C.D. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 10 2020, 9:00 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kelly Starling Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

C.D., September 10, 2020 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-JV-436 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Petitioner Marilyn Moore, Judge The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D09-1907-JD-876

Vaidik, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-436 | September 10, 2020 Page 1 of 4

Case Summary [1] C.D. appeals the juvenile court’s true finding that he committed what would be

Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official if committed by an adult,

arguing that the court erred by admitting certain evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 26, 2019, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department officers took

fourteen-year-old C.D. into custody and handcuffed him because they believed

he possessed or had recently possessed a handgun. After he was handcuffed, an

officer asked C.D. to sit down, but he refused to do so, yanked his arm away,

and told the officer to “get his hands off of him.” Tr. p. 17. A second officer

assisted, and they were able to “place [C.D.] on the ground.” Id. After he was

on the ground, C.D., who was “belligerent and argumentative,” “purposely”

and “forcefully” “cock[ed]” his leg back and “struck” the second officer in the

foot with the heel of his foot. Id. at 17, 18. [3] The State filed a petition alleging that C.D. was a delinquent child for

committing what would be Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official

if committed by an adult for “stomping” on the officer’s foot.1 Appellant’s App.

Vol. II p. 17. At the fact-finding hearing, C.D. asked the trial court to exclude

1 The State also alleged that C.D. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm if committed by an adult, but it dismissed these charges before the fact-finding hearing.

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evidence of what happened after he was taken into custody, i.e., his alleged

battery against the officer, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable

suspicion to seize him. The court admitted the evidence and entered a true

finding for battery against a public-safety official. [4] C.D. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [5] C.D. contends that his seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of

the Indiana Constitution because the officers “did not have information to

believe [he] committed a crime” and that therefore the juvenile court should

have excluded the evidence of what happened after he was taken into custody,

i.e., his alleged battery against the officer. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. However, even

if C.D. was illegally seized in violation of Article 1, Section 11, he is not

entitled to any relief. [6] In C.P. v. State, this Court held that if a suspect commits a “new and distinct”

crime in response to an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement, evidence

of that new crime is admissible under the new-crime exception to the

exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution. 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1183 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind.

2018) (acknowledging this Court’s adoption of the new-crime exception in

C.P.); K.C. v. State, 84 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting the

juvenile’s argument that C.P. was wrongly decided), trans. denied. We noted that

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if evidence that a suspect committed a new crime in response to an illegal

search or seizure was excluded, then “‘suspects could shoot the arresting

officers without risk of prosecution.’” C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1181 (quoting United

States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994)). [7] C.D. acknowledges this Court’s opinion in C.P. but asks us to make an

“exception” when the accused is a juvenile and “no harm or injury [is] caused

by the juvenile’s response.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 18, 21. C.D. then argues this

exception would apply here because he is a juvenile and the officer did not

testify that he “experienced any pain or harm as a result of his foot being struck

by C.D.’s foot.” Id. at 22. We decline to narrow the new-crime exception. First,

any physical attack on a police officer has the potential to harm the officer, even

if no harm is ultimately inflicted. And second, any physical attack on a police

officer can lead to responsive force by the officer, which could easily escalate

the encounter into something much more serious. Because the juvenile court

properly admitted the officer’s testimony that C.D. “forcefully” stomped on his

foot, we affirm the true finding for battery against a public-safety official. [8] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Baker, Sr.J., concur.

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