Rockville Housing Enterprises v. Deborah Redman

*767 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, Deborah Redman appeals various district court orders in two related cases, No. 16-1559 (“Redman I”) and No. 16-1790 (“Redman II’). In Redman I, Redman removed a state court eviction action to the district court, and the district court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Red-man II, Redman filed a separate complaint against her landlord and related entities. Redman failed to pay the filing fee after the district court denied her requests to proceed in forma pauperis. Although the district court stated that it would dismiss her case if she failed to pay the filing fee, the case is still pending. In Redman I, Redman appeals the district court’s orders remanding this removed action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying her motion for reconsideration. “[A] district court may remand a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time, and such an order is not reviewable.” Doe v. Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), (d) (2012). In Redman I, the district court remanded the case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that the state court complaint did not present a federal question, and denied Redman’s motion for reconsideration for the same reason. Because the district court remanded Redman’s removed action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders. Blair, 819 F.3d at 66-67. Accordingly, we deny Redman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. In Redman II, Redman appeals the district court’s orders denying her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and denying her motions for reconsideration and for entry of default. Redman also questions whether the district court judge should have re-cused himself, argues that the district court erred in removing the City of Rock-ville as a party, and requests that we enter judgment in her favor. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory, and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Redman II is still pending in the district court. Therefore, none of the orders Redman appeals is a final order, and this court has jurisdiction to review the orders only if they are ap-pealable interlocutory or collateral orders. Orders denying motions for entry of default, orders denying motions for recusal, and orders dismissing fewer than all of the parties are not final orders or appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. Gallant v. Deutsche Bank, 403 Fed.Appx. 871, 871-72 (4th Cir. 2010) (entry of default); Robinson v. Parke-Davis & Co., 685 F.2d 912, 913 (4th Cir. 1982) (fewer than all parties); In re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 1976) (recusal). Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s rulings, and we dismiss this portion of the appeal in Redman II. An order denying “a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable [interlocutory] order.” Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845, 70 S.Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed. 1326 (1950). We review an order denying a motion to proceed in forma pau-peris for abuse of discretion. Dillard v. *768 Liberty Loan Corp., 626 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1980). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Redman’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, although we grant Redman’s motion to proceed in form^ pau-peris in this court, we affirm the district court’s order. Finally, in Redman I and Redman II, we grant Redman’s motions to exceed length limitations and to fíle a supplemental brief. We deny Redman’s motion to appoint counsel and deny as moot he}* motion for partial summary disposition. We deny Redman’s motions for emergency injunction pending appeal and for emergency relief from illegal eviction becausp she did hot first present the motions to the district court and did not allege that it would have been impracticable to do so. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(i). With regard to Redman’s request that we enter judgment in her favor, that argument is a new argument on appeal not properly before this court. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. No. 16-1559 DISMISSED No. 16-1790 AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART