Luque v. Flovictov Cab Corp.

Luque v Flovictov Cab Corp. (2019 NY Slip Op 00428) Luque v Flovictov Cab Corp. 2019 NY Slip Op 00428 Decided on January 23, 2019 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided on January 23, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department SHERI S. ROMAN, J.P. SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX JOSEPH J. MALTESE HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ. 2016-09920 (Index No. 500905/13) [*1]Silvia Luque, appellant, v Flovictov Cab Corp., respondent, et al., defendant. William Pager, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant. Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondent. DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Debra Silber, J.), dated September 9, 2016. The order granted the motion of the defendant Flovictov Cab Corp. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Flovictov Cab Corp. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is denied. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she alleges she sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant Flovictov Cab Corp. (hereinafter the defendant) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals. The defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The papers submitted by the defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977; cf. Calucci v Baker, 299 AD2d 897). Since the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. ROMAN, J.P., HINDS-RADIX, MALTESE and LASALLE, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court