Victoria Vooys v. Maria Bentley

BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority reads H.R. 6116 as providing that the filing of a certiorari petition commences a case and so deprives us of jurisdiction over that case. I cannot agree. Under the majority's interpretation, we have certiorari jurisdiction over final judgments of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands-up until the moment a litigant asks us to exercise that jurisdiction. That is not what H.R. 6116 says. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the [trial] court," not by filing a certiorari petition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. The case is the entire civil action, not just the certiorari stage. As the majority's legislative survey illustrates, Congress distinguishes among "cases," "appeals," and "writs of certiorari." And it does so in statutes generally, appellate statutes, appellate statutes governing territorial jurisdiction, and statutes (going back to 1917) governing jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands. Nor can I agree that Bason 's reading would perpetuate our certiorari jurisdiction beyond the fifteen years specified by Congress. If H.R. 6116 applies to a case, then our jurisdiction over that case ends immediately. I see no way to read the statute that would preserve our jurisdiction beyond "fifteen years following the establishment" of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994). I would also not venture into the quicksand of legislative history, or speculate about legislative purpose. The text is clear. And stare decisis is a weighty concern, both generally and for litigants in the pipeline who relied on Bason . So I would adhere to Bason 's reading of H.R. 6116 and hold that we have jurisdiction here. I respectfully dissent.