Eric J. Lairson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 31 2020, 11:08 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Adam G. Forrest Curtis T. Hill, Jr. BBFCS Attorneys Attorney General Richmond, Indiana Josiah Swinney Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric J. Lairson, August 31, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-28 v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff Charles K. Todd, Jr., Judge Trial Court Cause No. 89D01-1804-MR-1

Vaidik, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 1 of 13

Case Summary [1] Eric J. Lairson was convicted of murder for beating his girlfriend to death and

sentenced to sixty years in prison. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court

erred in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and that his sentence

is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Around 2:00 p.m. on December 13, 2017, Lairson called 911 to report he had

just woken up and found his girlfriend of one year, Tylissa Isaacs, lying in a

bathtub with no water and not breathing. Lairson told the 911 operator he and

Tylissa “drank too much last night” and that she might have “alcohol

poisoning.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 215, 217. Lairson also said the two had argued and

he had gotten mad and “hit the walls.” Id. at 214. The 911 operator asked

Lairson if Tylissa was breathing, and he said no. The 911 operator then asked

Lairson if he could attempt CPR on Tylissa, but he said no because she had

been there “too long” and her body was “cold.” Id. at 214, 218. Lairson said

when he went to bed, Tylissa “went to take a shower” and he thought she was

coming to bed right after that. Id. at 216. Lairson added that at some point the

night before, he “fell forward, hit the wall and cut [his] hand”; however, he

“sw[ore] [he] didn’t do anything like that” and Tylissa was “still alive when [he]

went to sleep.” Id. Lairson said he and Tylissa had an “altercation” “two or

three, maybe four days ago” where he slapped her but that “nothing got

physical” the night before. Id. at 218.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 2 of 13 [3] Richmond Police Department Officer Paul Phillips arrived on the scene around

2:15 p.m. and found Tylissa’s naked body in the bathtub with bruises “from her

feet to her upper body, even to her neck.” Id. at 220; Ex. 4. He also saw a “tuft

of hair hanging on the corner of the bathroom sink.” Tr. Vol. II p. 220. Lairson

had a bandage on his left hand, and his blood had dripped throughout the

house. Lairson told Officer Phillips that “he hadn’t hurt [Tylissa], that he hadn’t

killed her, that they had been arguing and drinking the night before, [and] that

there had been some minor physical altercation.” Id. at 221-22. Lairson “kept

repeating over and over that [the police] needed to fix this” because “he had

done nothing.” Id. at 222. [4] A detective interviewed Lairson later that day and photographed fresh injuries

to his left (dominant) hand. Exs. 28-32, 34. Lairson told the detective Tylissa

had “too much” to drink the night before and they had argued. Tr. Vol. III p.

80. He explained:

Sometimes you gotta put a woman in their place but do it legal. If you can’t hold her down or whatever and she can’t slap you and you slap her, (indiscernible) but we hadn’t been fighting like that. I mean last week, you know, we got into something and I slapped her. That’s the reason why her eye was black . . . .

Id. at 82. Lairson clarified that the earlier incident occurred “four or five days

ago” and that during that incident, he “grabbed” and “mugged” Tylissa, which

meant that he “push[ed] her up off me.” Id. at 99, 128, 135.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 3 of 13 [5] When the detective again asked Lairson what happened the night before,

Lairson said he and Tylissa “had words” but it didn’t get “physical.” Id. at 104.

He added that they both “mugged” or pushed each other before she hopped in

the shower, and he insisted that the injuries to his hand were not related to any

violence toward Tylissa. Rather, he claimed they were due to an old injury,

from “back in the day” when he boxed, and because he punched a door or wall

the night before. Id. at 105. As Lairson explained to the detective:

[When I get angry] I’ll hit a door, I’ll hit a wall, I ain’t gonna hit my girl like that. I ain’t goin’ to knock my girl’s teeth out or bust her upside the head. You know what I mean? I don’t – I don’t rock like that.

Id. at 106. [6] Later during the interview, Lairson said he “may have slapped” Tylissa but that

he “never punched her.” Id. at 126. Lairson then told the detective he would be

“completely one hundred percent honest” and told the following story:

I got drunk and fell. We had words, we pushed and shoved each other last night, but that’s as bad as it got and then when I had my words, I said listen, what the fu** did you do? Why did you tear the shower curtain down and why the fu** is all this all over the place. . . . And she was mumbling and still moving around the shower, drunk. I said I ain’t dealin’ with this sh** and I walked the fu** out of the bathroom, went and laid down and I went to sleep, I woke up and my girl is dead. That’s what I’m telling you.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 4 of 13

Id. at 127. When the detective told Lairson they needed to figure out what

happened to Tylissa, Lairson speculated that she “fell in the shower” or “drank

too much.” Id. [7] The detective then asked Lairson about a scream heard around 2:00 a.m., and

Lairson responded that they “yell at each other from time to time” because:

We just an average young couple, we - we mug each other and slap each other. She - she may punch me a couple times, but I’m a man, I take that on the chin, but I slapped her, you know, that’s the reason why her eyes black, I slapped her four or five days ago.

Id. at 131. However, he claimed that Tylissa did not scream around 2:00 a.m.

Id. at 131-32. The detective continued asking Lairson what happened the night

before, but Lairson kept repeating he only “slapped” Tylissa and didn’t punch

her. Id. at 136. He characterized what happened between them as “small stuff”

and said they weren’t “for real” fighting. Id. at 139, 142. He said he “had a

wonderful time with [his] woman” and they were “drunk,” “having fun,” and

“partying.” Id. at 155. He again speculated that Tylissa was “too drunk and

fell,” had alcohol poisoning, or had “cancer.” Id. at 144, 148. He emphasized

that he didn’t push Tylissa down in the shower, that Tylissa was alive when he

last saw her in the shower, and that “[w]hat happened from there, [he didn’t]

know.” Id. at 160, 162. The interview ended shortly thereafter. [8] An autopsy occurred the next day. According to the forensic pathologist,

Tylissa died from multiple blunt-force injuries to her head, neck, torso, and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 5 of 13 extremities. The forensic pathologist found that two of the injuries were “more significant” than the others:

The locations that were deemed I think the most serious was the head trauma, the bleeding that was present over the surface of her brain and then there were various associated contusions or bruises on her scalp. The other location was in the abdominal cavity. There was a laceration or a tear of the mesentery, which is the fatty tissue, which is present connecting the intestines and there’s various blood vessels that run through this mesentery and there was a - a tear in there which subsequently caused a hemorrhage, which was identified within her abdominal cavity.

Id. at 228. The pathologist believed that “a significant amount of force” caused the injuries:

[T]he force in order to cause a tearing of the mesentery of the abdominal compartment and tearing of the serosal surface of the intestine, bruising the diaphragm, . . . that would take a significant amount of force to the abdomen in order to cause those injuries. And clearly with the head, again, there’s multiple contusions on the scalp and on the left side of the neck and on the face and on the right eye and then coupled with the subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhage of the brain, clearly it’s going to take . . . a significant amount of force.

Id. at 240. The forensic pathologist believed that the injuries to Tylissa’s abdominal area occurred “relatively close to the time of her death,” not days before, and that the nature of her injuries was “inconsistent” with a single fall. Id. at 239, 248. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 6 of 13 [9] The State charged Lairson with murder.1 At trial, a neighbor who lived next

door to Lairson and Tylissa testified that as she was leaving home around 2:00

a.m. to pick up her fiancé from work, she heard “the worst horror scream ever

in [her] life” coming from their house. Id. at 206. The scream, which came from

a female, lasted about twenty seconds and was followed by “dead silen[ce].” Id.

When the neighbor returned home shortly thereafter, she went to sleep but was

woken up around 4:30 a.m. by a “big loud thud” that sounded like a “50 pound

sack of potatoes being thrown around.” Id. at 207. In addition, Lairson’s 911

call and interview with the detective were played for the jury. [10] After the close of the evidence, Lairson requested a jury instruction on reckless

homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder. Tr. Vol. IV pp. 88-90. The

parties argued about whether a serious evidentiary dispute existed as to whether

Lairson acted knowingly or intentionally or recklessly. The trial court said it

had “spent considerable time” thinking about this issue and was inclined not to

instruct the jury on reckless homicide because:

My recollection and pretty strong recollection [of Lairson’s interview with the detective] is that when asked about well, could you have done something, and then [she] fell in the shower, no, she didn’t fall. Now, whether or not she fell when he went and laid down, he didn’t know, but at that point, the Defendant wouldn’t be doing anything or participating in any kind of

1 The State also charged Lairson with strangulation and aggravated battery but later dismissed those charges.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 7 of 13

reckless act, so I am also left with the fact that from the pathologist, there are numerous blunt force trauma injuries.

*****

The Defendant never really talks about making any reckless actions on - on the events in question. What he talks about is basically not being involved in that, not causing this - this death.

Id. at 93, 95. The court took a short recess to consider the issue more and then

returned to the bench to announce that it would not instruct the jury on reckless

homicide. The jury found Lairson guilty of murder. [11] At the sentencing hearing, evidence was presented that Lairson had five

misdemeanor convictions from Ohio, including a domestic-violence conviction,

and one felony conviction from Ohio for Level 1 felony aggravated burglary

with a firearm. Lairson was paroled for this felony in December 2016 and

committed this offense while he was on parole. In addition, Lairson had two

probation violations. The trial court found two aggravators, Lairson’s criminal

history and the fact that he committed this offense while on parole, and one

mitigator, Lairson’s expression of remorse. Finding that the aggravators

outweigh the mitigator, the trial court sentenced Lairson to sixty years, all

executed. [12] Lairson now appeals.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 8 of 13

Discussion and Decision I. Reckless-Homicide Instruction [13] Lairson first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on

reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder. Trial courts use a

three-part test to determine whether to instruct the jury on a lesser-included

offense: whether the lesser-included offense is inherently included in the crime

charged; if not, whether the lesser-included offense is factually included in the

crime charged; and, if either, whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists where

the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the

greater. Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995). When an

instruction is refused on grounds that a serious evidentiary dispute does not

exist, we review only for an abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252,

255 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. It is reversible error for a trial court not to give an

instruction, when requested, on an inherently or factually included lesser

offense if there is a serious evidentiary dispute. Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103,

1106 (Ind. 2012).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 9 of 13 [14] A person who knowingly2 or intentionally3 kills another human being commits

murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, while a person who recklessly4 kills another

human being commits reckless homicide, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5. Reckless

homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, as the only element

distinguishing the two is the mens rea. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind.

1999); McDowell v. State, 102 N.E.3d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. [15] Lairson argues that a serious evidentiary dispute exists as to whether he acted

knowingly or intentionally or recklessly given the evidence he had acted

violently toward Tylissa in the past (including four or five days earlier) but she

didn’t die and he said he loved Tylissa and wanted a future with her. We,

however, agree with the trial court that no serious evidentiary dispute exists as

to Lairson’s mens rea because he consistently claimed during his interview with

the detective that any slap or push was minor—just “small stuff”—and couldn’t

have caused Tylissa’s death. Instead, he blamed Tylissa’s death on being too

drunk and falling, alcohol poisoning, or cancer—all of which the forensic

pathologist ruled out. Indeed, the autopsy showed that Tylissa died from force

far beyond what Lairson admitted. More specifically, Tylissa died from blunt-

2 “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). 3 “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. at (a). 4 “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Id. at (c).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 10 of 13

force trauma to her abdominal cavity, which caused a “large” laceration to her

mesentery, and from blunt-force trauma to her head, which caused bleeding

over the surface of her brain. Tr. Vol. III p. 235. These brutal injuries entirely

contradict a reckless mens rea. See Atkinson v. State, --- N.E.3d ---, ---, 2020 WL

3865980 (Ind. Ct. App. July 9, 2020) (concluding that the trial court did not err

in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide because the four-year-old

victim’s “injuries were so severe that no reasonable person could have found

the injuries to have been inflicted only recklessly”), trans. pending; McDowell, 102

N.E.3d at 932 (holding that a reckless-homicide instruction wasn’t required

because to “beat someone as severely as [the victim] was beaten goes well

beyond the realm of acting recklessly”). The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide.

II. Inappropriate Sentence [16] Lairson next contends that his sixty-year sentence is inappropriate and asks us

to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to the advisory term of fifty-five

years. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that an appellate court “may revise a

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature

of the offense and the character of the offender.” “Whether a sentence is

inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity

of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that

come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)).

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Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters,

defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v.

State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [17] A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between

forty-five and sixty-five years, with an advisory term of fifty-five years. Ind.

Code § 35-50-2-3. The trial court sentenced Lairson to an above-advisory term

of sixty years. [18] Lairson concedes that the nature of the offense was “egregious.” Appellant’s Br.

p. 15. Indeed, Lairson, an ex-boxer, violently beat his girlfriend, causing her

brain and abdominal cavity to hemorrhage. Nevertheless, he argues that his

sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. Lairson acknowledges he was

on parole during this offense and has a criminal history, including a serious

felony and domestic battery. However, he claims that, given other

considerations, such as that he expressed remorse and behaved well during trial,

“it would not have been inappropriate for the Trial Court to conclude that an

advisory sentence of fifty-five (55) years was proper.” Id. at 16. But the question

is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is

whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). And given the egregious nature of this offense and

Lairson’s history of violent crimes, he has failed to persuade us that his sixty-

year sentence is inappropriate. We therefore affirm his sentence. [19] Affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 12 of 13 Bailey, J., and Baker, Sr.J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-28 | August 31, 2020 Page 13 of 13