J-S23045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : HUGO ALBERTO CABRERA : No. 2506 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order July 29, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-15-CR-0002140-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”) appeals from the Order granting a new trial to Hugo Alberto Cabrera (“Cabrera”). We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court thoroughly set forth the relevant factual and procedural background, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/16, at 1-11.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised a claim based on Birchfield v. North Dakota,[1] and committed an error of law in awarding [Cabrera] a new trial, as Birchfield [] does not apply retroactively to [Cabrera’s] case, as the issue was not properly preserved by [Cabrera]?
Brief for the Commonwealth at 4 (capitalization omitted, footnote added).
1 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
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The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred by raising, sua sponte, a Birchfield issue, and granting Cabrera a new trial. Id. at 19. The Commonwealth asserts that Cabrera waived any Birchfield issue, as he failed to raise the issue at or before trial. Id. at 20; see also id. at 23 (citing Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d 146 (Pa. 1983)). The Commonwealth argues that a suppression claim not raised prior to trial is waived, and cannot be raised for the first time in an oral motion for extraordinary relief at sentencing. Brief for the Commonwealth at 24. The Commonwealth claims that Cabrera’s reliance on Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B)2 is misplaced, as “[t]his provision is primarily concerned with newly discovered and undiscoverable evidence; and not changes in the law.” Brief for the Commonwealth at 29. The Commonwealth contends that Rule 581(B) “is a pre[]trial rule” which “does not permit a suppression motion to be litigated post-trial.” Id. The Commonwealth asserts that “Birchfield [] does not apply where a defendant has been convicted[,] and did not raise a Birchfield claim; irrespective if the defendant has been sentenced.” Id. at 32. The Commonwealth claims that “Birchfield does not fall within the category of non-waivable claims, as any suppression issue, even those of a
2 Rule 581 concerns the suppression of evidence, and subsection 581(B) provides that “[u]nless the opportunity did not previously exist, or the interests of justice otherwise require, such motion shall be made only after a case has been returned to court and shall be contained in the omnibus pretrial motion set forth in Rule 578. If timely motion is not made hereunder, the issue of suppression of such evidence shall be deemed to be waived.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B).
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constitutional dimension, can be waived if not raised and preserved at all stages of the adjudication[,] up to and including the direct appeal.” Id. at 37-38. The Commonwealth points to federal law, and argues that “for a new rule of constitutional law; retroactivity is accorded only to rules deemed substantive in character ….” Id. at 38 (citing Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989)). The Commonwealth contends that “[t]he Birchfield decision is not substantive, since it does not prohibit punishment for a class of offenders[,] nor does it decriminalize conduct.” Id. at 39.3
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed the Commonwealth’s issue, set forth the relevant law, and determined that the court had properly (1) granted Cabrera’s Motion for extraordinary relief; (2) vacated the verdict at Count I of the Information, driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(1)(iii); and (3) granted Cabrera a new trial as to that charge. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/16, at 11-21. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 331 (Pa. Super. 2016) (vacating the judgment of sentence, and remanding for a
3 The Commonwealth also contends that trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not anticipating the Birchfield decision. Brief for the Commonwealth at 41. However, as this issue was not raised in the Commonwealth’s Statement of Questions Presented, we decline to address it. See Pa.R.A.P 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”).
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re-evaluation of the appellant’s purported consent, where the appellant only consented to the warrantless blood draw after being informed, by the police, that his refusal to submit to the test could result in enhanced criminal penalties, in violation of Birchfield).
Order affirmed.
Judge Olson and Judge Solano join the memorandum.
Judge Olson files a concurring memorandum in which Judge Musmanno joins. Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/30/2017
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Circulated 05/17/2017 11 :43 AJ s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
vs. : CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
HUGO ALBERTO CABRERA : NO. 15-CR-0002140-20',l.5 ... ---~)
: CRIMINAL ACTIQ.N.;;.:._LJ.WV . l \ .
Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Esquire, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and • Cynthia B. Morgan, Esquire, for the Commonwealth .... ,·\. ·. • • I_ Ellen B. Koopman, Esquire, for the Defendant
OPINION SUR RULE 1 9 2 5 Ca) ;---·<,,'.
Before this Honorable reviewing Court is the Commonwealth's timel appeal from our grant of an oral motion for extraordinary relief made by the Defendant o the record, in open court, during his sentencing hearing. Defendant's sentencing hearin was held on July 29, 2016. Defense counsel made an oral motion for extraordinary reli f at sentencing based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Birchfield . North Dekote, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (U.S. N.D. June 23, 2016). We granted Defendant's or J motion for extraordinary relief on July 29, 2016, vacating Defendant's conviction for violating 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i), -(iii) (Count I) and awarding a new trial as to th~t charge. The Commonwealth filed its Notice of Appeal on August 5, 2016, pursuant to P R.A.P. 311 (a)(6), which provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken as of right and witho t reference to Pa. R.A.P. 341 (c) from: . . . (6) New trials.- An order . . . in a crimin I proceeding awarding a new trial where the ... Commonwealth claims that the trial cou committed an error of law.". Pa. R.A.P. 311 (a)(6). The Commonwealth's Appeal i timely, see Pa. R.A.P. 902 ("An appeal permitted by law as of right from a lower court t an appellate court shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the low r court within the time allowed by Rule 903 (time for appeal)."); Pa. R.A.P. 903(a)("Exce t *2 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manne\r of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which th appeal is taken."), and authorized by the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A. . 311(a)(6), and thus is properly before this Honorable reviewing Court.
· The operative facts underlying the present appeal are as follows. o,j August 24, 2016 the Commonwealth filed an Information charging Defendant with oni
count of Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled .Substance, 75 Pa. C.S.A. f 3802(d)(1)(i), -(iii), -(2) (Count I); one count of Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic, 7,
Pa. C.S.A. § 3309(1) (Count II): one count of Careless Driving, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3714( (Count 111), and one count of Drivers Required to Be Licensed, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1501 (a (Count IV). The charges stemmed from a motor vehicle stop that occurred within the confines of Chester County, Pennsylvania on March 27, 2015. (Suppression Transcrip , 3/28/16, N.T. 9-10, 14-18).
As a result of that stop, Defendant was arrested and transported by police to the hospital. (Suppression Transcript, 3/28/16, N.T. 23). At the hospital, the policr read to the Defendant PennDOT's standard Form DL-26. (Suppression Transcript 3/28/16, N.T. 23). Form DL-26, at least as in use on March 27, 2015, advised Defenda t that, in the event he were to be convicted of violating 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), h would face more severe civil and criminei penalties if he refused to consent to th administration of a blood test. (See 3/28/16, Ex. C-1). The arresting officer testified th t the Defendant signed the Form DL-26 after the officer read it to him (3/28/16, Ex. C-1; *3 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx Suppression Transcript, 3/28/16, N.T. 23-24).1 The blood test results yielded thr presence of 16 nanograms of Delta-9-THC, a marijuana constituent, and 99 nanogram of 9-Carboxy-THC, a marijuana metabolite, per milliliter of Defendant's blood. (Se 3/28/16, Ex. C-3, Stipulation).
Armed with the results of Defendant's blood test, the Commonwealth filed its Information against Defendant· charging him with the aforementioned offense Defense counsel filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on February 17, 2016. In h, 1. Motion, defense counsel challenged the admissibility of the evidence _obtained from thj Defendant on the basis that the officer did not have the requisite quantum of causet.. needed to effectuate the traffic stop and on the basis that the officer exceeded hi jurisdiction under the MPJA when he stopped the Defendant. Defense counsel did not argue that the blood draw directly violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment/Article I, Section 8 rights.
We held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence on March 28, 2016. At the close Of this hearing, following a brief period foi deliberation, we denied Defendant's Motion, placing our Findings of Fact anI
Conclusions of Law on the record in open court. We also issued a formal written Orde:r memorializing this denial on March 28, 2016.
Following our resolution of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, the
1 The Defendant's signature on the Form DL-26 appears to read "H Sagastegui". This is the same name as that whic appears on the "Acknowledgement of Notice of Presentment of Information to the Court of Common Pleas an Waiver of Arraignment" appended to the front of the Information which Defendant and his counsel signed on Jun 17, 2015. We are not certain of the origin of the surname "Sagastegui" but it appears to have been used with sorn consistency by the Defendant in this matter.
s:\ad m in\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appea I 192Sa.docx parties proceeded to a stipulated-fact non-jury trial before the undersigned. Immediate! prior to the trial, the Commonwealth withdrew Count Ill of the Information, chargin, Careless Driving under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3714(a). The Stipulation that formed the basir for the stipulated-fact nan-jury trial was admitted as Commonwealth's Exhibit C- . (3/28/16, Ex. C-3).
On the basis of those stipulations, which included the data concerning the results of Defendant's blood test, we issued a Verdict on April 1, 2016 convicting Defendant of Count I, charqlnq Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Co~trollet Substance, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(1 )(iii), both of which section require introduction of chemical test results (in this case, a blood test), and acquitte Defendant of Count I, charging Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), the "general impairment" section relating t, driving under the influence of a controlled substance only. We also acquitted Defenda t of Count II, Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3309(1) but convicted him of violating 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1501 (a), Drivers Required to Be Licensed (Count IV. Our Verdict with respect to these latter two (2) charges is not at issue in this appeal.
As part of our April 1, 2016 Verdict, we directed the Court Administrator t schedule Defendant for sentencing at _a date and time consistent with the customal business of the Court. On June 10, 2016, upon defense motion, Defendant's sentencin was continued ta allow Defendant to file an application for the Countis lntermediat Punishment Plan (hereinafter, "JPP11) program. Defendant was approved for JPP on Jun. 20, 2016. We reconvened on July 29, 2016 for Defendant's sentencing. *5 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx
Between the date of the Verdict and the date of Defendant's sentencinl hearing, between in fact the date of the Defendant's approval for IPP and the date of
sentencing, the United States Supreme Court on June 23, 2016 issued the Birchfield J1 Norlh Dakota decision. See Birchfield v. Norlh Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (U.S. N.D. Jun
23, 2016). The Birchfield, supra decision involved appeals by three (3) DUI defendant . Id. The first defendant, Danny Birchfield, refused to consent to a blood test after belnd advised by the arresting officer that refusing to submit to the blood test could lead ti criminal punishment. Id. Mr. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor violation of hi
State's refusal statute and entered a conditional guilty plea. Id. On appeal he argue I that the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal to submit to the test. I~.
The State.Courts did not accept his argument, but the United States Supreme Court di,. Id. The United States Supreme Court stated the Fourth Ameridment prohibii criminalizing refusals to consent to blood tests. Id. The second defendant, Willia! Robert Bernard, Jr., refused to take a breath test after being advised by the arrestinf officer that his refusal would be considered a crime under Minnesota law.2 Id. The · United States Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment permits a State t, compel warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Id. Finally, the thir defendant, Steven Michael Beylund, agreed to have his blood drawn after being advise that a refusal to do so would constitute a crime under North Dakota law. Id. After th blood test yielded a result of 0.250%, more than three (3) times the State's legal limi , administrative proceedings were initiated that resulted in defendant Beylund's driver'
2 The cases involving the first and third defendants In Birchfield, supra, arose in North Dakota, while Mr. Bernard case arose in Minnesota. Birchfield, supra. The three cases were consolidated for argument before the Unite States Supreme Court. Id.
s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx license being suspended for two (2) years. Id. The defendant appealed th administrative suspension. Id. The North Dakota District Court rejected defenda1t Beylund's claim that his consent to the blood draw was coerced and involuntary due tb the fact that the arresting officer advised him that refusal would constitute a crime. ,,.
Relying on what was then its own, pre-United States Supreme Court. decision iI Birchfield, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination tha
defendant Beylund's consent was voluntary. Id. The United States Supreme Couj however, did not agree. Id. Holding that the North Dakota Supreme Court erroneous! assumed that the State could permissibly compel both blood and breath tests, the Unite, States Supreme Court remanded defendant Beylund's case to the North Dakota Stat Courts to determine whether defendant Beylund's consent to the administration of th blood test was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances given the "parti I inaccuracy of the officer's advisory." Id.
In the weeks following the United States Supreme Court June 23, pronouncement in Birchfield, supra, the Commonwealth allowed every as-yet un
sentenced defendant who had previously tendered an open plea to violations of the pj( se provisions of§ 3802 of the Motor Vehicle Code, those provisions that require chemic,'.
testing to establish the violation, to re-plead to the applicable "general impairmen ' provisions that do not require any chemical test results. (Sentencing Hearing, 7/29/1 , N.T. 4-5). As we stated earlier, we had already acquitted Defendant of the applicabl
"general impairment" charge levied here, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Principles I Double Jeopardy would thus prevent this Court from convicting Defendant of violating 7
Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2) for the incident forming the basis of the above-captioned matte , *7 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx
see 18 Pa. C.S.A. _§ 109(1); thus, the option of vacating Defendant's conviction on Cou1 I for violating 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i), -(iii) and substituting a conviction for or pie
to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2) was not available to the Commonwealth here, and, f Defendant's conviction under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i), -(iii) were to be removed, th. Commonwealth would .have no recourse to penalize the Defendant for his intoxicate, driving and would be relegated to punishing Defendant, if at all, for his summary violatior
of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1501(a} only. I At Defendant's sentencing hearing on July 29, 2016, which followed, as wr
just mentioned, a string of cases re-pleaded, as we indicated, to. accommodate th concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court's Birchfield, supra, decision, th following exchange occurred.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: This is, well, it's Hugo Cabrera, term number 2140 of 2015. This was a suppression into a stipulated fact trial, your Honor.
THE COURT: Right.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: There was a DL-26 involved in the blood draw, though that was not admitted into evidence because it was stipulated that it was a consensual blood draw. Your Honor found him-
THE COURT: Is he present?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor, he's seated.
THE COURT: He should have a seat next to counsel.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor found him -
THE COURT: I found him not guilty under 3802(d)(1)(1) and - I'm sorry. I found him guilty of 3802(d)(1 )(i) and 3802(d)(1)(iii), not guilty of 3802(d)(2).
s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx
[THE PROSECUTOR]: That's correct.
THE COURT: Not guilty of driving on roadways laned for traffic. Careless driving was withdrawn. And drivers required to be licensed, I found him guilty.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct.
Tl-IE COURT: And does the U.S. Supreme Court decision impact this or. not?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: My position is it does not. I know [defense counsel] is going to argue that it does.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor. I would make a motion right now for extraordinary relief, asking to vacate at least the conviction as it pertains to Count One, since it was premised upon what we now know is the illegally seized blood draw evidence.
Certainly at the time of litigation, I was unaware that this was an appropriate challenge to make. However, while the case is still pending, the law has changed significantly. And because the case is still pending, l think it is appropriate for me to make this request at this time and proceed to challenge the blood.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I would argue the opposite. He has been convicted by your Honor. · He was convicted upon a blood draw that was stipulated to be consensual at the time. The Commonwealth v. Birchfield-
THE COURT: We have to operate in good faith here.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Of course, your Honor.
THE COURT: This was under paragraph four, the defendant in the stipulated fact trial, the defendant did consent to testing of his blood. But that was pursuant, I'm sure, to the reading of the DL-26 form even though it's not contained in there, I mean.
(Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 2-4)(emphasis added). *9 s:\adrnln\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx
The Commonwealth objected to Defendant's oral Motion. (Suppressio Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 4). The Commonwealth stated,
[THE PROSECUTOR]: If I could, your Honor, I think I can clarify this. The reason that we have been allowing for defendants who have pied open and have not been sentenced, we have been allowing them to essentially withdraw their guilty pleas. And then we have been repleading them to 3802(a)(1) or 3802(d)(2). The reason we have been allowing that is because after a guilty plea, but prior to sentencing, the defense can ask for withdrawal of a guilty plea for really any reason and the Court will grant it, so long as it does not prejudice the Commonwealth. This is a very different situation. Your Honor found at the time that the defendant, that we proved sufficiently beyond· a reasonable doubt that he had marijuana in his system under 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(iii).
THE COURT: I guess the question becomes is Birchfield applicable here?
[THE PR.OSECUTOR]: It's not, your Honor, because it's not retroactive. The issue is not preserved for appeal. understand, of course, why [defense counsel] wasn't going to make that argument at the time because she didn't know that would be a viable argument. lt would have been seen, quite frankly, as a frivolous argument to make. And I understand that. But if your Honor were to vacate this conviction, every single other person that has ever pied or been convicted and sentenced pursuant to a DL-26 -
THE COURT: He hasn't been sentenced. That's the difference.
[THE PROSECUTOR}: But he has been convicted. That's very different than an open guilty plea.
(Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 4-6).
The Commonwealth contended that Defendant had failed to preserve the Fourth Amendment issue pre-trial and consequently, his issue was waived und r Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d 146 (Pa.. 1983), which the Commonwealth cited for *10 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx the proposition that new rules do not apply retroactively unless the issue concerning thj rule has been preserved at all stages in the litigation up to and including direct appea. (Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7 /29/16, N.T. 6-8). They also contended that they di, not realize that Birchfield, supra would be an issue in Defendant's case "until your Hon r brought it up this morning[.]" (Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 7). In othjr words, they contended that we improperly raised a defense on behalf of a party su sponte by asking both counsel on the· record at the sentencing hearing whethe Birchfield, supra had an impact on Defendant's case.
Ultimately, we granted Defendant's oral Motion for Extraordinary Relief on July 29, 2016 pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(8). We vacater Defendant's verdict at Count I of the Information, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i) and§ 3802(d)(1)(iii) and grante, Defendant a new trial as to that charge. As we stated on the record,
Under the Rule 70_4, it mentions the remedy of one of these being a new trial. So in my humble opinion, the use of the blood test can then be determined at a subsequent suppression hearing.
(Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 13)(emphasis added). It was our intentio1 with respect to Count I of the Information, to put the parties back in the same positior they enjoyed prior to the stipulated fact trial so that the issue concerning the applicabilitr of Birchfield, supra to Defendant's compelled blood test and the validity of his waiver f his constitutional rights could be litigated properly. (Sentencing Hearinq Transcrip , . 7/29/16, N.T. 10, 13). · *11 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx
The Commonwealth filed its Notice of Appeal on August 5, 2016. By Orde dated August 5, 2016, we directed the Commonwealth to file within twenty-one (21) day The Commonwealth timely complied, complaining that we erred by granting Defendant'! oral motion for extraordinary relief because Defendant had failed to preserve his Birchfield claim prior to or during trial and because this Court allegedly improperly raiser the Birchfield issue sue sponte. Having reviewed the relevant constitutional, statutorr and decisional law, we are now prepared to make the following recommendatiom regarding the merits of the Commonwealth's appeal.
In support of its first issue, the preservation issue, the Commonwealth cite! Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d 146 (Pa. 1983) for the proposition that where a appellate decision overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the decisio specifically declares the ruling to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages If adjudication up to and including any direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2r 146 (Pa. 1983). Unquestionably, Cabeza, supra states the proposition for which it har been cited. However, Cabeza, supra, involved the award of a new trial by the appellate court, not an oral mo~ion for extraordinary relief made immediately before sentencind. The holding in Cabe~a. supra, that an issue concerning a new rule of law must b I properly preserved at all stages of litigation in order to obtain relief on direct appeal, mu t be viewed in the context in which it arose, i.e. the perspective of an appellate cour reviewing a direct appeal. Defendant has not even reached the direct appeal stage. Thi context in which the instant case developed involved, as we discussed above, an or *12 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx motion for extraordinary relief immediately prior to sentencing. Such a motion i permitted in delineated circumstances such as occurred in the case sub judic .
Preservation at earlier stages is not required, because, given the nature and scope of al oral motion for extraordinary relief, the issues giving rise to such motion do nJ
necessarily arise prior to or during trial. Preservation of issues raised in oral motions for extraordinary relief is accompflshed, in the event the oral motion is denied, by filing subsequent post-sentence motion. Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa. Supe . 2006), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 954 (Pa. 2007). Indeed, had we denied Defendant's or,! motion, Defendant would likely have filed a post-sentence motion, preserving the issur for purposes of appeal and thus satisfying Cabeza, supra and allowing for direct appeJ of the issue, assuming for purposes of argument that we would have denied Defendant' post-sentence motion. Cabeza, supra did not involve an oral n:1otion for extraordina1 relief and is thus factually and procedurally inapposite. The Commonwealth's reliance or Cabeza, supra is putting the proverbial horse before the cart. In terms of Defendant' oral motion for extraordinary relief, the factual and procedural prerequisites to th undersigned's exercise of discretion under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedur 704(8) were met. The Commonwealth's failure to recognize the differences in th procedural postures of Cabeza, supra and the instant case is a fatal flaw in th , foundation of its argument.
Although it is true that Defendant did not, prior to or during trial, make a direct Fourth Amendment/Article I, Section 8 claim that his blood test results should b suppressed as unconstitutionally compelled and the product of an involuntary waiver *13 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx constitutional rights due to the misinformation the officer gave him concerning thi. applicability of higher criminal penalties were he to refuse, at the time Defenda]1 appeared before the Court to litigate his pre-trial motion challenging the basis for the stol and the admission of evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree, the validity or Pennsylvania's Implied Consent laws was not in question. It was an accepted part or Pennsylvania law that, by driving on the roadways of this Commonwealth, motorists gave up their right to unfettered refusal of any chemical test, including blood tests. Counsel dif not raise this argument because to do so would have been, in this Commonwealt1, considered meritless, even frivolous. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing te raise a frivolous issue. Commonwealth v. Silvis, 452 A.2d 1045. (Pa. Super. 1982). Tht. Birchfield, supra issue did not arise until after Defendant's stipulated fact trial, indeed well after the trial, but a little more than one month before sentencing. Defendant's conviction was not yet final because he had not been sentenced. See Commonwealth ex rel. Holl v. Ashe, 82 A.2d 244 (Pa. 1951), cert. denied, Holly v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvani , 72 S.Ct. 90 (U.S. Pa. 1951)(the judgment in a criminal case is the sentence and not the conviction; final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence). When we convened for sentencing on July 29, 2016, defense counsel raised the Birchfield issue at the earliJ possible moment, by making an oral motion for extraordinary relief.3 Pennsylvania Rul
3 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(8) provides
' (8) Oral Motion for Extraordinary Relief
(1) Under extraordinary circumstances, when the interests of justice require, the trial judge may, before· sentencing, hear an oral motion in arrest of Judgment,for a judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial.
s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx of Criminal Procedure 704(8) expressly contemplates this motion, particularly under circumstances like the one that occurred here, where there has been an interveninf change in case law. See Pa. R.Crim.P. 704(8), Comment ("It would be appropriate fir
counsel to move for extraordinary relief, for example, when there has been a change T case /aw[.]")(emphasis added). Further, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(8!
expressly contemplates the type of relief given here. See Pa. R.Crim.l 704(8)(1 )("Under extraordinary circumstances, when the interests of justice require, thi
trial judge may, before sentencing, hear an oral motion in arrest of judgment, for j judgment of acquittal, or for a new tria/.")(emphasis added). A defendant who makes a 1 oral motion for extraordinary relief and, if denied, follows it with a post-sentence motior
raising the same issue, is considered to have properly preserved his issue for purposer . of direct appeal, and the appellate courts will address the merits of his issue on direT
appeal. Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 91i A.2d 954 (Pa. 2007)(Rule 704 specificauy declares that any motion for extraordinary reliif
must be preserved via post-trial motion). It is, in effect, an alternative method If preserving, when followed by a timely-filed post-sentence motion,4 an issue for appejl
when certain extraordinary circumstances occur. It is a way of affording an avenue fo( (2) The judge shall decide a motion for extraordinary relief before imposing sentence, and shall not delay the sentencing proceeding in order to decide it.
(3) A motion for extraordinary relief shall have no effect on the preservation or waiver of issues for post-sentence consideration on appeal.
Pa. R.Crim.P. 704(8).
4 An oral motion for extraordinary relief, by Itself, does nothing to preserve an issue for appellate review. Pa. R.Crim.P.704(B)(3).
s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx relief to defendants for whom a change in the law cannot be anticipated, and for who
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it pre- or during trial, ser Commonwealth v, Jones, 811 A.2d 994 (Pa. 2002), denial of post-conviction relief atf'd,
858 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2004), denial of post-conviction relief affd, 54 A.3d 14 (Pa. 2012! failing to advance a novel legal theory which has never been accepted by the pertine1t courts) and who would otherwise be unable to obtain appellate review of the issue, evet in a PCRA context, for both of those reasons. Indeed, had we denied Defendant's or,I motion for extraordinary relief, we would have no doubt that defense counsel would havr followed our denial with a timely-filed post-sentence motion I thereby preserving the issur for appellate review. However, we are not at the direct appeal stage. Questions of preservation at this juncture are premature. To right certain wrongs at the earliest tim instead of perpetuating error, to avoid unnecessary proceedings as well as unnecessar appeals, and ultimately, to ensure that Defendant's sentence is valid and not predicate, on incompetent evidence and that his waiver of his constitutional right to bodily integritr was truly knowing, voluntary and intelligent instead of obtained by coercion and/or misrepresentations of the law, we took the earliest opportunity which with we wer presented to place the parties, with respect to the charges of violating 75 Pa. C.S.A.. · 3802(d)(1)(i) and -(d)(1)(iii) in Count I, back into the same positions they enjoyed prior to trial, with the opportunity to present to the Court a suppression motion raising tht
Birchfield issue so that both parties may litigate to the fullest their positions as to itr applicability to and impact upon Defendant's case. Indeed, this is precisely the remedr
the United States Supreme Court ordered with respect to defendant Beylund, wh, *16 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx challenged the validity of his consent to the blood test due to the arresting officer'. warnings concerning the ability of the State to compel his compliance. Birchfield, 13; S.Ct. at 2186-87. As the United States Supreme Court stated,
Because voluntariness of consent to a search must be 'determined from the totality of all the circumstances,' ... we leave it to the state court on remand to reevaluate Beylund's consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer's advisory.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186. We ordered the same remedy as that prescribed by th United States Supreme Court for addressing a defendant's claim that unlawful warnings tainted the validity of the defendant's consent to a blood test. Birchfield, supra. Furthej,
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(8) requires that "[t]he judge . . . decide r motion for extraordinary relief before imposing sentence, and shall not delay thr
sentencing proceeding in order to decide it." Pa. R.Crim.P. 704(8)(2). The need for t quick decision on an oral motion for extraordinary relief, coupled with the fact thjt
evidence de hors the record must be developed in order to get to the bottom of thr underlying issue properly, requires that the sentencing court be given a bit of latitude i
determining whether or not said motion should be granted. It is difficult for a sentencin, I court to examine in the context of an oral motion for extraordinary relief, the consideratio
of which is expressly mandated to not delay sentencing, all of the technical legal nicetie that may impact upon the resolution of the ultimate underlying issue. At all times we ai for fairness. Because there is at least arguable merit to Defendant's motion, because th circumstances that occurred here with the issuance of the Birchfield decision fulfill th requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(8), and because of th fact that the result of our decision placed the parties in the same position they were i *17 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx prior to trial with _the complete ability to litigate the merits of Defendant's Birchfield claiJ to the fullest, we would respectfully submit that our decision to grant Defendant's oril motion for extraordinary relief was proper under Pennsylvania Ruleof Criminal ProcedurT 704(8). Certainly, there is no harm to the Commonwealth here. Of course, they may nJ\ like our decision because, in light of his acquittal on the safe driving charge, they cannJt re-plead him to a lesser offense and, if we determine after the suppression hearing th ,t the Defendant's consent was involuntary, they will lack the evidence necessary to preva I on the crime(s) .as charged. However, as we stated ~efore, we do at all times strive fol fairness, and for decisions, particularly with regard to convictions and sentencing, that arr accurate, viable and right in the eyes of the law. These aims do not conflict with thi.
duties of the prosecution under our Constitution; that is to say, our goals are, or shoul 1 be, compatible in this respect. Finally, in light of the Commonwealth's acquiescence ii
the plea context to.withdrawals of pleas due to Birchfield, supra and the allowance of rj pleading to lesser charges, to reject Defendant's right to judicial review of his BirchfielJ: supra claim is to essentially penalize Defendant for exercising his right to a trial instead of capitulating to the Commonwealth with the tender of a plea. This is neither fair nor just.5
There appears to be very little case law regarding the standard of appellat. review applicable to decisions regarding oral motions for extraordinary relief. Howeve , there is plenty of case law concerning the standard of review for decisions granting a ne trial. "[A] trial court has an 'immemorial right to grant a new trial, whenever, in its opinio ,
5 See also Zack Needles, Pa. Courts Retroactively Applying SCOTUS Blood Test Ruling, Pennsylvania Law Weeki , August 30, 2016, at· 1, 13 (discussing cases ln which three Common Pleas Court Judges from Fayette Count , Jefferson County and Warren-Forest applied Birchfield retroactively to cases pending direct review at the tim Birchfield, supra was issued).
s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 192Sa.docx the justice of a particular case so requires."' Commonwealth v. Dorm, 971 A.2d 128 ,
1288 (Pa. Super. 2009)(citing Commonwealth v. Powell, 590 A.2d 1240, 1242 (P,. 199:)). "[T]he 'interest of jus~ce' is a ~istorically recognized basis.for the award ~f ~ nei
trial. Id. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated'. "[t]he granting of a new trial in thr Interest of justice cannot be arbitrary, but must be supported by the record.' Commonwealth v. Riley, 643 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Pa. Super. 1994). The appellate standar of review regarding an order granting a new trial in the interest of justice is abuse o discretion. Commonwealth v. Dorm, 971 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2009)(citin Commonwealth v. Powell, 590 A.2d 1240, 1243 (Pa. 1991)). An abuse of discretion i not a mere error in judgment, but, rather, involves bias, ill will, manifes unreasonableness, misapplication of the law, partiality, and/or prejudice. Dorm, 971 A.2, at 1288-89 (citing Commonwealth v. Hacker, 959 A.2d 380, 392 (Pa. Super. 2008), rev', on other grounds, 15 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2011)). Our Supreme Court has held that the !er "abuse of discretion" indicates that the appellate court determines that the trial couiI committed an error of law. Powell, 590 A.2d at 1245 n .. 8. Our Supreme Cou_rt furthi
explained that an error of law is a clearly _erroneousconclusion and judgment-one th :t is clearly. against logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of th
application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the fact disclosed upon the hearing; an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of la Powell, 590 A.2d at 1245 n. 8. Given that there is a Pennsylvania Rule of Crimin Procedure that expressly authorizes the actions taken by this Court under the particular circumstances as were presented to this Court and that we have complied to the lette with the requirements of said Rule, it is our position that our granting of Defendant's or *19 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx motion for extraordinary relief and our award of a new trial on Count 1 charging 75 P . C.S.A § 3802(d)(1)(i), -(iii) IJYaS supported by the record and did not constitute an abus of discretion Or an error of law. Accordingly, we would respectfully submit that !hr Commonwealth's allegation that we erred by granting Defendant's oral motion for extraordinary relief has no merit and should, respectfully, be denied and dismissed. · With respect to the Commonwealth's second issue, our alleged iri1propej' raising of a defense sua sponte on behalf of the. opposing party, the Commonwealth' argument is, at best, natve: at worst it is disingenuous. The argument derives from th · following exchange.
THE COURT: I would have appreciated being briefed on this and given some notice if this was the position of everyone.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: We honestly, your Honor, didn't realize until your Honor brought it up this morning that this was going to have a Birchfield effect.
(Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 7). The hollowness Commonwealth's statement is evident from the fact that the effects of the Birchfie/ , supra decision were rippling through the Court on every DUI case involving a blood te t that was litigated throughout that miscellaneous term and we had in fact been discussins Birchfield, supra all week before getting to the Defendant's case on July 29, 2016, will
the Commonwealth, as We stated earlier, allowing every Defendant who tendered ar · open plea to the charge of per se DUI based on blood test results to withdraw his or hi'
plea and tender a plea to the lesser applicable general impairment provisions of section 3802. It is further, and perhaps more tellingly so, evident from the fact that when wj *20 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx convened for Defendant's sentencing hearing on July 29, 2016., the Commonwealtj opened discussion with a recitation of the following facts. ·
[THE PROSECUTOR]: There was a DL-26 involved in the blood draw, though that was not admitted into evidence because it was stipulated that it was a consensual blood draw.
(Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 2). It was in fact the Commonwealth whi brought the Birchfield, supra issue to the forefront of everyone's consciousness lt Defendant's sentencing hearing, not the Court.
The crux of the Commonwealth's chagrin, it seems, is that our questioI 11And does the U.S. Supreme Court decision impact this [sentencing] or not?" (Sentencin,
Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 3), made on the record in open court in the presence J~ both parties after the Commonwealth's recitation of the facts of the case, precipitate!
defense counsel's making an oral motion for extraordinary relief to the Court. (Se Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7/29/16, N.T. 3 [11Yes, your Honor. I would make motion right now for extraordinary relief."]). However, we did not make that motion. W did not suggest to defense counsel that an oral motion for extraordinary relief should b. made. We did not represent or suggest to defense counsel that Defendant would the Defendant or even rule on the ultimate issue of whether or not Birchfield, supt. requires suppression of Defendant's blood test results. We asked a legal questiol implicated by the facts recited by the Commonwealth and gave both parties the opportunity to respond. We did not raise a defense on behalf of the Defendant. Defens counsel did that. And to suggest that defense counsel was ignorant of Birchfield, supr and would not have made an oral motion for extraordinary relief if we hadn't aske *21 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.docx whether Birchfield, supra has an impact on the case a. t hand is absurd, particularly as th! Commonwealth recognized, in response to our question, that defense counsel "is goini to argue that it does." (Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 7129/16, N.T. 3). We merelr acted on the defense motion to place the parties back in the position they were in prior tr. trial so that the issue concerning the validity of his waiver of his constitutional rights coulj be fully explored by both parties to the fullest extent permissible by law. When thJ. deprivation of one's liberty is predicated on his waiver of important constitutional right
we consider it prudent.and wholly appropriate to voice on the record in the presence If 1•
both parties any questions or concerns we have about the validity and/or propriety of thi actions we are about to take in order to ensure that the actions we take are appropriati and consistent with a person's constitutional safeguards. Ignorance is not bliss when oni. shoulders the burden of making such solemn, weighty and portentous decisions .: other people's lives as whether to consign them to prison and for how long. Every person, whether judge, prosecutor, defense .counsel, or lay consumer, has an interest it ensuring that our criminal justice system works fairly for all, not only for those who do not put the Commonwealth through the rigors of a trial.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we would respectfully submit that the Commonwealth's argument that we improperly sua sponte raised a defense on behalf of the Defendant is without merit and should, respectfully, be denied and dismissed.
Accordinqly, because it is our position that neither of the issues th Commonwealth has raised have any merit, we would respectfully request that this *22 s:\admin\sarcione\Cabrera Hugo Cmwlth Appeal 1925a.doc>c Honorable reviewing Court deny and dismiss the Commonwealth's appeal and reman this matter for proceedings consistent with our Order dated July 29, 2016.
BY THE COURT: Date J.