Jimmy E. Crase v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 04 2019, 6:28 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE James H. Voyles, Jr. F. Aaron Negangard Tyler D. Helmond Chief Deputy Attorney General of Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Indiana Webb Indianapolis, Indiana Sierra A. Murray Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jimmy E. Crase, October 4, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2423 v. Appeal from the Shelby Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Charles D. Appellee-Plaintiff. O’Connor, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 73C01-1607-FA-2

Bradford, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2423 | October 4, 2019 Page 1 of 5

Case Summary [1] After being accused of and charged with molesting his step-granddaughters, on

February 10, 2018, Jimmy E. Crase pled guilty to two counts of Class B felony

child molestation. Pursuant to the terms of his guilty plea, Crase agreed that he

would be classified as a credit restricted felon. The trial court accepted Crase’s

guilty plea and sentenced him in accordance with its terms. On appeal, Crase

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his classification as a credit

restricted felon. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] M.D., who was born in 2002, and M.S., who was born in 1999, are Crase’s

step-granddaughters. Crase molested M.D. and M.S. “on numerous occasions”

between January of 2007 and December of 2010. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.

19. On July 12, 2016, the State charged Crase with two counts of Class A

felony child molesting. On February 10, 2018, Crase pled guilty to two counts

of the lesser-included offense of Class B felony child molesting. The plea

agreement explicitly stated that Crase and the State “agree that [Crase] shall be

a credit restricted felon.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 54, 58. [3] During Crase’s guilty plea hearing, the State provided a factual basis, stating

that if the matter proceeding to trial, M.D. and M.S. would testify that on a

number of occasions between January of 2007 and December of 2010, they

visited Crase and he molested them by placing his hand on or in their vaginas.

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Crase “admit[ted] and agree[d]” that he “acted as described” in the factual

basis. Tr. p. 13. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and, on July 31,

2018, sentenced Crase to an aggregate eighteen-year sentence with eight years

executed in the Department of Correction, two years served on home detention,

and eight years suspended to probation. The trial court also found, pursuant to

the terms of the plea agreement, that Crase would be classified as a credit

restricted felon.

Discussion and Decision [4] Indiana courts “have long recognized that a defendant may forgo a trial and

plead guilty.” Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996). “One

consequence of pleading guilty is restriction of the ability to challenge the

conviction on direct appeal.” Id. In comparing plea agreements to settlements

in civil cases, the Indiana Supreme Court indicated that “the plea as a legal act

brings to a close the dispute between the parties, much as settling civil parties

do by submitting an agreed judgment. To permit appeal by settling parties

would, of course, make settlements difficult to achieve in any litigation.” Id. at

396. [5] Plea agreements “are in the nature of contracts entered into between the

defendant and the State.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004). As the

Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

[A] plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the state and the trial court. The prosecutor and the

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defendant are the contracting parties, and the trial court’s role with respect to their agreement is described by statute: If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.

Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (internal citation and

quotation omitted). [6] On appeal, Crase challenges his classification as a credit restricted felon.

Specifically, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the

classification because the factual basis does not specify that the qualifying acts

took place after the credit restricted felon classification came into existence on

July 1, 2008. For its part, the State argues that by specifically agreeing in the

plea agreement that he shall be classified as a credit restricted felon, Crase has

waived this challenge on appeal. We agree with the State. [7] Again, the plea agreement entered into by Crase and the State explicitly stated

that Crase and the State “agree that [Crase] shall be a credit restricted felon.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 54, 58 (emphasis added). Given the contractual

nature of his plea agreement, Crase is bound by the terms of the agreement,

including the term indicating that he shall be classified as a credit restricted

felon. See Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d 1248; Holloway v. State, 980 N.E.2d 331, 335

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Crase, therefore, cannot challenge this classification on

appeal. [8] Moreover, to the extent that Crase argues that the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence by classifying him as a credit restricted felon, we note that the Indiana

Supreme Court has held that “[a] defendant ‘may not enter into a plea Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2423 | October 4, 2019 Page 4 of 5

agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then

later complain that it was an illegal sentence.’” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40

(Ind. 2004) (quoting Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987)). In this

case, Crase received substantial benefit from his plea agreement, i.e., that two

Class A felony charges were reduced to Class B felony charges and the executed

portion of his sentence was capped at ten years. As such, even if classification

of Crase as a credit restricted felony did result in an illegal sentence, Crase

cannot challenge said sentence after entering into a plea agreement calling for

the sentence and benefiting from the terms of the agreement. [9] Furthermore, waiver notwithstanding, the evidence is sufficient to support

Crase’s classification as a credit restricted felon. The factual basis alleges that

Crase’s criminal conduct occurred between January 2007 and December 2010.

Crase admitted both that the factual basis was accurate and that he should be

classified as a credit restricted felon. Given that timeline set forth in the factual

basis included approximately two and one-half years after the statute creating

the credit restricted felon classification went into effect on July 1, 2008, one can

reasonably infer from Crase’s admissions that he committed qualifying acts at

some point after July 1, 2008. [10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

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