MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 15 2020, 9:33 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Robert M. Sklar Matthew J. Mize North Manchester, Indiana Law Offices of Matthew J. Mize, LLC North Manchester, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert M. Sklar, January 15, 2020 Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-OV-2157 v. Appeal from the Wabash Superior Court Town of North Manchester, The Honorable Benjamin Appellee. Vanderpool, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 85D01-1906-OV-470
Brown, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 1 of 7 [1] Robert M. Sklar appeals the dismissal of an information filed by the Town of
North Manchester (the “Town”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On June 14, 2019, the Town filed an Information For Blocking
Drive/Sidewalk/Alley, Ordinance Violation 73.01 against Sklar in the Wabash
Superior Court under cause number 85D01-1906-OV-470. An entry on the
same day in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicates that the court
set an initial hearing on the violation for June 24, 2019, and ordered Sklar to
appear. Sklar sent a letter, addressed to Wabash Superior Court Judge
Benjamin Vanderpool and dated June 23, 2019, requesting a continuance and
stating that he disputed the validity of the violation. A June 28, 2019 CCS
entry states that the court held the initial hearing, that Sklar did not appear, and
that prior to the hearing the court received ex parte correspondence from Sklar
disputing the ordinance violation. The same CCS entry indicated the matter
was set for a contested bench trial on August 5, 2019. [3] A CCS entry, titled “Motion to Quash Filed,” indicates that the Town filed a
Motion to Quash Subpoenas on July 10, 2019, and another CCS entry indicates
Sklar filed an answer on July 16, 2019, to the Town’s motion and states
“Motion to Compel, Jury Trial Demanded.” Appellee’s Appendix Volume II
at 3. A CCS entry for July 22, 2019, indicates that the court vacated the
scheduled August 5, 2019 bench trial and scheduled a hearing on the Town’s
motion for August 14, 2019.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 2 of 7 [4] On August 7, 2019, the Town filed a motion to dismiss which states it had
“received payment for the parking ticket(s) in question” and that “there no
longer exists an outstanding ordinance violation,” and the court granted the
Town’s motion. Id. at 9. On August 8, 2019, Sklar filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Reinstate Action that states “Jury Trial
Demanded” and, in contending that a due process and equal protection
violation had occurred, that “[a]fter the Town Court was dissolved in favor of
the Superior Court, Defendants have no ability to challenge any ordinance
violation unless the Town first decides to take enforcement action and only
after Defendant fails to pay said citation.” Id. at 10-11. It also states that the
Town “accepted Payment for the violation, thus a fine is still being paid, but
rather than by the Defendant, by an unknown third party” and that “by the
[T]own accepting another person’s payment for Defendant[’]s tickets, they are
essentially entering a guilty plea.” Id. at 11. The court denied Sklar’s motion to
reinstate action.
Discussion [5] Sklar argues that the trial court erred “in allowing the Town to dismiss its case.”
Appellant’s Brief at 7. Without pointing to support in the record, he contends
that the “Town dissolved its Town Court in September 2010 and has not
designated a violations bureau or administrative body.” Id. at 8. He states:
“The Town claims that on August 6, 2019[,] an ‘anonymous’ payment arrived
by US Postal Service with $30[] Cash in a letter addressed to [the North
Manchester Police Department.” Id. (internal footnote omitted). He cites Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 3 of 7
Code § 9-30-11-11 and contends that the Town, in accepting payment,
“essentially entered a Judgment against [him] without his consent.” Id. at 10.
He claims: “The Town has every right to dismiss an action on its own, without
reason; however it cannot do so while secretly accepting a payment from an
‘anonymous source’. . . .” Id. He cites Ind. Code § 33-36-3-2 and asserts that
the “Town clerk-treasurer” did not receive any admission from him or a waiver
of his right to trial. 2 Id. at 11. He further contends that ordinance violations are
quasi-criminal actions and, without citing to the record or authority, claims that
the court had an obligation to make sure the payment was made knowingly. Id.
at 13. [6] Although Sklar is proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standard
as trained attorneys and are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of
being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)
(citing Matter of G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)). This Court will “not become
an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too
poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d
980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied.
1 Ind. Code § 9-30-11-1 states: “As used in this chapter, ‘judgment’ means a monetary penalty assessed for the violation of an ordinance that regulates parking violation.” 2 Sklar does not develop an argument with regard to, or point to any authority interpreting, Ind. Code § 33- 36-3-2, which provides that a “person charged with an ordinance or a code violation is entitled to a trial before a court as provided by law, unless the person waives the right to trial and enters an admission of the violation with the violations clerk. Upon an admission, the clerk shall assess and receive from the violator the amount prescribed by the schedule of civil penalties established under section 1 of this chapter.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 4 of 7 [7] We note Sklar’s failure to follow the requirements of the Appellate Rules.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) governs the statement of case and provides that “[p]age
references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix are required in accordance with
Rule 22(C).” Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) governs the statement of facts and
provides that “[t]he facts shall be supported by page references to the Record on
Appeal or Appendix in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)
governs the argument and provides that “[t]he argument must contain the
contentions of the appellant on the issues presented” and that “[e]ach contention
must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or
parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.” Appellate
Rule 22(C) governs references to the record on appeal and provides that “[a]ny
factual statement shall be supported by a citation to the volume and page where it
appears in an Appendix, and if not contained in an Appendix, to the volume and
page it appears in the Transcript or exhibits, e.g., Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 5;
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 231-32.” Sklar does not include any citation to the record in his
statement of case, statement of facts, or argument, and we note that he did not
file an appendix. 3 See Ind. Appellate Rules 49, 50. [8] Generally, a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Finke v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 862 N.E.2d 266, 270-272
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing a dismissal of a cause of action under Trial
3 Although Sklar provides certain citations to an “Ex A-1,” “Exhibit A-2,” “Ex A-3,” and “Ex A-4” in his argument section, see e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 8, we observe that he did not submit a separate Appellant’s appendix containing such documents. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(F).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 5 of 7
Rule 41(A) for an abuse of discretion), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion
occurs if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances, or reasonable inferences therefrom, that were before the court,
or if the decision is without reason or based upon impermissible reasons or
considerations. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Needler, 816 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004). [9] “[I]t is well established that ‘prosecution for the violation of a city ordinance in
which a monetary penalty only is sought is a civil and not a criminal action.’”
Gates v. City of Indianapolis, 991 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), trans. denied. With regard
to the nature of the proceedings, the General Assembly has set forth procedures
for enforcing ordinances that are plainly civil in nature. Boss, 944 N.E.2d at 23.
An action to enforce an ordinance begins with a complaint and summons and
must conform to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. See id. See also Ind.
Code § 34-28-5-1 (providing in part that actions under the chapter, which is
titled “Infraction and Ordinance Violation Enforcement Proceedings,” be
conducted in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure). Indiana
Trial Rule 41(A)(2) governs the voluntary dismissal of a cause of action at the
plaintiff’s instance “upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper.” [10] Our review of the record reveals that on June 14, 2019, the Town filed an
Information For Blocking Drive/Sidewalk/Alley, Ordinance Violation 73.01
against Sklar, and the court set an initial hearing on the violation and ordered
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-OV-2157 | January 15, 2020 Page 6 of 7
Sklar to appear. On August 7, 2019, after the court had vacated the bench trial
and scheduled the August 14, 2019 hearing on the Town’s motion, the Town
filed a motion to dismiss, stating that it had “received payment for the parking
ticket(s) in question” and that “there no longer exists an outstanding ordinance
violation.” Appellee’s Appendix Volume I at 9. Sklar does not establish there
was an outstanding ordinance violation, show that he has been prejudiced, or
otherwise develop a cogent argument. See Zoller v. Zoller, 858 N.E.2d 124, 127
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“A party waives any issue for which it fails to develop a
cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority.”). After due
consideration of the record and proceedings before us, we affirm the trial court. [11] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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