Rhonda Pittman v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

MEMORANDUM ** Rhonda Pittman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction); Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We affirm in part and dismiss in part. The district court properly dismissed Pittman’s TILA claim for damages because Pittman failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Wells Fargo violated TILA or that Pittman’s claim was not time-barred. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation). To the extent Pittman seeks injunctive relief related to the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, this court cannot grant that relief because the sale of the property has already been completed. See Vegas Diamond Props., LLC v. FDIC, 669 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he sale of the real properties prevents this Court from granting the requested relief and accordingly renders this appeal moot.”); Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Baker, 22 F.3d 880, 896 (9th Cir. 1994) (a case is moot when there is no longer a present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.