Errington v. Warden, Bedford Hills Correctional Facility

19-2736-pr Errington v. Warden, Bedford Hills Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

¹ At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 26th day of May, two thousand twenty. 4 5 PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 MICHAEL H. PARK, 8 Circuit Judges. 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 SHERRI ERRINGTON, 11 12 Petitioner - Appellant, 13 14 v. No. 19-2736-pr 15 16 WARDEN, BEDFORD HILLS CORRECTIONAL 17 FACILITY, 18 19 Respondent - Appellee. ∗ 20 ------------------------------------------------------------------

∗ The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

1 FOR PETITIONER: Robert J. Boyle, Law Office of Robert 2 J. Boyle, New York, NY 3 4 FOR RESPONDENT: Barbara Underwood, Solicitor 5 General, Nikki Kowalski, Deputy 6 Solicitor General for Criminal 7 Matters, Andrew W. Amend, 8 Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, 9 Margaret A. Cieprisz, Assistant 10 Attorney General, for Letitia James, 11 Attorney General for the State of 12 New York, New York, NY.

13 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the 14 Western District of New York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Judge). 15 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 16 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 17 Petitioner Sherri Errington appeals from a judgment of the District Court 18 (Wolford, J.) denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2254. Errington was convicted after a jury trial in New York state court of two 20 counts of a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and one 21 count of first-degree sexual abuse. As relevant to this appeal, Errington’s 22 habeas petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel related to her trial

1 attorney’s purported failure to advise her of her right to testify. 1 We assume the 2 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, 3 to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 4 We review a district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. Cornell v. 5 Kirkpatrick, 665 F.3d 369, 374 (2d Cir. 2011). The New York state court denied 6 Errington’s motion to vacate her convictions pursuant to section 440.30(4)(d) of 7 New York Criminal Procedural Law. 2 The parties do not contest, and we 8 therefore assume without deciding, that the state court’s denial of the motion to 9 vacate constitutes an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 10 See Chrysler v. Guiney, 806 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we can 11 grant the petition only if the state decision “was contrary to, or involved an

1 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 2 the Supreme Court[,]” or if it “was based on an unreasonable determination of 3 the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 4 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(i)–(ii); see also Chrysler, 806 F.3d at 117. 5 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 6 show prejudice, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 7 counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 8 different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984). We agree with 9 the District Court that, on this record, Errington cannot show that she was 10 prejudiced by the alleged failure to advise her of her right to testify. Errington 11 argues that her testimony would have been crucial to a duress defense, but most 12 of the content of her proffered testimony was introduced into the trial record 13 through video-taped and written statements in which Errington contradicted 14 portions of the testimony of one of the victims and another witness and 15 described her husband’s history of controlling and threatening her. The record 16 also suggests that, if Errington had chosen to testify, she would have been 17 subjected to damaging cross-examination about inconsistent statements and

1 actions that would have undermined her defense. See Rega v. United States, 2 263 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim for failure to 3 show prejudice where defendant’s testimony “would have added little weight to 4 his defense but would have opened the door to” damaging impeachment). 5 Thus, Errington has failed to show that her testimony would have created a 6 reasonable probability of a different outcome. 7 We have considered Errington’s remaining arguments and conclude that 8 they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 9 Court is AFFIRMED.

10 FOR THE COURT: 11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

Footnotes

[1] Errington’s petition raised other grounds for relief, but Errington conceded to the District Court that all but the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and a due process claim were procedurally barred based on her failure to exhaust state remedies. The District Court rejected the due process claim on the merits, and Errington does not challenge that ruling on appeal. See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 380 n.6 (2d Cir. 2003).

[2] Under section 440.30(4)(d), the state court may deny a motion to vacate without a hearing if, “[u]pon considering the merits,” the court determines that “[a]n allegation of fact essential to support the motion . . . is made solely by the defendant and is unsupported by any other affidavit or evidence,” and, under “all the other circumstances attending the case, there is no reasonable possibility that such allegation is true.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 440.30(4)(d).