A.L. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 21 2020, 9:02 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE David M. Payne Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana Marion, Indiana Courtney Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

A.L., January 21, 2020 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-JV-1629 v. Appeal from the Grant Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Dana J. Appellee-Petitioner. Kenworthy, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 27D02-1905-JD-47

Barteau, Senior Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1629 | January 21, 2020 Page 1 of 7

Statement of the Case [1] A.L. appeals the juvenile court’s determination that she is a juvenile delinquent

for an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute disorderly conduct, a

Class B misdemeanor. We affirm.

Issue [2] A.L. raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to rebut her claim of self-defense.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On the night of May 17, 2018, Rebecca Wesling, A.L., D.M., and others were

at Cody Roberts’ apartment in Gas City, Indiana. Wesling and others prepared

to leave. D.M., who was Wesling’s ex-boyfriend, said “make sure you take that

bitch, directing towards [Wesling], with you.” Tr. p. 10. Wesling responded to

D.M.’s insult. A.L. approached Wesling and struck her. [4] Wesling left the building, but A.L. and D.M. followed her to her car. A.L.

struck Wesling again, and Wesling “started to defend [her]self.” Id. at 11. The

fight ended, and Wesling left. [5] On May 18, 2018, Wesling arrived at the Gas City Police Department to

complain that A.L. had attacked her. While she was there, she displayed signs

of medical distress and was transported to a hospital. Wesling returned to the

department the next day to complete her statement. She had bruises on her

face.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1629 | January 21, 2020 Page 2 of 7 [6] Wesling later saw a post on one of A.L.’s social media accounts. In the post,

A.L. stated she attacked Wesling because Wesling was “running her mouth.”

Id. at 14. A.L. threatened to “beat” Wesling again. Id. at 15. [7] On May 28, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition, claiming A.L. was a

delinquent child for acts that, if committed by an adult, would amount to

battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor (Count I), and

disorderly conduct (fighting), a Class B misdemeanor (Count II). [8] The juvenile court held an initial hearing on May 29, 2019, and A.L. denied the

allegations in the State’s petition. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing

for June 17, 2019. [9] The court held the hearing as scheduled. At the end of the hearing, the court

stated, “I can’t find that you committed the act of battery. But, I am going to

find that you committed disorderly conduct – fighting.” Id. at 38. The court

further explained as to the allegation of battery that there was “enough

uncertainty” about the circumstances. Id. at 43. Next, the court placed A.L. on

probation for six months for the juvenile adjudication on Count II. On June 24,

2019, the court issued a fact-finding order and a dispositional order setting forth

the court’s decisions. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Conclusion [10] A.L. argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s

determination that she was a juvenile delinquent for committing an act of

disorderly conduct. “A child commits a delinquent act if, before becoming Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1629 | January 21, 2020 Page 3 of 7

eighteen (18) years of age, the child commits an act that would be an offense if

committed by an adult, . . . .” Ind. Code § 31-37-1-2 (1997). In this case, the

State claimed A.L. had committed the act of disorderly conduct, a Class B

misdemeanor. The General Assembly has provided the following definition, in

relevant part: “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . .

engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct . . . commits disorderly conduct, a

Class B misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a) (2014). [11] A.L. does not dispute that her conduct fulfilled the elements of disorderly

conduct. She instead argues the State failed to disprove her claim of self-

defense. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise

unlawful act. McCullough v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),

trans. denied. The General Assembly has explained:

(c) A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:

(1) is justified in using deadly force; and

(2) does not have a duty to retreat;

if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.

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Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019). [12] The Assembly further provided, “a person is not justified in using force if . . .

the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial

aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates

to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless

continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g). [13] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that in order to prevail upon a claim

of self-defense, “the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he

had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the

violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wilson

v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). Once a person claims self-defense,

the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of these elements beyond a

reasonable doubt. McCullough, 985 N.E.2d at 1138. The State may meet this

burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the person

did not act in self-defense, or by relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in

chief. Id. [14] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a

claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the

evidence claim. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. We neither reweigh the evidence

nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of

probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict

will not be disturbed. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1629 | January 21, 2020 Page 5 of 7 [15] At the fact-finding hearing, Wesling testified that A.L. struck her inside the

apartment. She further explained that A.L. struck her again outside the

apartment, provoking Wesling into fighting back. Wesling also read to the

court one of A.L.’s social media posts, in which A.L. stated she attacked

Wesling because of something Wesling had said. A.L. further threatened to

attack Wesling again. This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that A.L. instigated the fight with Wesling. As a result, the

State successfully disproved A.L.’s claim of self-defense. A.L. points to other

evidence indicating that Wesling attacked her first, but A.L. is asking the Court

to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids. [16] A.L. further argues the juvenile court had “accepted self-defense” in declining

to determine that A.L. had committed an act of battery and should have also

accepted her defense as to the allegation of disorderly conduct. She further

argues the trial court’s split decision “makes no sense.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. [17] With respect to the battery allegation, we cannot agree that the juvenile court

accepted A.L.’s claim of self-defense. The court instead merely stated there was

“uncertainty” about the facts. Tr. p. 43. In any event, if A.L. is arguing that

the court’s different determinations on Counts I and II are erroneously

inconsistent, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, in the context of jury

verdicts in criminal cases, that a finder of fact’s judgments “are not subject to

appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or

irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). “A jury’s

right to exercise lenity is an important component of our criminal justice

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system.” Id. at 648-49. Applying the reasoning in Beattie to the fact-finder’s

decision in this case, we will not examine the possible reasons for the juvenile

court’s differing decisions on Count I and Count II.

Conclusion [18] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

[19] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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