Monroe County, Indiana and Monroe County Plan Commission v. Boathouse Apartments, LLC (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 22 2020, 9:23 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE1 David B. Schilling William J. Beggs Lee F. Baker Ryan M. Heeb Monroe County Legal Department Bunger & Robertson Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Monroe County, Indiana and April 22, 2020 Monroe County Plan Court of Appeals Case No. Commission, 20A-PL-177 Appellant-Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court v. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure, Judge Boathouse Apartments, LLC, Trial Court Cause No. Appellee-Defendant. 53C01-1702-PL-257

Bradford, Chief Judge.

1 We note that while Appellee Boathouse Apartments, LLC, did not file an Appellee’s Brief in the instant appeal, the listed counsel filed a joint appearance on Boathouse’s behalf.

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Case Summary [1] On February 3, 2017, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Plan

Commission (collectively, “the County”) filed a complaint in the Monroe

Circuit Court, seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse Apartments, LLC

(“Boathouse”), for alleged violations of certain Monroe County ordinances.

Boathouse subsequently filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, arguing

that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s

claims. The trial court granted Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. Because we

conclude that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the

County’s claims, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Boathouse owns three lots (the “Boathouse Property”) within the Lakes

Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington. During 2016,

Boathouse began a project to construct six buildings of townhome apartments

on the Boathouse Property. In completing the project, Boathouse was required

to comply with the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County

Code of Ordinances (“Monroe County Code”). [3] On February 3, 2017, the County filed a complaint seeking a monetary penalty

against Boathouse, alleging that Boathouse had violated the use and occupancy

requirements of the Monroe County Code. Specifically, the County alleged

that Boathouse had permitted tenants to occupy the apartment units before a

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land use certificate and certificate of occupancy were issued. Boathouse

answered and filed affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 4, 2017. [4] On October 14, 2019, Boathouse filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss,

claiming that the County had failed to comply with applicable ordinances in

bringing its claims against Boathouse and “[t]his failure deprives the Court of

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76.

As such, Boathouse requested “that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss

because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the County’s]

claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. The County filed both a brief and a

supplemental brief in opposition to Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. On January

6, 2020, the trial court, ruling on a paper record, issued an order granting

Boathouse’s motion and dismissing the County’s lawsuit.

Discussion and Decision [5] Initially we note that where, as here, the appellee fails to submit an appellate

brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the

appellee’s behalf. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind.

2006). “Rather, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief

presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. “Prima facie error in this context is

defined as, ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting

Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 3 of 8 [6] In challenging the trial court’s dismissal of its action against Boathouse, the

County claims that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims. Where, as here, the facts before

the trial court are not in dispute, “the question of subject matter jurisdiction is

purely one of law.” GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001).

“Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court’s conclusion

because “appellate courts independently, and without the slightest deference to

trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem to be questions of

law.” Id. “Thus, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial court are

undisputed.” Id.

[7] Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. So, in determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner’s claim falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.

State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711–12 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations

omitted). “Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter

jurisdiction.” Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel

Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “All circuit courts have: (1)

original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.”

Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2 (a). “The Monroe circuit court is a court of general

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jurisdiction” and, as such, has the authority to maintain a civil docket. Ind.

Code § 33-33-53-2(a). [8] The County claims that statutory authority expressly confers subject matter

jurisdiction over the County’s case against Boathouse to the trial court. We

agree. “The Indiana General Assembly, through statutes, has both authorized

local units of government to create ordinances and established the manner in

which those ordinances are to be enforced.” Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 22

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, the General Assembly “specifically withheld

from [local] units, however, the power to prescribe a penalty for conduct

constituting” a violation of a local ordinance. Id. (internal quotation omitted).

The General Assembly instead gave this power to the courts. [9] Indiana Code sections 36-7-4-1013 and 36-7-4-1014 detail remedies for

enforcement and allowable actions for violations of ordinances. Specifically,

Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1013(a) provides that if, after conducting an

investigation into an alleged violation of an ordinance, a municipal attorney or

an attorney representing the county comes to the reasonable belief that an entity

has violated an ordinance, “the municipal attorney or an attorney representing

the county may file a complaint against the person and prosecute the alleged

violation under IC 36-1-6.”2 Ind. Code section 36-7-4-1014 provides as follows:

2 Indiana Code section 36-1-6-4(a) provides that “A municipal corporation may bring a civil action … if a person: (1) violates an ordinance regulating or prohibiting a condition or use of property[.]”

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(a) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may bring an action under IC 36-1-6 to enforce any ordinance adopted or action taken under this chapter.

(b) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may also bring an action to enforce:

(1) conditions imposed by the commission or board of zoning appeals under this chapter; or

(2) covenants made in connection with a subdivision plat, a development plan, or a PUD district ordinance (as defined in section 1503 of this chapter).

****

(d) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or designated enforcement official may invoke any legal, equitable, or special remedy in an action described in subsection (a) or (b).

(e) An action for the levy of a fine or penalty for enforcement of a zoning ordinance may be brought in any court located within the jurisdiction of the plan commission or board of zoning appeals.

The above-quoted statutory sections clearly indicate that actions such as that

brought in this case by the County, which seeks penalties for alleged violations

of the certain County ordinances, may be brought in court, with Indiana Code

section 36-7-4-1014 allowing for the action to be brought in “any court located

within the jurisdiction.” [10] Furthermore, we agree with the County that the arguments set forth in

Boathouse’s motion to dismiss allege procedural, i.e., legal, error. “Subject

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matter jurisdiction and legal error are distinct concepts.” Clark Cty. Bd. of

Aviation Comm’rs v. Dreyer, 986 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 3013), trans.

granted, opinion vacated, 992 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 2013), and aff’d, 993 N.E.2d 624

(Ind. 2013). “Procedural error doesn’t rob the court of jurisdiction.” Reinhart,

112 N.E.3d at 712. Stated differently, “[i]t goes without saying that a court’s

power to award relief and a claimant’s entitlement to relief on the merits are

very different things.” Price v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind.

2017). “Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency

adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without

any service of process.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis

in original). “Thus, characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as

‘jurisdictional’ misapprehends the concepts.” Id. “Indeed, as strongly

suggested by the K.S. Court, practitioners and the judiciary, including

ourselves, should stop using the phrase ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’

rather than ‘legal error.’” Dreyer, 986 N.E.2d at 291. [11] Again, in its motion to dismiss, Boathouse alleged that the County failed to

comply with applicable ordinances in bringing claims against Boathouse and

“[t]his failure deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over these

claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. However, contrary to Boathouse’s

claim, we have previously concluded that procedural error or the failure to

follow statutory guidelines for initiating a particular action does not affect

subject matter jurisdiction, so long as the action was filed in the proper court for

such an action. Blackman v. Gholson, 46 N.E.3d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

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(citing K.S., 849 N.E.2d 542 (providing a juvenile court’s failure to follow all of

the statutory procedures for initiating a delinquency petition did not affect

either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but was mere procedural error);

Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg, 32 N.E.3d 798, 805

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding alleged defect in annexation remonstrance

signatures did not affect subject matter jurisdiction of trial court to consider

remonstrance petition)); see also Prosecuting Attorney of Hendricks Cty. v. Hammer,

92 N.E.3d 649, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (providing that the question of

whether a suspended driver petitions the proper court under the SDP statute is a

“question of legal error, not jurisdictional error”). Thus, any procedural or

legal error that may have been committed by the County would not deprive the

trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. [12] In sum, given that the relevant authority clearly demonstrates that the trial

court has subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims against

Boathouse, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Boathouse’s Trial

Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss. We therefore remand the matter back to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. [13] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter remanded for further

proceedings.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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