Aaron L. Dalton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 30 2018, 10:31 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE John Quirk Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Quirk & Hunter PC Attorney General Muncie, Indiana Henry A. Flores, Jr. Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Aaron L. Dalton, July 30, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-776 v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Kimberly S. Appellee-Plaintiff Dowling, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C02-1607-F1-04

Vaidik, Chief Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-776 | July 30, 2018 Page 1 of 6

Case Summary [1] Aaron L. Dalton pled guilty to two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting,

and the trial court sentenced him to the maximum term of twelve years on each

count, to be served consecutively. Dalton now appeals, arguing that the trial

court erred in ordering the sentences to run consecutively and that his twenty-

four-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In July 2016, the State charged Dalton with five counts relating to two victims:

Level 1 felony child molesting (A.J.), Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit child

molesting (A.J.), Level 4 felony child molesting (A.J.), Level 4 felony child

molesting (A.M.), and Level 5 felony aiding, inducing, or causing child

exploitation (A.J. and/or A.M.). [3] Dalton and the State later entered into a plea agreement. According to the plea

agreement, Dalton agreed to plead guilty to both counts of Level 4 felony child

molesting (one for each victim), and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining

charges (two Level 1 felonies and a Level 5 felony) in this case. The State also

agreed to dismiss child-molesting-related charges in another case, Cause No.

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18C02-1609-FA-04.1 Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 101. [4] At the guilty-plea hearing, a factual basis was established for the two counts of

Level 4 felony child molesting. That is, Dalton admitted that between February

1, 2016, and June 29, 2016, he knowingly touched A.J. and A.M., both of

whom were less than fourteen years old, on their breasts with the intent to

arouse or satisfy his sexual desires. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court

accepted Dalton’s guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction. It then

identified numerous aggravators, including that Dalton has “three (3) prior

felony convictions for sex offenses involving minors” (a conviction in 1996 for

Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor and two convictions in 1999 for

Class B felony child molesting) and “has not benefitted from four (4) years of

the most structured and specialized sex offender treatment available through the

correctional system; to wit: the defendant stated ‘I did not learn anything.’”

Tr. pp. 39-40. The court also identified as mitigators that Dalton pled guilty

and “has maintained some gainful employment at times.” Id. at 40. Finding

that the aggravators “clearly and substantially” outweighed the mitigators, id.,

the court sentenced Dalton to the maximum term of twelve years on each

count. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5(b) (providing that the sentencing range for a

Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years). It

1 According to the Presentence Investigation Report, Dalton was charged with three counts of Class A felony child molesting and one count of Class C felony child exploitation in Cause No. FA-04. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 7.

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then ordered the sentences to run consecutively because “there are two (2)

different victims and two (2) separate incidents.” Tr. p. 41. The court

acknowledged that it had ordered Dalton to serve the maximum sentence but

found that this case “crie[d] out” for it. Id. at 40. [5] Dalton now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision [6] Dalton contends that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run

consecutively and that his twenty-four-year sentence is inappropriate.2

I. Consecutive Sentences [7] Trial courts have the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Ind. Code §

35-50-1-2(c). But in order to impose consecutive sentences, a trial court must

find at least one aggravator. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013), reh’g denied, trans. denied. It is well established that the existence of

multiple victims or crimes constitutes a valid aggravator that the court may

consider in imposing consecutive sentences. Id. at 919-20; see also Myers v. State,

27 N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015), reh’g denied. Here, the trial court found that

the fact that there were “two (2) different victims and two (2) separate

2 Dalton also argues that the trial court’s sentencing statement is not sufficient because the court “failed to provide a specific reason why each factor is aggravating or mitigating.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. In making this argument, he does not challenge any individual aggravators. We find that the trial court’s sentencing statement sufficiently identifies its “reasons for selecting the sentence that it impose[d].” Ind. Code § 35-38-1- 1.3.

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incidents” justified consecutive sentences. Dalton admits that there were two

victims. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Dalton’s

twelve-year sentences to run consecutively.

II. Inappropriate Sentence [8] Dalton also argues that his twenty-four-year sentence is inappropriate. Under

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this Court may revise a sentence authorized by

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

of the offender. Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). The defendant has

the burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Thomson

v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). [9] Dalton’s inappropriateness argument focuses on the nature of the offenses to

which he pled guilty. He claims that the fact that he touched the breasts of two

different girls, one time each, does not warrant a twenty-four-year sentence.

Although we agree with Dalton that his offenses, by themselves, do not warrant

the maximum sentence, Dalton’s character—which he does not even address

on appeal—does. That is, Dalton was convicted of Class C felony sexual

misconduct with a minor in 1996 and given a suspended sentence of four years.

Dalton later violated his probation in that case and was ordered to serve two

years in the Department of Correction. Then, in 1999, Dalton was convicted of

two counts of Class B felony child molesting and sentenced to ten years in the

DOC. The court ordered Dalton’s ten-year sentence to run consecutive to his

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two-year sentence in the probation-revocation case. In addition, Dalton had

Class A felony child-molesting charges in Cause No. FA-04 dismissed as part of

the plea agreement in this case. Finally, Dalton received four years of sex-

offender treatment that was “a condition of [his] parole and not self pursued.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 11. He claimed, however, that he “did not learn

anything” from this treatment. Id. Dalton’s character reveals that he is a threat

to children and hasn’t taken advantage of the previous attempts to rehabilitate

him. Accordingly, Dalton has failed to persuade us that his twenty-four-year

sentence is inappropriate. [10] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

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