of impairment as well.” (Tr. at 118.)

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1611-CR-2539 | May 25, 2017 Page 5 of 6 [14] Deputy Dodson offered similar testimony. He characterized Hoots’s demeanor

as “kind of scared, manic,” and stated that “I could just tell from [Hoots’s]

behavior, from training and experience or other situations I’ve dealt with, I

believed it was something to do with … some kind of amphetamine, how he

was acting.” (Tr. at 139.) Deputy Dodson further testified that Hoots “kept

apologizing, saying he was sorry” and asking that they not arrest him “because

he wouldn’t see his son again.” (Tr. at 140.) [15] Hoots draws our attention to the lack of an expert-introduced list of signs of

methamphetamine intoxication. Our case law already addresses the need for

such specific information, and has held that it is not necessary. See Woodson,

966 N.E.2d at 142 (stating that a non-expert’s training and experience is

sufficient to establish evidence of intoxication). The testimony offered by

Deputies Matthews and Dodson was thus sufficient to establish that Hoots was

intoxicated.3 Taken together with Hoots’s post-Miranda-advisement statement

that he had consumed methamphetamine, there was sufficient evidence to

sustain the conviction. [16] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.

3 Because we conclude there was evidence other than Hoots’s own extrajudicial statement, the doctrine of corpus delecti is inapposite here.

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