Sean Wofford v. Christopher Bracks

MEMORANDUM ** Sean Wofford appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of his detention and arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Wofford’s Fourth Amendment claims because Wofford failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants lacked reasonable suspicion for his detention or probable cause for his arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (a search of an arrestee’s person is lawful incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (an initial detention is reasonable when officers have reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime); Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990) (probable cause requirement for a war-rantless arrest); see also United States v. Cook, 808 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a search of a defendant’s backpack was reasonable and valid incident to arrest); United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We look at the total circumstances known to the officer to determine whether probable cause existed.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wofford’s motion for relief from judgment, because Wofford failed to demonstrate any basis for relief from the judgment. See Foley v. Biter, 793 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard of review). We reject as unsupported by the record Wofford’s contentions concerning bias of the district court. Wofford’s motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No, 5) is denied. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.