Reid v. Edwards-Grant

Reid v Edwards-Grant (2020 NY Slip Op 05247) Reid v Edwards-Grant 2020 NY Slip Op 05247 Decided on September 30, 2020 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided on September 30, 2020 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J. ROBERT J. MILLER JOSEPH J. MALTESE BETSY BARROS, JJ. 2018-09782 (Index No. 511777/15) [*1]Shawn Reid, appellant, v Daisy Edwards-Grant, respondent. William Pager, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant. Correia, King, Fodera, McGinnis & Liferiedge, New York, NY (Ryan Hershkowitz of counsel), for respondent. DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lara J. Genovesi, J.), dated June 6, 2018. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on May 31, 2015. This action was joined for trial with another action arising out of the same accident. The defendant in the instant action moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals. The defendant failed to meet her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The papers submitted by the defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977; cf. Calucci v Baker, 299 AD2d 897). While the defendant relied upon the transcript of the plaintiff's deposition testimony to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the 90/180-day category, this evidence failed to identify the plaintiff's usual and customary daily activities during the specific relevant time frame, and did not compare the plaintiff's pre-accident and post-accident activities during that relevant time frame. Since the defendant failed to meet her prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MILLER, MALTESE and BARROS, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court