Keonie T. Martin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 26 2020, 9:01 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Spenser G. Benge Curtis T. Hill, Jr. The Law Office of Spenser G. Benge Attorney General of Indiana Anderson, Indiana J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keonie T. Martin, October 26, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-155 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Andrew R. Appellee-Plaintiff. Hopper, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C03-1806-F4-1487

Najam, Judge. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 1 of 7

Statement of the Case [1] Keonie T. Martin appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order

that he serve three years of his previously suspended ten-year sentence in the

Department of Correction (“DOC”) followed by two years on in-home

detention. Martin raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Martin to serve three years of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC and two years on in-home detention.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] In July of 2019, the trial court ordered Martin to serve ten years suspended to

probation for dealing in cocaine, as a Level 4 felony, and possession of

marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor. In September, the State filed a notice of

probation violation on the ground that Martin had committed invasion of

privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor. The court held a hearing on the State’s

notice in December.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 2 of 7 [4] At that hearing, A.S. testified that Martin is the father of her child and that, on

August 5, 2019, she had obtained an ex parte protective order against Martin 1

on the basis that she was a victim of domestic violence and identified in her

petition three different incidents in which Martin had “attempted to cause [her]

physical harm,” “threatened to cause [her] physical harm,” and “placed [her] in

fear of him causing [her] physical harm.” Tr. at 35. At the time of A.S.’s

petition, Martin alternated where he lived—he occasionally stayed at A.S.’s

residence on West 17th Street in Anderson, and he also occasionally stayed at

his mother’s residence on Louise Street. A.S. reported Martin’s address on the

petition for the protective order as the Louise Street address, which was the

same address Martin had given as his address to the probation department and

to the trial court when he was placed on probation. Upon the issuance of the

protective order, the Madison County Sheriff’s Department “[p]erfected”

service of the order on Martin in person at the Louise Street address. Ex. Vol.

at 4. 2 [5] At the hearing on the notice of the probation violation, A.S. testified that, on

August 23, during a doctor’s appointment for her pregnancy with Martin’s

child, her doctor advised her that the baby’s heart rate required an emergency

admission. She drove herself to a nearby hospital and informed Martin, who

then also went to the hospital. There, Martin and A.S. got into heated

1 The issuing court dismissed the protective order on August 30, 2019. 2 Our reference to the pages of the Exhibits Volume is to the .pdf pagination.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 3 of 7

exchanges, and A.S. called hospital security to have him removed from her

room. When hospital security arrived, they could hear A.S. and Martin yelling

from the hallway, and upon entering the room they observed food and milk

“throughout the room floor.” Tr. at 13. The security officers asked Martin to

leave “seven or eight times” before he complied. Id. The security officers then

escorted Martin out of the building. As they were exiting, Martin “threw a set

of keys” at the security officers, which they returned to A.S. Id. [6] Following the hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence

that Martin had committed the new offense of invasion of privacy, as a Class A

misdemeanor, for violating the protective order. The court then ordered Martin

to serve three years of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC, to be

followed by two years on in-home detention. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision Standard of Review

[7] Martin appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. As our Supreme

Court has explained:

“Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Id. In appeals from trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, id., or when the trial court misinterprets

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 4 of 7

the law, see State v. Cozart, 897 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind. 2008) (citing Axsom v. Axsom, 565 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“An abuse of discretion may also be found when the trial court misinterprets the law or disregards factors listed in the controlling statute.”)).

Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation. Id.

Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). Here, Martin appeals both

steps of the revocation process, which we address in turn.

Issue One: Revocation of Probation [8] Martin first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support

the revocation of his probation. Specifically, Martin argues that the State did

not present sufficient evidence to show that he knew of the protective order.

But Martin’s argument disregards our standard of review and the evidence most

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. That evidence shows that Martin was

served in person with the protective order, and he was served at the address that

he had provided to the probation department and to the court when he was

placed on probation. Martin’s argument to the contrary on appeal simply seeks

to have this Court disregard that evidence and instead consider only evidence

Martin finds favorable, which we will not do. The State presented sufficient

evidence to support the allegation that Martin had committed invasion of

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privacy based on his violation of the protective order, and therefore the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Martin’s probation.

Issue Two: Sanction [9] Martin also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him

to serve three years in the DOC followed by two years on in-home detention for

his violation of the terms of his probation. But Martin’s argument on this issue

again is nothing more than a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence,

which we cannot do. Moreover, the trial court’s decision was within its

discretion. The court placed Martin on probation for Level 4 felony dealing in

cocaine on July 31, 2019; A.S. filed her petition for the protective order on

August 5; the Madison County Sheriff’s Department served Martin with the

order on August 6; and he violated it on August 23. And, in announcing the

sanction here, the trial court lamented Martin’s lack of responsibility and failure

to take advantage of the favorable terms of his probationary sentence for his

Level 4 felony offense. As we have noted, probation is a matter of grace. We

cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Martin to serve

three years in the DOC followed by two years on in-home detention.

Conclusion [10] In sum, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Martin’s probation and its

order that he serve three years in the DOC followed by two years on in-home

detention. [11] Affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 6 of 7 Bradford, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-155 | October 26, 2020 Page 7 of 7