In re: Margaret A. Bertran

FILED APR 06 2018 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT [4] 5 In re: ) BAP No. AK-17-1139-LBF ) 6 MARGARET A. BERTRAN, ) Bk. No. 4:12-bk-501-FC ) 7 Debtor. ) ______________________________) 8 ) DONALD TANGWALL; DONALD ) 9 TANGWALL, Member of Tangwall ) Entities, ) 10 ) Appellants, ) 11 ) v. ) M E M O R A N D U M* 12 ) LARRY D. COMPTON, Trustee, ) 13 ) Appellee. ) 14 ______________________________) 15 Submitted Without Argument on March 22, 2018 16 Filed - April 6, 2018 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska [18] Honorable Fred Corbit, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding** 19 _________________________ 20 Appearances: Appellant Donald Tangwall, pro se on brief; Cabot Christianson of Law Offices of Cabot Christianson, 21 P.C., on brief for Appellee. _________________________ [22] Before: LAFFERTY, BRAND, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges. [24] * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 25 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may 26 have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. [27] ** Hon. Fred Corbit, Chief Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern 28 District of Washington, sitting by designation. 1 Appellant Donald Tangwall appeals the bankruptcy court’s 2 order declaring him a vexatious litigant and requiring him and 3 his entities to request permission before filing any further 4 documents in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska. 5 Mr. Tangwall also appeals the bankruptcy court’s order denying 6 his motion to void all orders entered in Margaret Bertran’s 7 bankruptcy case due to an alleged conflict on the part of the 8 judge who briefly presided over the case. 9 We AFFIRM both orders. 10 FACTS 11 A. Prepetition Events 12 Mr. Tangwall is married to Debtor’s daughter, Barbara 13 Tangwall. Several years ago, the Tangwalls sued William and 14 Barbara Wacker in Montana state court over a dispute concerning a 15 trucking enterprise and a cattle trailer. The Wackers filed a 16 third party complaint against Debtor, the Tangwalls, and others 17 to recover on a debt. At that time, Debtor and Ms. Tangwall co18 owned a parcel of real property in Roundup, Montana (the 19 “Ranch”). While the state court litigation was pending, they 20 transferred the Ranch and a commercial property owned by Debtor 21 (“Montana Properties”) to the Toni 1 Trust, of which Mr. Tangwall 22 was purportedly the trustee. 23 In May 2011, the Wackers obtained a $137,551.47 judgment in 24 the state court litigation against the Tangwalls and Debtor. The 25 Wackers then brought a fraudulent transfer suit in Montana state 26 court against the Toni 1 Trust, seeking to recover and execute 27 against the Montana Properties. In May 2012, the state court 28 entered an order setting aside the transfers and permitting the -2- 1 Wackers to execute on the Montana Properties, sell the properties 2 at public auction, and apply the proceeds to the 2011 judgment 3 (the “Fraudulent Transfer Judgment”). A writ of execution was 4 issued in July 2012, and a notice of public auction was sent to 5 Debtor and Ms. Tangwall, who unsuccessfully moved to quash the 6 writ and set aside the Fraudulent Transfer Judgment. 7 B. Mr. Tangwall’s History of Litigation in Ms. Bertran’s Bankruptcy Case [8] 9 Debtor filed a chapter 71 petition on August 17, 2012. The 10 bankruptcy case was originally assigned to Judge Donald 11 MacDonald IV, then reassigned to Judge Gary Spraker upon Judge 12 MacDonald’s retirement. On December 14, 2012, Judge Spraker 13 reassigned the case to Judge Herb Ross; after Judge Ross passed 14 away in February 2017, Judge Spraker reassigned the case to Chief 15 Bankruptcy Judge Frederick P. Corbit of the Eastern District of 16 Washington. 17 Appellee Larry Compton was appointed chapter 7 trustee 18 (“Trustee”). Relying on the Fraudulent Transfer Judgment, 19 Trustee asserted the estate’s ownership of the Montana 20 Properties. On December 20, 2012, Mr. Tangwall, as trustee of 21 the Toni 1 Trust, filed an adversary proceeding against Trustee 22 and the Wackers, seeking damages for defendants’ alleged 23 interference with the Toni 1 Trust’s use of the Montana 24 Properties (the “2012 Adversary Proceeding”). In the complaint, [25] 26 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 27 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 , and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil 28 Procedure. -3- 1 Mr. Tangwall asserted, among other things, that service of 2 process on the Toni 1 Trust in the fraudulent transfer litigation 3 was defective such that the Fraudulent Transfer Judgment was 4 void. 5 The bankruptcy court agreed that it was not clear that the 6 Toni 1 Trust had been properly served in the state court 7 fraudulent transfer litigation. Therefore, Trustee filed a 8 counterclaim in the 2012 Adversary Proceeding to avoid the 9 transfers of the Montana properties as fraudulent transfers under 10 state and federal law. During that litigation, Mr. Tangwall was 11 ordered to produce the alleged trust documents for the Toni 1 12 Trust but did not do so. The court also ruled that the Toni 1 13 Trust was required to appear through an attorney and that 14 Mr. Tangwall could not file pro per papers or pleadings on behalf 15 of the Toni 1 Trust. Nevertheless, Mr. Tangwall continued to 16 file and appear on behalf of the Toni 1 Trust. 17 After many hearings, the bankruptcy court issued a 18 Memorandum Decision for Entry of Default Judgment finding that 19 entry of judgment against the Toni 1 Trust was appropriate 20 because it had failed to appear through counsel.2 Further, the 21 bankruptcy court found that the transfers of the Montana 22 Properties “were made to keep the property out of the hands of 23 the Wackers, who were on the verge of obtaining a $137,000 [24] 25 2 The parties did not supply a comprehensive record, and we 26 have exercised our discretion to examine the bankruptcy court’s docket and imaged papers in Case No. 12–501 and related adversary 27 proceedings. Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227 , 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003); Omoto v. 28 Ruggera (In re Omoto), 85 B.R. 98, 100 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). -4- 1 judgment against the debtor,” and that the real property 2 transfers were thus avoidable under § 548(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, 3 the court entered a final judgment avoiding Debtor’s conveyances 4 of her interests in the Montana Properties as fraudulent and 5 declaring that Trustee’s rights to Debtor’s interests in those 6 properties were superior to those of the Toni 1 Trust itself and 7 Mr. Tangwall, as its trustee (the “2013 Final Judgment”). The 8 2013 Final Judgment also dismissed Mr. Tangwall’s complaint. 9 Mr. Tangwall, in his capacity as trustee of the Toni 1 10 Trust, appealed the 2013 Final Judgment to the Bankruptcy 11 Appellate Panel, then appealed a previously entered interlocutory 12 order in the adversary proceeding denying Debtor’s and 13 Mr. Tangwall’s motion to intervene and to strike the answer to 14 Trustee’s counterclaim. The BAP dismissed both appeals as 15 untimely. Mr. Tangwall appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which 16 dismissed the appeal of the 2013 Final Judgment as frivolous and 17 the appeal of the motion to intervene for failure to perfect the 18 appeal. 19 On May 11, 2016, Trustee filed a motion in the main case 20 seeking an order permitting him to sell the bankruptcy estate’s 21 interest the Ranch. By this time the Wackers had obtained 22 Barbara Tangwell’s 50% interest in the Ranch and joined in the 23 motion. After a hearing at which the Tangwalls, Trustee, his 24 attorney, and counsel for the Wackers appeared, on June 7, 2016, 25 the bankruptcy court granted Trustee’s motion, finding that: 26 (1) the bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction over 27 Trustee’s motion as it constituted a core proceeding pursuant to [28] 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(A) and (N); (2) the bankruptcy court has -5- 1 personal jurisdiction over Donald Tangwall, both in his 2 individual capacity and as the “alleged trustee of the Toni 1 3 Trust”; (3) the bankruptcy court has personal jurisdiction over 4 the Toni 1 Trust; (4) the bankruptcy court has personal 5 jurisdiction over Barbara Tangwall and Margaret Bertran; 6 (5) Trustee may sell the bankruptcy estate’s 50% undivided 7 interest in the Ranch by auction; (6) because the Wackers joined 8 in Trustee’s motion, Trustee shall sell the Ranch as a whole; 9 (7) proper notice of the motion was given to all parties involved 10 in the Bertran bankruptcy proceedings and all persons claiming 11 through them; and (8) the sale of the Ranch would be free and 12 clear of the claims and liens of all persons who received notice 13 of the motion. 14 On June 13, 2016, the Tangwalls filed a notice of appeal 15 from the order approving the sale, later electing to have the 16 appeal heard by the District Court. On June 20, 2016, they filed 17 in the bankruptcy court a request for an evidentiary hearing on 18 the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over 19 the Toni 1 Trust. They maintained that all “orders, memorandum 20 and judgments entered by [the Bankruptcy] Court should be deemed 21 null and void.” The bankruptcy court denied the motion because 22 the pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction. 23 Debtor and the Tangwalls then moved to stay the execution of 24 the order approving sale. The bankruptcy court denied the motion 25 to stay, as did the District Court. Importantly, the District 26 Court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enter 27 the order approving the sale. Mr. Tangwall appealed the District 28 Court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Appeal -6- 1 No. 17-35334). On February 28, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of 2 Appeals dismissed the appeal as frivolous. 3 C. The Vexatious Litigant Motion 4 On February 14, 2017, Trustee filed a Motion to Declare 5 Donald A. Tangwall a Vexatious Litigant and Require Pre-Filing 6 Order for Him or his Entities to File Any Pleadings; and to 7 Vacate Lis Pendens (“Vexatious Litigant Motion”). Trustee 8 requested the bankruptcy court enter an order requiring written 9 authorization before Mr. Tangwall or any “Tangwall Entity” filed 10 any pleading in the bankruptcy court; Trustee also requested the 11 court vacate three lis pendens filed by Mr. Tangwall that clouded 12 Trustee’s title to the Ranch. 13 As background, Trustee recounted Mr. Tangwall’s lengthy 14 litigation history in various federal and state venues in 15 Michigan, Illinois, Tennessee, Montana, and the Northern Mariana 16 Islands. The litigation included bankruptcy filings and 17 litigation pursued on behalf of Mr. Tangwall and various entities 18 that he controlled. Trustee pointed out that in 1992, the United 19 States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had 20 entered a vexatious litigant order against Mr. Tangwall and 21 others, which Mr. Tangwall unsuccessfully appealed. And in 2011 22 the Montana Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Musselshell 23 County, declared Mr. Tangwall a vexatious litigant.3 Trustee 24 included copies of the vexatious litigant orders with the [25] 26 3 It later came to light that the Montana state court had 27 entered not one, but two, vexatious litigant orders against Mr. Tangwall, one on May 9, 2011 in Cause No. DV-11-08, and the 28 other on July 22, 2011 in Cause No. DV-11-18. -7- 1 Vexatious Litigant Motion. 2 Mr. Tangwall filed an opposition complaining that Trustee’s 3 motion was “nothing more than bald allegations” and was not 4 supported with complete and true copies of the relevant filings 5 from his previous litigation in other courts. He also objected 6 to the hearing date, claiming that he had not had sufficient 7 notice. At the initial hearing held April 5, 2017, Judge Corbit 8 continued the matter to April 14 and permitted Mr. Tangwall to 9 supplement the record. 10 On April 12, Mr. Tangwall filed a supplemental response to 11 the Vexatious Litigant Motion. His sole arguments with respect 12 to the Vexatious Litigant Motion were that the bankruptcy court 13 lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the request to declare 14 him a vexatious litigant and that the motion was Trustee’s 15 attempt to silence him. The balance of the response addressed 16 his argument that the bankruptcy court lacked personal 17 jurisdiction over Mr. Tangwall and his entities. Mr. Tangwall 18 contended that the Toni 1 Trust was not the plaintiff in the 2012 19 Adversary Proceeding; instead, he claimed that he filed the 20 complaint “as a natural person in his capacity as trustee of the 21 Toni 1 Trust” and therefore had the right to represent himself. 22 Mr. Tangwall also complained, as discussed below, that Judge 23 Spraker had a conflict in hearing matters in the bankruptcy case 24 because he was once a law partner with Trustee’s counsel, Cabot 25 Christianson. Mr. Tangwall demanded an evidentiary hearing on 26 the issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, 27 Mr. Tangwall argued that United States district courts “were 28 never delegated the authority to hear issues on vexatious -8- 1 litigants.” He asserted that such matters may only be heard in 2 Alaska state courts, citing Johnson v. Johnson, 293 P.2d 393 3 (Alaska 2010). 4 Trustee filed a supplemental response which noted that most 5 of Mr. Tangwall’s arguments had been “hashed and rehashed, 6 rebutted and re-rebutted” numerous times. Trustee outlined 7 numerous inconsistencies in Mr. Tangwall’s assertions as 8 evidenced in pleadings and other documents filed in the court. 9 D. The “Motion to Find Judgments, Orders, and Memorandums Void Abinitio” [10] 11 While the Vexatious Litigant Motion was pending, on 12 March 31, 2017, the Tangwalls and various related entities 13 (Barbara Trust, Toni 1 Trust, CBT Farm and Mine, Inc., Trickle 14 Down Trucking, LP, and Trust Protectors of Alaska, LP) filed a 15 “Motion to Find All Judgments, Orders, and Memorandums [sic] Void 16 Abinitio [sic]” (“Motion to Void”). 17 In the Motion to Void, Mr. Tangwall alleged that Judge 18 Spraker, Trustee, and Trustee’s counsel had conflicts of interest 19 that warranted the voiding of all orders entered in the 20 bankruptcy case and related adversary proceedings. Mr. Tangwall 21 alleged that before his appointment to the bench, Judge Spraker 22 had been a law partner with Trustee’s counsel, Cabot 23 Christianson. He further alleged that in December 2012 Judge 24 Spraker had entered orders against the Debtor in favor of “his 25 law partner and its client.” Both orders were dated December 6, 26 2012. One was an order denying Debtor’s motion to avoid the 27 judgment lien held by the Wackers; the other granted the Wackers’ 28 motion for relief from stay (Trustee was not a party to either -9- 1 motion). Mr. Tangwall also noted that on December 14, 2012, the 2 same day Trustee filed his application to employ Cabot 3 Christianson, Judge Spraker reassigned the case to Judge Ross. 4 In his brief in support of the Motion to Void, Mr. Tangwall 5 argued that both Judge Spraker and Judge Ross should have recused 6 themselves. He further asserted that Judge Corbit should recuse 7 himself “because of the improprieties of Judge Spraker.” 8 Additionally, although he did not make any jurisdictional 9 arguments, Mr. Tangwall requested an evidentiary hearing on the 10 issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 11 Trustee filed an opposition, in which he pointed out that 12 (i) according to a vexatious litigant order entered in 2011 in 13 the Montana state court, Mr. Tangwall had a history of suing 14 every judge who had issued a ruling in any case in which he was 15 involved, and (ii) Judge Spraker had entered the orders in 16 question before Trustee had filed his application to employ 17 Mr. Christianson. 18 E. The Combined Hearing and Disposition of the Motions 19 The bankruptcy court heard the Vexatious Litigant Motion and 20 the Motion to Void on April 14, 2017. At that hearing, 21 Mr. Tangwall consented to the bankruptcy court taking judicial 22 notice of the court filings submitted by Trustee in support of 23 the Vexatious Litigant Motion. He also stated in answer to Judge 24 Corbit’s inquiry that, despite the language of the Motion to 25 Void, he did not want voided Judge Spraker’s order assigning the 26 case to Judge Corbit. Although the bankruptcy court gave 27 Mr. Tangwall an opportunity to argue the Vexatious Litigant 28 Motion, Mr. Tangwall made virtually no argument in opposition to -10- 1 that motion, at one point stating in regard to the jurisdictional 2 issues he had raised, “I’m going to argue . . . until hell 3 freezes over, and if I’m vexatious, then I’m vexatious, but 4 somewhere along the line, it’s going to be proven that [Civil] 5 Rule 17 applies . . . there’s a way that you have to sue a trust, 6 and they did not do it.” 7 As to the Motion to Void, Mr. Tangwall complained that he 8 had never been given a hearing on the jurisdictional issues, so 9 Judge Corbit permitted him to argue. Mr. Tangwall argued, as he 10 had in his papers, that the Toni 1 Trust was not a party to the 11 2012 Adversary Proceeding and that the trustee of the Toni 1 12 Trust was not a named party in Trustee’s counterclaim. 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the bankruptcy court took 14 the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision and 15 Order. The Order granted the Vexatious Litigant Motion and 16 denied the Motion to Void. The Order also set forth a procedure 17 for Mr. Tangwall and his entities to follow to request permission 18 to file papers in the bankruptcy court. 19 Mr. Tangwall timely appealed. 20 JURISDICTION 21 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 23 § 158. 24 ISSUES 25 Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in 26 granting Trustee’s Vexatious Litigant Motion. 27 Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying the Motion to 28 Void. -11- 1 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo 3 and its findings of fact for clear error. Keller v. New Penn 4 Fin., LLC (In re Keller), 568 B.R. 118, 121 (9th Cir. BAP 2017). 5 We review a pre-filing order entered against a vexatious 6 litigant for abuse of discretion. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty 7 Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). To determine whether 8 the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion, we conduct a 9 two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the bankruptcy 10 court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief 11 requested and (2) if it did, whether the bankruptcy court’s 12 application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or 13 without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in 14 the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 , 1262–63 & 15 n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 16 DISCUSSION 17 A. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting Trustee’s Motion to Declare Mr. Tangwall a 18 Vexatious Litigant. 19 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) provides: “The 20 Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may 21 issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 22 respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 23 principles of law.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not 24 explicitly held that bankruptcy courts are “courts established by 25 Congress” such that they are authorized to issue writs under the 26 All Writs Act. But it is beyond dispute that federal courts, 27 including district courts, “have the inherent power to file 28 restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants with -12- 1 abusive and lengthy histories of litigation.” Weissman v. Quail 2 Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 3 De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We 4 recognize that there is strong precedent establishing the 5 inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of 6 abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions 7 under appropriate circumstances.”). Relying on these 8 authorities, bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit have 9 concluded that they have the power to regulate vexatious 10 litigation under § 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a). See Stanwyck 11 v. Bogen (In re Stanwyck), 450 B.R. 181, 200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 12 2011); Goodman v. Cal. Portland Cement Co. (In re GTI Capital 13 Holdings, LLC), 420 B.R. 1, 11 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). This 14 power includes the power to issue restrictive pre-filing orders 15 against vexatious litigants. 16 Because such orders constrain a litigant’s fundamental right 17 of access to the courts, they should rarely be used, and only if 18 courts comply with certain procedural and substantive 19 requirements. Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of L.A., 761 F.3d 1057 , 20 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, before imposing pre-filing 21 restrictions, the court must: 22 (1) give litigants notice and an opportunity to oppose the order before it is entered; (2) compile an adequate 23 record for appellate review, including a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to 24 conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed; (3) make substantive findings of frivolousness or 25 harassment; and (4) tailor the order narrowly so as to closely fit the specific vice encountered. [27] Id. (quoting DeLong, 912 F.2d at 1147-48 ). 28 The bankruptcy court made explicit findings as to all of the -13- 1 relevant factors, and Mr. Tangwall does not contend that any of 2 those findings were erroneous. Taking each in turn: 3 1. Mr. Tangwall had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. [4] 5 It is undisputed that Mr. Tangwall was given adequate notice 6 of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. In fact, the 7 bankruptcy court went out of its way to ensure that Mr. Tangwall 8 had the opportunity fully to address the issues when it continued 9 the hearing on the Vexatious Litigant Motion and permitted 10 Mr. Tangwall to supplement the record. Additionally, the 11 bankruptcy court permitted Mr. Tangwall to argue at length at the 12 April 14, 2017 hearing. 13 2. The bankruptcy court provided an adequate list of the cases and motions leading to its conclusion that the 14 vexatious litigant order was needed. [15] The bankruptcy court provided in its memorandum a list and [16] details of numerous cases and appeals involving Mr. Tangwall and [17] entities controlled by him in several federal and state [18] jurisdictions. The bankruptcy court also noted that vexatious [19] litigant orders had been entered against Mr. Tangwall in Michigan [20] federal court and Montana state court. [21] The bankruptcy court further referenced “the record in this [22] court” as evidencing the necessity for a vexatious litigant [23] order, and, in its discussion of the third factor, listed the [24] cases and appeals relating to ownership of the Montana [25] Properties. [28] -14- 1 3. The bankruptcy court made substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment. [2] 3 The bankruptcy court cited findings from the vexatious 4 litigant order entered in the Montana state court in May 2011, 5 which included a finding that Mr. Tangwall’s “history of filing 6 frivolous and patently meritless lawsuits . . . demonstrates that 7 he has no intention of refraining from such practices without 8 intervention of the Court.” 9 Additionally, the bankruptcy court cited Mr. Tangwall’s 10 “numerous repetitive and redundant [bankruptcy court] filings 11 that lack a basis in fact or law.” The bankruptcy court listed 12 at least twelve cases and appeals originating in the bankruptcy 13 court from Ms. Bertran’s bankruptcy as well as Mr. Tangwall’s own 14 chapter 7 bankruptcy case, all of which involved the same issues. 15 Based on these filings, the bankruptcy court found: 16 Mr. Tangwall has caused needless expense to other parties and has [im]posed an unnecessary burden on the 17 court and its personnel. The court shares the trustee’s concerns that Mr. Tangwall will continue to 18 burden the bankruptcy estate’s resources and the court. The vast majority of Mr. Tangwall’s filings have been 19 meritless. The trustee and his counsel have been burdened because they have had to respond not only to 20 Mr. Tangwall’s motions and oppositions, but to the complaints Mr. Tangwall has made outside of this 21 bankruptcy case that attack the trustee’s personal reputation and professional capacity. Additionally, 22 Mr. Tangwall’s filings, which primarily sought to reargue matters previously decided, have resulted in an 23 overabundance of hearings before this court on issues which are not germane to this bankruptcy. Thus, the 24 court makes a substantive finding of frivolousness and harassment as to Mr. Tangwall. [25] 26 4. The bankruptcy court’s order was narrowly tailored. 27 The bankruptcy court found that an appropriate order was one 28 which required Mr. Tangwall -15- 1 to obtain leave of the court before filing any further documents in this court other than a notice of appeal 2 of this memorandum decision and the related vexatious litigant order. The court assures Mr. Tangwall that it 3 will approve for filing any complaint, pleading or other document if such document adequately demonstrates 4 a basis in law, and conforms to the federal and local rules. [5] 6 The bankruptcy court’s order granting the Vexatious Litigant 7 Motion set forth the procedure that Mr. Tangwall must follow 8 before filing any further papers in the bankruptcy court. 9 Specifically, the order requires Mr. Tangwall to file an 10 application seeking leave to file that attaches the proposed 11 document to be filed and a copy of the pre-filing order. 12 Further, the application must be supported by a declaration that 13 the matters asserted have not previously been raised and disposed 14 of by any court; that the claim or claims are not frivolous, made 15 in bad faith, or for the purpose of harassment; and that the 16 applicant has conducted a reasonable investigation of the facts, 17 and the investigation supports the claims or allegations. 18 On appeal, Mr. Tangwall does not argue that the bankruptcy 19 court abused its discretion in granting the Vexatious Litigant 20 Motion. Instead, Mr. Tangwall’s sole argument with respect to 21 the court’s ruling is that the bankruptcy court is an Article I 22 court with limited jurisdiction; as such, it is not a “United 23 States Court” with powers to declare Mr. Tangwall and his 24 entities vexatious litigants. Mr. Tangwall cites no authority 25 for this argument. In the bankruptcy court, he cited Johnson, [26] 239 P.3d 393 , without elaboration. We have reviewed this case, 27 which was in part a review of the propriety of awarding 28 attorney’s fees for vexatious or bad faith litigation under -16- 1 Alaska court rules. Nothing in that case addresses the authority 2 of bankruptcy courts to issue pre-filing orders against vexatious 3 litigants. Based on the authorities cited above, we conclude 4 that the bankruptcy court had the power to enter the pre-filing 5 order, and the court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 6 B. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in denying the Motion to Void. [7] 8 As noted, the Motion to Void focused primarily on an alleged 9 conflict due to Judge Spraker’s former relationship as a law 10 partner with Trustee’s counsel. The bankruptcy court found that 11 Mr. Tangwall had presented no facts to support his claims of 12 alleged bias by the court and that even if such facts existed, 13 the time to present arguments had long passed. The bankruptcy 14 court did not err in this finding. The bankruptcy court docket 15 reflects that Judge Spraker ceased involvement in the case on the 16 same day Trustee filed his application to employ 17 Mr. Christianson. Thereafter, all matters were decided by Judge 18 Ross or Judge Corbit (other than the orders reassigning the case 19 to other judges). As for the two orders entered by Judge Spraker 20 in December 2012, Trustee was not a party to either of the 21 underlying motions; thus, Mr. Tangwall’s allegation in the 22 bankruptcy court that those orders were entered “in favor of 23 [Judge Spraker’s] law partner Cabot Christianson and their [sic] 24 client Larry D. Compton” is entirely groundless. Moreover, 25 Mr. Tangwall has never filed a motion for recusal despite the 26 fact that the bankruptcy case has been ongoing for over five 27 years. 28 As for the jurisdictional issues, the bankruptcy court found -17- 1 that those issues had already been litigated and decided. The 2 record supports this finding. In its order approving the sale of 3 the Ranch, the bankruptcy court explicitly found that it had both 4 personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and 5 matters involved in the motion, and the District Court explicitly 6 affirmed that aspect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling. In its 7 Decision & Order on Appeal affirming the bankruptcy court, the 8 District Court held that the bankruptcy court had subject matter 9 jurisdiction over the estate’s interest in the Ranch because the 10 Ranch became property of the estate upon the filing of 11 Ms. Bertran’s bankruptcy case (because the 2013 Final Judgment 12 had avoided the transfer of the Ranch to the Toni 1 Trust), and 13 the bankruptcy court had authority to authorize the sale of the 14 Wackers’ interest in the Ranch because they had consented to the 15 sale. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the District Court held 16 that the bankruptcy court obtained personal jurisdiction over the 17 Toni 1 Trust by virtue of the fact that its trustee, 18 Mr. Tangwall, had filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy 19 court. 20 On appeal, Mr. Tangwall argues that he never had a hearing 21 on the jurisdictional issues, but he fails to recognize that the 22 bankruptcy court gave him the opportunity to present his 23 arguments at the April 14, 2017 hearing. 24 Additionally, Mr. Tangwall complains that the bankruptcy 25 court did not make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of 26 law in denying the Motion to Void. While the bankruptcy court 27 arguably could have been more specific in its findings, we may 28 affirm on any basis supported by the record. Caviata Attached -18- 1 Homes, LLC v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Caviata Attached 2 Homes, LLC), 481 B.R. 34, 44 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). As explained 3 above, the record supports the bankruptcy court’s denial of the 4 Motion to Void. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM both the 7 bankruptcy court’s granting of the Vexatious Litigant Order and 8 its denial of the Motion to Void. [28] -19-