United States v. Conrad Taylor, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 20-1580 ___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Conrad Fred Taylor, Jr., also known as C.J.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________

Submitted: December 4, 2020 Filed: December 11, 2020 [Unpublished] ____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Conrad Taylor received a 144-month prison sentence after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. In an Anders brief, Taylor’s counsel requests permission to withdraw and raises the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction as an issue for our review. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Taylor has also filed two pro

se briefs in which he challenges a career-offender enhancement, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the failure to suppress evidence. We affirm.

Taylor is foreclosed from raising the latter two challenges by a broad appeal waiver in the plea agreement that covers “all . . . objections” to his conviction. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Based on prior felony assault and drug convictions, he also qualifies as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (defining a “career offender” as someone who “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”); United States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that a conviction of possession with intent to deliver under Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) is a controlled-substance offense); United States v. Quigley, 943 F.3d 390, 393–95 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a conviction for assault with intent to inflict serious injury under Iowa Code § 708.2 qualifies as a crime of violence). Moreover, the district court1 had reason to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction after Taylor was caught with a controlled substance in jail. See United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court may consider even “unrelated criminal conduct in denying an acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction”).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment, grant counsel permission to withdraw, and deny Taylor’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel and discovery. ______________________________

1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. -2-