Veloz-Ramirez v. Gonzales

PER CURIAM: * Apolonio Veloz-Ramirez pleaded guilty in 1993 to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a firearm. He seeks review of the BIA’s removal order and denial of his waiver-of-removal and cancellation-of-removal applications under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Under the REAL ID Act, because Veloz-Ramirez’s 1993 conviction was a firearm offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), our jurisdiction is limited by § 1252(a)(2)(C) to review of his constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 40, 166 L.Ed.2d 18 (2006). We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it was influenced by the IJ’s decision. See Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.1996). Although we review de novo the BIA’s conclusions of law, we defer to its interpretation of immigration regulations if such interpretation is reasonable. Herna ndez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 519. Veloz-Ramirez first contends the BIA erred in finding him ineligible for waiver of removal under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Veloz-Ramirez was charged with being removable based on his 1993 conviction, which, in addition to constituting a § 1227(a)(2)(C) firearm offense, constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Because there was a directly comparable ground of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), Veloz-Ramirez was eligible for former § 1182(c) waiver of removability for his crime as involving moral turpitude. Nevertheless, he was not similarly eligible for his crime as a firearm offense because there was no such directly comparable inadmissibility ground. Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir.1993). *302 Veloz-Ramirez next maintains the BIA erred in finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). He maintains the BIA erred in retroactively applying the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s “stop-time” provision to pretermit his application. As noted, VelozRamirez’s 1993 conviction was a § 1227(a)(2)(A)® moral-turpitude crime, which is referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Therefore, when Veloz-Ramirez committed the underlying aggravated assault on 1 January 1992, his period of continuous United States residence terminated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l). At that time, he had not yet accrued the seven years of continuous United States residence required for § 1229b(a) cancellation-of-removal eligibility. Further, retroactive application of the stop-time rule does not violate aliens’ due process rights. See Gonzalez-Torres v. INS, 213 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir.2000). Therefore, Veloz-Ramirez has again failed to show BIA error. DENIED. Footnotes [*] Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.