Glebe Mountain Wind Energy, LLC

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} Glebe Mountain Wind Energy, LLC } Docket No. 234‐11‐05 Vtec (Appeal of JO #2‐227) } }

Decision on Cross‐Motions for Summary Judgment Glebe  Mountain  Wind  Energy,  LLC  (“Appellant”  or  “GMWE”)  appealed  from Jurisdictional Opinion (JO) #2‐227 of the Acting District 2 Environmental Coordinator, issued  on  October  6,  2005,  concluding  that  a  “proposed  wind  energy  project represent[s]  material  and  substantial  changes  to  existing  Act  250  permits  and  thus require[s]  an  [Act  250  permit]  amendment.”    Appellant  is  represented  by  Christopher D. Roy, Esq.; Interested Person Glebe Mountain Group, Inc. (GMGI) is represented by Robert E. Woolmington, Esq.; Interested Person Vermont Electric Power Co. (VELCO) is represented  by  Stephen  A.  Reynes,  Esq.;  Interested  Person  Central  Vermont  Public Service  (CVPS)  is  represented  by  Carolyn  Brown  Anderson,  Esq.;  Interested  Person Town of  Windham  and  Intervenor Town of Windham  Planning Commission are  both represented  by  David  Grayck,  Esq.;  Intervenor  Department  of  Public  Service  (DPS)  is represented  by  Aaron  Adler,  Esq.;  Intervenor  Natural  Resources  Board  is  represented by  Melanie  Kehne,  Esq.;  and  Intervenor  Windham  Regional  Planning  Commission  is represented by Richard D. Perra, Esq.

Now  pending  before  this  Court  are  cross‐motions  for  summary  judgment  filed by  Appellant,  by  Interested  Person  Glebe  Mountain  Group,  Inc.,  and  jointly  by Interested  Person  Town  of  Windham  and  Intervenor  Town  of  Windham  Planning Commission.    Intervenor  Windham  Regional  Commission  also  filed  a  motion  for summary  judgment,  advising  that  it  joined  in  the  motion  filed  on  behalf  of  Glebe *2 Mountain  Group,  Inc.    Memoranda  in  support  of  Appellant’s  motion  for  summary judgment have been filed on behalf of VELCO and DPS.

Factual Background The parties have stipulated to the material facts in this case, which are as follows: 1.  Appellant  is  developing  plans  for  a  wind  power  generation  facility  on Glebe Mountain in the Towns of Londonderry and Windham (the “Project”). 2.   The Project includes the construction of up to twenty‐seven wind turbines and associated roads and accessory structures. 3.  The Project is proposed to be located on two parcels of land (the “Tract”) owned  by  the  McGraw  Family  Partnership  and  Magic  Mountain,  LLC.    The  Tract,  or portions  of  it,  is  encumbered  by  a  number  of  Act  250  permits  and  amendments previously issued to other projects on the same parcels.   There are five sets of permits and amendments thereto, dating back to 1971.  The various permits are referenced in JO #2‐227, at ¶¶ 12–36. 4.  Appellant  has  installed  one  temporary  wind  measurement  tower  on  the Project  site.    This  tower  was  approved  by  the  Vermont  Public  Service  Board  (PSB) pursuant  to  30  V.S.A.  § 248(j)  on  January  29,  2004,  in  PSB  Docket  No.  6786.    In  that proceeding, on October 8, 2004, the PSB also approved the installation of two additional temporary wind measurement towers on the Project site.  These two additional towers have not yet been installed. 5.  The Project is an “electric generation facility” subject to review by the PSB pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 248. 6.  Appellant  has  not  finalized  the  project’s  design,  and  has  not  yet  filed  a petition for a certificate of public good with the PSB pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 248. 7.  Appellant  sent  the  Windham  Regional  Planning  Commission  and  the Towns  of  Londonderry  and  Windham  a  formal  notice  of  intent  to  file  a  petition  for  a certificate of public good with the PSB pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 248. *3 8.  The  Parties  have  agreed  by  stipulation,  for  the  purposes  of  this  appeal only, that if the analysis typically employed under Environmental Board Rule 34 were to  apply to the Project as currently planned, it can be assumed that the  Project  would constitute  a  material  and/or  substantial  change  to  the  previously  approved development on the Project site under one or more Act 250 criteria found in 10 V.S.A. § 6086.

Discussion At issue in this appeal is a jurisdictional conflict between Act 250 review under a concept known as “amendment jurisdiction,” see former Environmental Board Rule 341 (EBR  34),  and  PSB  jurisdiction  over  power  generation  facilities  under  30  V.S.A.  § 248. The conflict arises because a power generation facility is being proposed on lands that are  already  encumbered  by  multiple  Act  250  permits,  amendments  thereto  and  the many conditions contained therein.2 It is undisputed that if the wind power generation facility were proposed on land unencumbered  by  Act  250  permit  conditions,  then  jurisdiction  over  the  proposed facility would rest solely with the PSB.  Electric generation or transmission facilities that require  a  certificate  of  public  good  under  30  V.S.A.  § 248  are  defined  out  of  the  term

1 The former Environmental Board Rules have been supplanted by the Act 250 Rules promulgated by the Natural Resources Board, effective May 1, 2006. We look to the former Environmental Board Rules as they existed on October 6, 2005, because we are required to apply the substantive standards that were applicable before the tribunal appealed from, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 8504(h). The Legislature ratified former EBR 34, along with all other Environmental Board rules pertaining to the administration of Act 250, by Public Act 52, § 5 (1985), and the Rule therefore “has the same effect as would any law passed by the Legislature in the first instance.” In re Spencer, 152 Vt. 330, 336 (1989). See Vermont Commission on Wind Energy Regulatory Policy: Findings and Conclusions, Attach. A to 2

Appellant’s Mot. for Summ. J., at § 4.2.1(7): There are conflicting opinions and there is currently no definitive answer for how to deal with the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between Section 248 and Act 250 (e.g., on land that already falls under an existing Act 250 permit). For example, some wind turbines may be proposed on lands that are already subject to the jurisdiction of Act 250 with permit conditions that may be difficult to resolve without going through two regulatory processes. Section 248 should have jurisdiction in these cases but provide for consideration of the existing Act 250 permit conditions.

“development”  by  10  V.S.A.  § 6001(3)(D)(ii),  and  therefore  do  not  trigger  Act  250 jurisdiction. The  question  before  the  Court  is  not  whether  the  Project  constitutes “development” under Act 250 (as it clearly does not), but whether the Project will cause material or substantial changes to previously permitted development, and thus require the holders of the pre‐existing permits to seek a permit amendment under EBR 34.  EBR 34(A),  effective  January  12,  2004,  required  a  permit  amendment  “for  any  material  or substantial change in a permitted project.” Appellant argues that, although EBR 34 would require a permit amendment “if the  analysis  typically  employed  .  .  .  were  to  apply,”  Stipulation  of  Facts  at  2,  that requirement  would  be  at  odds  with  the  Legislature’s  grant  to  the  PSB  of  exclusive jurisdiction over § 248 projects.  Appellant reasons that since power generation facilities do  not  constitute  development  in  the  context  of  Act  250,  the  construction  of  such facilities  cannot  trigger  amendment  jurisdiction  under  EBR  34  because  “material  or substantial change,” as that term is used in EBR 34, is a subset of “development.”  See EBR 2(A)(1)(e) (“‘Development’ means . . . (e) Any construction of improvements which will  be  a  substantial  change  of  a  pre‐existing  development,  and  any  material  or substantial  change  to  an  existing  development  over  which  the  board  or  a  district commission  has  jurisdiction”).    Intervenor  DPS  offered  its  concurrence  at  the  motion hearing  by  asserting  that  amendment  jurisdiction  is  a  derivative  of  development jurisdiction and not an independent source of jurisdiction.

The consequence of the argument expounded by Appellant and the DPS is that if the District Commission is deprived of development jurisdiction over power generation facilities,  then  the  Commission  is  likewise  deprived  of  amendment  jurisdiction  over those facilities. Interested  Person  GMGI  opposes  Appellant’s  interpretation.    GMGI  agrees  that Act  250  jurisdiction  is  not  triggered  by  the  construction  of  power  generation  facilities, *5 but argues that when the construction of those facilities creates a material or substantial change  to  an  existing  development  encumbered  by  an  Act  250  permit,  then  Act  250 review of the changes to the pre‐existing development is required. The  plain  language  of  EBR  34  and  § 248  do  not  provide  an  answer.    Neither statutory provision specifically addresses the situation at bar: that is, construction of a § 248 project on lands already encumbered by Act 250 permit conditions.  In resolving this  jurisdictional  conflict,  our  task  is  to  “discern  and  implement  the  intent  of  the Legislature.”    In  re  MacIntyre  Fuels,  Inc.,  2003  VT  59,  ¶  7.    District  Commission jurisdiction over development and PSB jurisdiction over power generation facilities are both in derogation of common law property rights, and therefore both must be strictly construed.    See  Committee  to  Save  Bishop’s  House,  Inc.,  137  Vt.  142,  152  (1979)  (“The court’s true function is to give effect to the legislative intent, and in this endeavor, we are  guided  by  rules  of general  applicability, evolved through long judicial  experience. One  of  these  is  that  legislation  in  derogation  of  common  law  property  rights  will  be strictly construed.”). We  conclude  that  EBR  34  represents  an  explanation  of  and  not  an  expansion from  the  statutory  jurisdiction  granted  to  District  Commissions.    The  “amendment jurisdiction”  set  out  in  EBR  34  is  the  lawful  interpretation  of  existing  Act  250 jurisdiction, which does not extend to the “construction of improvements for an electric generation  or  transmission  facility  that  requires  a  certificate  of  public  good  under section 30 V.S.A. § 248.”  10 V.S.A. § 6001(3)(D)(ii).

Interested Person the Town of Windham and Intervenor the Town of Windham Planning  Commission  argue  in  their  joint  motion  for  summary  judgment  that  “where land is subject to an Act 250 permit, a permit amendment is required under Board Rule 34 for otherwise exempt activity—such as logging3 or farming—where such activity is a

The site preparation and construction for the proposed facility would involve tree‐cutting on the top of 3

Glebe Mountain. *6 substantial or material change to the permit or permitted project,” This argument by the Town and its Planning Commission relies upon the Environmental Board’s analysis in Re: Keith Van Buskirk d/b/a/ American Wilderness Resources, Inc., Declaratory Ruling No.  302,  Findings  of  Fact,  Conclusions  of  Law,  and  Order  (Aug.  15,  1995).4    In  Van Buskirk, the Environmental Board, noting that logging activities below the elevation of 2,500  feet  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of  development,  went  on  to  state  that  the “[a]pplication    of  the  logging  exclusion  to  Van  Buskirk’s  operations  does  not  end  the jurisdictional inquiry.  The logging exclusion does not absolutely prohibit the assertion of  Act  250  jurisdiction  over  the  cutting  of  trees  [below  2,500  feet]  .  .  .  .    A  competing consideration  is  the  Board’s  (or  district  commission’s)  authority  to  impose  conditions when granting Act 250 permits.”  Id. at 8.  The Environmental Board found an exception to the logging exclusion, ruling that:

Where findings of fact or conditions regarding tree cutting or logging are included in a permit, or a representation is made that no tree cutting or logging will take place, tree cutting or logging which constitutes a material or substantial change to that permitted development or subdivision will only be allowed if the permit holder applies for a[n amendment to their] permit under EBR 34.

Id. at 9.5

The situation in Van Buskirk is distinguished from the case before this Court by the  fact  that  in  Van  Buskirk,  the  timber  harvesting  would  come  under  Act  250 amendment  jurisdiction,  or  under  no  jurisdiction  whatsoever.    The  Board  stated  that “[t]he  policy  behind  the  exception  to  the  logging  exclusion  is  that  logging  and  tree cutting associated with a development or subdivision has adverse effects with respect to

4 In a recent decision, In re Green Crow Corp., 2006 VT 14, our Supreme Court stressed the “specialized expertise of the Environmental Board in determining whether it has jurisdiction over a particular development proposal.” Id. at ¶ 7 (internal quotation omitted), citing In re Denio, 158 Vt. 230, 235 (1992). 5 The Board did not order that Van Buskirk apply for a permit under EBR 34, but only because it found that no such findings, conditions, or representations were present in the case.

the  ten  criteria  of  10  V.S.A.  § 6086(a).”    Id.    An  absolute  exclusion  for  logging,  then, could cause harm to the very values sought to be protected by Act 250.  Here, however, it  is  not  a  question  of  “Act  250  jurisdiction  or  nothing.”    The  excluded  activity, construction  of  an  electric  generation  facility,  is  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  PSB, which  is  required  to  conduct  an  environmental  review,  with  due  consideration  to  the applicable Act 250 criteria, pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 248. Section 248(a)(2) states that “(A) no company . . . and no person . . . may begin site  preparation  for  or  construction  of  an  electric  generation  facility  or  electric transmission  facility  within  the  state  which  is  designed  for  immediate  or  eventual operation at any voltage, . . . (B)  . . . unless the public service board first finds that the same will promote the general good of the state and issues a certificate to that effect.” 30  V.S.A.  § 248(a)(2).    When  a  petitioner  files  an  application  for  a  certificate  of  public good with the PSB, the PSB “shall hold a nontechnical public hearing” under 30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(4)(A), and one or more technical hearings under 30  V.S.A.  § 248(a)(4)(B).   The statute requires further that copies of the application:

shall be given by the petitioner to the attorney general and the department of public service, and, with respect to facilities within the state, the department of health, agency of natural resources, historic preservation division, scenery preservation council, state planning office, agency of transportation, the agency of agriculture, food and markets and to the chairperson or director of the municipal and regional planning commissions and the municipal legislative body for each town and city in which the proposed facility will be located.

30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(4)(C). Pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(4)(E), the Agency of Natural Resources:

shall appear as a party in any proceedings held under this subsection, shall provide evidence and recommendations concerning any findings to be made under subdivision (b)(5) of this section, and may provide evidence and recommendations concerning any other matters to be determined by the board in such a proceeding.

Section  248(b)(5)  provides  the  basis  for  Appellant’s  claim  here  that  the  PSB  has exclusive jurisdiction over all electric power generation projects.  Section 248(b) requires the PSB to make a number of findings before issuing a certificate of public good.

Prior to 1987, § 248(b)(5) required the PSB to find that the construction of an in‐ state  electric  power  generation  facility  “will  not  have  an  undue  adverse  effect  on aesthetics,  historic sites, air and water purity, the natural environment and the public health and safety.”  In 1987, the Legislature amended § 248(b)(5)6 by adding the phrase “with  due  consideration  having  been  given  to  the  criteria  specified  in  10  V.S.A. § 1424a(d).”7   In 1988, the Legislature again amended § 248(b)(5)8 by adding the phrase “and § 6086(a)(1) through (8) and (9)(K).”

As  it  exists  now,  and  at  the  time  of  the  appealed‐from  JO,  § 248(b)(5)  reads  as follows:

Before the public service board issues a certificate of public good as required under subsection (a) of this section, it shall find that the purchase, investment or construction: . . . with respect to an in‐state facility, will not have an undue adverse effect on esthetics, historic sites, air and water purity, the natural environment and the public health and safety, with due consideration having been given to the criteria specified in 10 V.S.A. § 1424a(d) and § 6086(a)(1) through (8) and (9)(K)[.]

The  phrase  “due  consideration”  also  appears  in  § 248(b)(1),  requiring  that  due consideration  be  given  to  the  recommendations  of  municipal  and  regional  planning commissions,  recommendations  of  municipal  legislative  bodies,  and  the  land conservation measures contained in Town Plans.

6 1987, No. 67 (Adj. Sess.), An Act Relating to Establishing a Comprehensive State Rivers Policy (H. 339). 7 Section 1424a(d) provides a non‐exclusive list of fourteen criteria that may be considered by the water resources panel (at that time the water resources board) when deciding whether particular waters should be designated as outstanding resource waters. 8 1988, No. 273, An Act Relating to Act 250 Jurisdiction over Waste‐Burning Electricity Generating Facilities (H. 681).

The “due consideration” language of § 248(b)(1) was interpreted by our Supreme Court  to  mean  that  those  recommendations  and  land  conservation  measures  were “advisory rather than controlling.”  City of South Burlington v. Vermont Electric Power Co., 133 Vt. 438, 447 (1975) (“‘Due consideration’ for municipal legislative bodies . . . at least impliedly postulates that municipal enactments, in the specific area, are advisory rather than controlling . . . .  Any attempt at municipal regulation is pre‐empted.”).

The  Legislature  was  presumably  aware  of  the  meaning  ascribed  to  the  phrase “due  consideration”  when  it  added  that  phrase  to  § 248(b)(5)  in  1987  and  1988,  see Heffernan v. Harbeson, 2004 VT 98, ¶9 (“When we interpret statutes, we presume that the  Legislature  was  mindful  of  relevant  precedents  and  prior  legislation.”).    It  is abundantly clear that the Legislature intended that the PSB have exclusive jurisdiction over  electric  generation  facilities  proposed  on  previously  unencumbered  land,  as evidenced by the language excluding electric generation facilities from the definition of development, combined with the language empowering the PSB to grant certificates of public good “with due consideration” to Act 250 Criteria 1–8 and 9(K).  It is less clear, however,  that  the  Legislature  intended  that  pre‐existing  Act  250  jurisdiction  would disappear when an electric generation facility is proposed on land encumbered by Act 250 permit conditions. Where  the  plain  statutory  language  is  not  clear,  the  Court  endeavors  to  give effect  to  the  legislative  intent  underlying  the  statute  by  looking  at  “the  legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the legislative policy it was designed  to  implement.”    MacIntyre  at  ¶  7  (internal  quotation  and  citation  omitted). The pertinent legislative history includes a meeting of the Senate Natural Resources and Energy  Committee  held  on  March  13,  1988,  at  which  the  Committee  heard  testimony relating to H. 681, which was enacted later that year as 1988, No. 273, An Act Relating to *10 Act 250 Jurisdiction over Waste‐Burning Electricity Generating Facilities (H. 681).9  This Act added the phrase “and § 6086(a)(1) through (8) and (9)(K)” at the end of § 248(b)(5). The  hearing  began  with  the  testimony  of  Representative  Emmons,  who explained  that  questions  regarding  environmental  review  of  waste‐to‐energy  plants, wood‐fired plants, and gas pipelines were raised during discussions on H. 681:

Rep. Emmons: When we started working on this, we were dealing with the Act 250 and the Environmental Board and also the Public Service Board . . . . Environmental issues would be covered under the Environmental Board in their Act 250 review. We had the chairman of the Environmental Board, Lon Wilson, and the Public Service Board, Rich Cowert, in our committee discussing this, and they worked out a compromise which seemed to be more workable, that under Public Service Board review—the 248 process—the environmental aspects of that would be expanded to include Act 250 criteria 1–9.

Appellant’s Attach. D at 2–3.  Representative Emmons then outlined the structure of the House  bill,  and  answered  questions  posed  by  Senator  Racine,  the  Chairman  of  the Natural Resources and Energy Committee:

Rep. Emmons: [Subsection 5] on page 5 is where we include the Act 250 review. 10 V.S.A. Section 1424[a] and Section 6086, 1–8 and 9, that’s your criteria 1–10 of Act 250 and that’s where . . . . the compromise was between the Environmental Board and the Public Service Board—to include Act 250 review and 248 review. . . .

Sen. Racine:    Would they need an Act 250 permit?

Rep. Emmons: No. The certificate of public good is what they’re going for and that’s exactly the reason, Mr. Chairman, that we did incorporate the Act 250 process for our 248 review so it would not be duplicative.

9 A transcript of the hearing was provided to the Court as Attach. D to Appellant’s Mot. for Summ. J.

Sen. Racine: I don’t understand what you’re saying, you’re incorporating the process. You aren’t requiring a 250 permit, but you’re requiring a 250 review? How will that work?

At this point there is a gap in the transcript with the notation “break to turn tape over.”  Some testimony, including Rep. Emmons’ answer, appears to be missing.  When the  transcript  resumes,  PSB  Chair  Rich  Cowert  and  Senator  Carter  have  joined  in  the dialog:

. . . Mr. Cowert: It10 would apply to any Section 248 permit which would include electric transmission lines as well—electric generating station, electric transmission lines, gas line, anything that needed Section 248 review. . . . Sen. Carter: Can I go back and ask a question which ties in? I notice that you’ve got NEPA involved here as well. Why do we exclude Criterion 10 on laterals which deals with compliance with local and regional plans? Mr. Cowert: I’ll be glad to answer that. There’s already a section in 248 which requires the [Public Service] Board to give due consideration to local and regional plans. Sen. Carter: I realize you have to give due consideration to it, but you don’t have to make a finding that it complies. Mr. Cowert: Correct. Sen. Carter: I guess I’m asking the question still why you phrased it that way. Mr. Cowert: Why did we choose to go with due consideration rather than compliance with local plans? Sen. Carter: Yes. Mr. Cowert: The chief reason for doing that is that—first of all, the history of it in 248 was that the facilities that provide those utility services to the state are an integrated network, and it has always

Presumably, the compromise by which the PSB would undertake the environmental review normally 10

conducted by the Environmental Board.

been thought to be unwise to allow a single jurisdiction (inaudible) to put up a roadblock as part of a network. Sen. Carter: I understand that. Is this a sign that the state, in fact, is pre‐empting local and regional jurisdiction with respect to control of the location of these pipelines? Mr. Cowert: That has always been the case. Sen. Carter: Does this extend to secondary impacts? Mr. Cowert: No.

Appellant’s Attach. D at 4–8. It is not absolutely clear what Senator Carter meant by “secondary impacts,” but it  is  at  least  plausible  that  he  was  referring  to  situations  like  that  discussed  one  year later by our Supreme Court in In re Southview Associates, 153 Vt. 171 (1989), where the Court  upheld  the  Environmental  Board’s  denial  of  a  permit  application  to  build  a residential development in a deeryard, stating that the “proposed project would destroy ten acres of critical habitat and, through the secondary impacts of people living in the homes,  imperil  the  remaining  34  acres.”  Id.  at  178.    It  is  also  not  clear  whether  Mr. Cowert was stating that PSB § 248(b) jurisdiction did not extend to secondary impacts prior  to  the  proposed  amendment,  but  would  so  extend  if  H.  681  were  enacted,  or whether  he  was  stating  that  PSB  jurisdiction  would  not  extend  even  if  H.  681  were enacted. If it is true that the Legislature did not intend for the PSB’s exclusive jurisdiction to  extend  to  secondary  impacts  generated  by  § 248  projects,  then  they  must  have intended  that  jurisdiction  over  those  secondary  impacts  would  remain  part  of  the  Act 250 review process.11

11 There is some evidence that the Legislature intended that the PSB have exclusive jurisdiction over secondary impacts. Mr. Cowert testified that a “fact of life we have to deal with is that we don’t have statewide or regional comprehensive land use planning to reassure us that we have the capability to manage the secondary effects of infrastructure as significant as the pipeline. So what can we do? Well, this bill attempts to do the best we can with what we’ve got right now.” Appellant’s Attach. D at 23. More to the point, the testimony of Mr. Parenteau, then the Commissioner of the Department of

Later  in  the  hearing  on  H.  681,  the  testimony  turns  to  the  concept  of  “one‐stop shopping” for permit approval.  Mr. Cowert continues his testimony as follows:

Question: where should review lie? And this goes back to the beginning of Act 250, and as you all know, the Legislature determined—and I think it was a good decision—that electric generating facilities and transmission facilities would not be subject to Act 250 review because the Public Service Board was going to review, and they did not want two‐stop shopping. They wanted one‐stop shopping. And everybody knew that the Public Service Board was going to have to review the financing of the facility, the way it’s located and connected to the network, the system reliability issues that are related to the location of the network, whether transmission facilities are adequate to service a generating station, whether the company is going to have adequate catch [sic “cash”] flow and its effect on rates. The Public Service Board is going to be reviewing all of those things, and it didn’t make any sense to the Legislature to have the Environmental Board or the district environmental commission on a different track doing environmental review. Consequently, there was language added to Section 248—very broad language—that required the Public Service Board to conduct an environmental review of those facilities at the same time that they were conducting these other reviews, the financial and system reviews.

Appellant’s Attach. D at 16–17. The  “broad  language”  Mr.  Cowert  was  referring  to  is  the  first  portion  of § 248(b)(5), which establishes the following standard of review: “with respect to an in‐ state  facility,  [the  project]  will  not  have  an  undue  adverse  effect  on  esthetics,  historic sites,  air  and  water  purity,  the  natural  environment  and  the  public  health  and safety . . . .”  Mr. Cowert went on to state that the PSB viewed this language as giving it

Environmental Conservation, includes this statement: “The logic of [the shift in control to the PSB] is that you will have an expert board who will understand the full picture of the pipeline, the laterals, the mainline, secondary impacts, environmental concerns, growth concerns and all the rest. But I do want to stress that I have not looked at this language or these criteria with a view towards could they be improved from the standpoint of secondary impacts. It may well be that they could. I don’t know if the language needs to be changed, though.” Id. at 40. The legislative record presented to the Court in this appeal does not reveal an adoption or a rejection by House and Senate members of the witness testimony offered by Messrs. Cowert and Parenteau.

an environmental mandate “as broad and more flexible” than the mandate in Act 250, and that the PSB “looked at the criteria of Act 250 in order to be informed as to what the broad language of Section 248  meant.”  Appellant’s Attach. D at 17.  Mr.  Cowert then noted that the phrase “due consideration having been given to the criteria specified in 10 V.S.A. § 1424a(d)” had been added in the previous year (1987), and stated that “we proposed [the language in the House bill] adding specifically the cross references to the appropriate sections of Act 250.”  Id.  at 18. It appears from the record presented to us that Mr. Cowert viewed the addition of the phrase “and § 6086(a)(1) through (8) and (9)(K)” as merely codifying the existing practice  of  the  PSB,  as  he  stated  that  “I  view  this  as  an  improvement  because  it  will codify  what  has  been  the  unspoken  practice  in  most  cases  that  come  before  the  PSB, which  is  that  the  PSB  will  look  at  Act  250  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  general umbrella language about the natural environment and the public health and safety has been met.”  Id. at 20. Mr.  Cowert  then  returned  to  the  concept  of  one‐stop  as  opposed  to  two‐stop permit shopping:

At one point I was discussing one‐stop versus two‐stop shopping and why I think that it is preferable to keep this review at the PSB rather than having an Environmental Board review and a PSB review. First, as I said, all on the system stability and economic factors, we’re going to have that review in any event so you would have a dual track. You’d have the environmental review going off over here and the financial review going on over here. Now that raises an immediate coordination problem, not just in timing. It’s a burden on everybody. It’s a burden on citizens who want to oppose a facility. It’s a burden on local select boards and planning commissions who have got to go to two sets of hearings. It’s a burden on the applicant. It takes longer. I don’t think it’s worth it. But there’s an even more fundamental problem. As you’ve seen with Vicon, over on the environmental side every time you change the litigation [sic “mitigation”] requirement, you change the economics of the project. You better install a new scrubber. You’ve got to change your ash disposal methods; you’ve got to do something over here. All of a sudden your

finances are different, and the terms of any contract that you’ve got for the sale of your power is going to be different. So the idea that you can somehow segregate these things in their two different worlds is just not reality. I think it’s a lot more sensible to keep them in the same place.

Id. at 20–21. Interested  Person  VELCO  asserts  that  “[b]ecause  [10  V.S.A.]  § 6001(3)(D)(ii) excludes  electric  generation  and  transmission  facilities  that  require  a  [certificate  of public good], Act 250 jurisdiction does not apply to such facilities regardless of whether they  would  constitute  a  material  or  substantial  change  to  existing  development.” VELCO  Mem.  in  Support  of  Appellant’s  Mot.  for  Summ.  J.  at  11.    We  agree.    Such facilities  are  carved  out  of  Act  250  jurisdiction  by  the  plain  language  of  the  statute. There  are  strong  policy  arguments,  upon  which  the  record  establishes  that  the Legislature relied, supporting the sole jurisdiction of the PSB over such facilities, chief among them is the wisdom of having one statewide board handle the integrated electric generation  and  transmission  network,  so  that  no  single  local  body  can  put  up  a roadblock.    Also,  the  PSB  has  an  institutional  memory  and  an  ever‐growing  body  of knowledge regarding the cases it oversees, in contrast to local or regional boards which would have to reinvent the wheel with every case. We wish to minimize any confusion or misinterpretation that our decision here may  create,  and  therefore  offer  further  comments  on  “secondary  impacts,”  with  the hope  that  these  further  comments  do  not  increase  the  chance  of  confusion  or misinterpretation.    Even  though  the  proposed  facility  itself  is  not  subject  to  Act  250 jurisdiction, it is possible that the exempt facility will generate secondary impacts on the encumbered land surrounding the proposed facility.  For example, the site clearing for any construction of the proposed facility may force sensitive or protected species off the site  and  onto  surrounding  encumbered  land.    The  removal  of  forest  cover  and  the creation of new impervious surfaces may alter stormwater runoff patterns in areas far *16 removed  from  a  facility’s  footprint.    In  the  above  two  examples,  the  site  clearing  and construction would be subject to the sole jurisdiction of the PSB, but the displacement of animals  and  altered  stormwater  runoff  patterns  could  create  impacts  beyond  the boundaries  of  the  facility,  and  thus  outside of  the  PSB’s  jurisdiction.    These  and  other potential secondary impacts may either: (1) constitute material and substantial changes to  the  previously permitted  projects, triggering  EBR 34  amendment jurisdiction;  or  (2) create  changes  which  must  be  addressed  when  an  amendment  to  the  pre‐existing  Act 250  permits  is  otherwise  required,  due  to  the  ordinary  evolution  of  the  pre‐existing developments on the lands of McGraw Family Partnership and Magic Mountain, LLC. Such off‐site, secondary impacts fall within the District Commission’s particular area  of  expertise  and  jurisdiction,  and  not  that  of  the  PSB.      The  potential  secondary impacts  are  local,  depending  on  local  conditions  and  the  particulars  of  the  existing permit  conditions.   The strong  policy  arguments in  favor of  exclusive  PSB  jurisdiction do not pertain to such impacts, as the District Commission would not be called upon to examine the proposed facility itself, nor would it be empowered to impose conditions on the facility, or prevent its construction.  The proposed facility would simply be an act of the PSB, much as a meteor strike removing the top of Glebe Mountain would be an act  of  God.    The District  Commission  can  do nothing to prevent  either one,  but must address the changed conditions  on the lands over which it has continuing jurisdiction and  attempt  to  mitigate  adverse  impacts  on  the  values  sought  to  be  protected  by  Act 250. The  existence  of  secondary  impacts  sufficient  to  require  an  Act  250  permit amendment is, at this point, merely theoretical.  While the parties have stipulated that the  proposed  project  would  itself  constitute  a  material  or  substantial  change  if  the analysis  typically  employed  under  EBR  34  were  to  apply,  they  have  made  no  such stipulation  regarding  secondary  impacts.    Appellant  has  yet  to  file  a  petition  for  a certificate of public good with the PSB for the proposed facility.  Once that petition has *17 been  submitted,  the  PSB  may  impose  conditions  or  require  alterations,  so  that  the secondary  impacts,  if  any,  do  not  rise  to  the  level  of  substantial  or  material  changes requiring  an  amendment  to  the  existing  Act  250  permits.    It  will  be  the  PSB  that conducts the environmental review of the proposed facility, with due consideration to Act 250 Criteria 1–8 and 9(K) as required by § 248(b)(5).  Furthermore, it is up to the PSB to  determine  the  physical  boundaries  of  the  facility,  within  which  its  jurisdiction  is exclusive, and beyond which the District Commission retains continuing jurisdiction on the subject properties. If  the  PSB  issues  a  certificate  of  public  good  for  the  proposed  facility,  and  the facility subsequently generates secondary impacts beyond the boundary established by the  PSB,  and  those  impacts  amount  to  a  substantial  or  material  change  to  the surrounding permitted development, then there are a number of procedural avenues by which the District Commission could exercise its authority to address the impacts. The secondary impacts could cause the previously permitted development to be in violation of  prior  permit  conditions,  resulting  in  an  enforcement  action  that  could  be  resolved though a permit amendment.  Or, the holder of an Act 250 permit could seek a permit amendment  for  any  reason,  and  the  District  Commission  could  then  address  the secondary  impacts  in  conjunction  with  the  requested  amendment.    We  leave  the consideration of these possible future scenarios to a future proceeding, as they are not a case or controversy before us here. Accordingly,  based  on  the  foregoing,  it  is  hereby  ORDERED  and  ADJUDGED that  Appellant’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  GRANTED  as  to  Question  1  in Appellant’s  Revised  Statement  of  Questions.    In  so  ruling,  we  conclude  that  Act  250 jurisdiction under ERB 34 does not attach to electric generation facilities that are located on  lands  encumbered  by  pre‐existing  Act  250  permits.    For  these  same  reasons, *18 Interested Person GMGI’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Question 1 in Appellant’s Revised Statement of Questions. As  to  Question  2  in  Appellant’s  Revised  Statement  of  Questions,  Appellant’s motion is GRANTED to the extent that it refers to the PSB’s exclusive jurisdiction over all impacts within the boundaries of the subject facility.  However, Appellant’s motion is  DENIED  to  the  extent  that  it  refers  to  secondary  impacts  beyond  the  established boundaries of the proposed § 248 facility.  We deny that part of Appellant’s motion for the  reason  that  such  impacts  are  not  properly  before  this  court  and  therefore  do  not constitute a case or controversy for which this court has authority to rule.  See Cupola Golf  Course,  Inc.  v.  Dooley,  2006  VT  25,  ¶  11  (stating  that  “the  judiciary  is  not empowered  to  render  advisory  opinions.  Courts  are  not  permitted  to  dispose  of  the merely  hypothetical.”).    For  these  same  reasons,  the  various  summary  judgment motions  filed  on  behalf  of  Interested  Persons  GMGI  and  Town  of  Windham  and Intervenors Town of Windham Planning Commission and Windham Regional Planning Commission are also DENIED as to Question 2. Because we have adjudicated all of Question 1, and that part of Question 2 that presents  an  actual  case  or  controversy  to  us,  and  because  no  other  Questions  are contained  in  Appellant’s  Statement  of  Questions,  this  decision  concludes  the proceedings  before  this  Court  in  this  appeal.    A  Judgment  Order  accompanies  this decision. Done at Berlin, Vermont this 18th day of May, 2006.

__________________________________________ Thomas S. Durkin, Environmental Judge