Marcus Lloyd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 12 2019, 9:49 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Megan Shipley Attorney General of Indiana Marion County Public Defender Agency George P. Sherman – Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marcus Lloyd, September 12, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2649 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David J. Certo, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G12-1804-CM-13965

Mathias, Judge. [1] Marcus Lloyd (“Lloyd”) has filed a petition for rehearing, which we grant for

the limited purpose of correcting our memorandum decision.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision on Rehearing 18A-CR-2649 | September 12, 2019 Page 1 of 2 [2] In his petition, Lloyd correctly observes that our memorandum decision

incorrectly stated that Lloyd had to prove “reasonable fear of death or serious

bodily harm.” Slip op. at *2 (quoting Simpson v. State, 915 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). A defendant is only required to prove that

element in a case involving deadly force. When a case does not involve deadly

force, a defendant claiming self-defense must only show that he was protecting

himself from what he “reasonably believe[d] to be the imminent use of unlawful

force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c); Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014), trans. denied. And in our opinion, we observed that “a reasonable

person would not fear death or great bodily harm in the presence of uniformed

officers that were stopping the fight.” Slip op. at 2. [3] However, the State negated Lloyd’s claim of self-defense by proving that he

willingly participated in the fight and refused to withdraw from the fight when

ordered to do so by police officers. Id. For this reason, we affirm our

memorandum decision in all other respects.

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision on Rehearing 18A-CR-2649 | September 12, 2019 Page 2 of 2