Mondesir v. Ahmed

Mondesir v Ahmed (2019 NY Slip Op 06489) Mondesir v Ahmed 2019 NY Slip Op 06489 Decided on September 11, 2019 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided on September 11, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J. SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX HECTOR D. LASALLE BETSY BARROS, JJ. 2018-01343 (Index No. 513397/15) [*1]Jacques C. Mondesir, appellant, v Khalil A. Ahmed, et al., respondents. Law Offices of Michael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC, New York, NY (Stacey Haskel of counsel), for appellant. Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Robert D. Grace of counsel), for respondents. DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Edgar G. Walker, J.), dated December 15, 2017. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on July 10, 2015. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. By order dated December 15, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals. The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to the cervical region of his spine under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d). One of the defendants' experts found significant limitations in the range of motion of the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine and failed to adequately explain and substantiate, with competent medical evidence, his belief that the limitations were self-imposed (see Singleton v F & R Royal, Inc., 166 AD3d 837, 838; Rivas v Hill, 162 AD3d 809, 810-811; Miller v Ebrahim, 134 AD3d 915, 916; Mercado v Mendoza, 133 AD3d 833, 834; Miller v Bratsilova, 118 AD3d 761). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable [*2]issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., HINDS-RADIX, LASALLE and BARROS, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court