Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass'n v. County of Cook

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2021 IL App (1st) 190396

THIRD DIVISION March 3, 2021

No. 1-19-0396

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ILLINOIS ROAD AND TRANSPORTATION ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, FEDERATION OF ) Cook County. WOMEN CONTRACTORS, ILLINOIS ) ASSOCIATION OF AGGREGATE PRODUCERS, ) ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF ) ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS ASPHALT PAVEMENT ) ASSOCIATION, ILLINOIS READY MIXED ) CONCRETE ASSOCIATION, GREAT LAKES ) CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN ) COUNCIL OF ENGINEERING COMPANIES ) (ILLINOIS CHAPTER), CHICAGOLAND ) ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ) No. 18 CH 2992 UNDERGROUND CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION ) OF ILLINOIS, and ILLINOIS CONCRETE PIPE ) Honorable Peter Flynn, ASSOCIATION, ) Judge Presiding ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) ) THE COUNTY OF COOK, a Body Politic and ) Corporate, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. )

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

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1-19-0396 ¶1 In November 2016, Illinois voters approved an amendment to the Illinois Constitution, adding to the revenue article a new section 11, titled “Transportation Funds” (the Amendment). Roughly sketched, the Amendment requires that funds collected from transportation-related taxes and fees be spent only for transportation purposes. ¶2 Plaintiffs, an amalgamation of trade groups and associations that represent a variety of sectors in the transportation planning and construction industry, sued the County of Cook (County), claiming the County violated the Amendment by diverting tax revenues protected by the Amendment to non-transportation uses. Plaintiffs identified six different taxes the County imposed related to transportation, all of whose revenues, they say, should have been sequestered and used only for transportation-related purposes. Instead, those moneys were placed into the County’s Public Safety Fund for non-transportation purposes to fund the county courts, jails, the sheriff’s office, and like items. ¶3 The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that, in any event, the complaint failed to state a violation of the Amendment. ¶4 We disagree as to standing. Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the County’s alleged violation of the Amendment. But we agree, albeit for different reasons, that the complaint fails to state a constitutional violation. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶5 BACKGROUND ¶6 In the November 2016 general election, voters across Illinois were presented with an initiative to amend the Illinois Constitution to protect funds generated from transportation-related taxes from being spent for any purposes other than transportation-related ones. Passage of the Amendment required approval of either three-fifths of those voting on the question or a majority *3 1-19-0396 of those voting in the election. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 2(b). The Amendment easily cleared that hurdle, garnering the support of nearly 80% of those who voted on the question. ¶7 On March 6, 2018, plaintiffs—a group of business and trade associations—filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County. The complaint alleged that, “to plug gaps in its budget,” the County was diverting “revenue from transportation-related taxes and fees to the County’s Public Safety Fund,” where it was then spent on non-transportation-related purposes in violation of the Amendment. Plaintiffs identified the following sources of revenue that were unconstitutionally diverted from transportation uses:

(1) the Cook County Home Rule County Use Tax Ordinance (see Cook County

Code of Ordinances § 74-270 et seq. (adopted Feb. 16, 2011);

(2) the Cook County Retail Sale of Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Tax Ordinance (see

id.§ 74-470 et seq.);

(3) the Cook County New Motor Vehicle and Trailer Excise Tax Ordinance (see

id. § 74-230 et seq.);

(4) the Cook County Home Rule Use Tax Ordinance for Non-Retailer Transfers

of Motor Vehicles (see id. § 74-595 et seq. (adopted Nov. 15, 2011));

(5) the Cook County Wheel Tax on Vehicles Ordinance (see id. § 74-550 et seq.

(adopted May 21, 2020)); and

(6) the Cook County Parking Lot and Garage Operations Tax Ordinance (see id.

§ 74-510 et seq. (adopted July 17, 2013)). ¶8 For ease of references, we will refer to these taxes listed above, collectively, as the “Cook County Transportation Taxes.” *4 1-19-0396 ¶9 The complaint alleged that, despite the fact that each of these taxes was a “transportation-related tax within the meaning of [the Amendment],” the County was “deposit[ing] all revenue” from the taxes listed above “in the County’s Public Safety Fund.” ¶ 10 The Public Safety Fund, according to the complaint, funds operations of the County’s criminal justice system, including the sheriff’s office, the state’s attorney, the department of corrections, and the clerk of the circuit court. The complaint alleges that “[t]he Public Safety Fund is not a transportation-related purpose within the meaning of Article IX, Sections 11(b) or (c) of the Illinois Constitution.” ¶ 11 The County moved to dismiss the complaint, both for failure to state a claim and on standing and justiciability grounds. The trial court agreed with the County on both points, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the complaint did not state a constitutional violation. The court thus dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. ¶ 12 ANALYSIS ¶ 13 I ¶ 14 A ¶ 15 Our first question is whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the County’s alleged constitutional violation. A dismissal based on lack of standing is entered pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018); Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). ¶ 16 A complaint need not allege facts establishing standing. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (2005). In Illinois, lack of standing is an affirmative defense, placing the burden on the defendant to “plead and prove lack of standing.” Id. Thus, when “standing is challenged by way of a motion *5 1-19-0396 to dismiss,” the usual principles applicable to section 2-619 motions govern: “[A] court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. Appellate review is de novo. Id. ¶ 17 The standing doctrine assures that parties have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy. Scachitti v. UBS Financial Services, 215 Ill. 2d 484, 493 (2005). But “it should not be an obstacle to the litigation of a valid claim.” People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 330 (1997). The plaintiff’s claimed injury must be “(1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to defendant’s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.” Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). ¶ 18 Plaintiffs allege two forms of standing. The first is associational standing, as plaintiffs are all nonprofit trade associations representing various aspects of the construction industry. ¶ 19 Associational standing refers to the ability of an association to sue as a representative body on behalf of its members. The doctrine “is firmly established in federal law” and was first adopted in Illinois in International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 48. Our supreme court expressly adopted the test for associational standing from the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 51-52. ¶ 20 In Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine if an association has standing to sue on behalf of its constituent members. An association will have standing to sue on behalf of its members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s *6 1-19-0396 purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 21 The County does not dispute that plaintiffs satisfy Hunt’s second and third requirements. We thus confine our analysis to a single question: whether the association plaintiffs have alleged “ ‘that [their] members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.’ ” International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 46 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). ¶ 22 Which means that we return full circle to general standing principles. That is to say, have the members of plaintiffs’ organizations suffered an injury that is “(1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to defendant’s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief?” Wexler, 211 Ill. 2d at 23. And given the burden of proof on this affirmative defense, the real question is, has the County established that plaintiffs have not suffered such an injury? ¶ 23 We will briefly examine each of the plaintiff associations and their claim of injury suffered by their individual members. ¶ 24 Plaintiff Illinois Road and Transportation Builders Association (IRTBA) is a trade association consisting of “more than 350 member firms who design, build, and maintain Illinois’ highways, transit systems, railways, and aviation systems.” “Many” of its members “are based in Cook County and contract with the County to perform construction work on transportation-related project within the County.” ¶ 25 Plaintiff Federation of Women Contractors (FWC) “consists of more than one hundred women and women owned firms working in the construction industry, including general and specialty contractors, subcontractors, architecture and engineering firms, and suppliers *7 1-19-0396 representing every facet and component of construction,” the “majority” of which “are based in Cook County.” ¶ 26 Plaintiff Illinois Association of Aggregate Producers (IAAP) is a not-for-profit trade association that represents “every sector of Illinois’ non-coal aggregate mining industry.” IAAP members are responsible for producing “more than 90 percent of Illinois’ aggregate and industrial minerals at more than two hundred plants and facilities in seventy counties throughout Illinois, including Cook County.” “Most of the aggregate material produced by IAAP members is utilized in road construction, including crushed aggregate in concrete and asphalt pavements and drainage bases under roads, sewers, parking lots, and sidewalks.” ¶ 27 Plaintiff Associated General Contractors of Illinois (AGCI) “is one of the largest heavy-highway construction trade associations in Illinois.” AGCI “represents highway, heavy, and utility contractors” and “has more than one hundred active, associate, and affiliate members, including members that are based in Cook County and that conduct business with Cook County.” ¶ 28 Plaintiff Illinois Asphalt Pavement Association (IAPA) is a trade association with “nearly two hundred members, including sixteen members that produce or supply hot mix asphalt within Cook County and approximately ninety members that supply material, equipment, or services directly to Cook County or to the IAPA’s plant mix members working in Cook County.” ¶ 29 Plaintiff Illinois Ready Mixed Concrete Association (IRMCA) is a trade association representing “nearly 150” companies, including “multiple firms that supply concrete in Cook County.” ¶ 30 Plaintiff Great Lakes Construction Association (GLCA) “represents more than two hundred member firms in twenty-seven work categories in the construction industry,” “including approximately one hundred members who are based in Cook County.” *8 1-19-0396 ¶ 31 Plaintiff American Council of Engineering Companies, Illinois Chapter (ACEC), is a “Statewide association dedicated solely to the interests of Illinois consulting engineering firms.” ¶ 32 Plaintiff Chicagoland Associated General Contractors (AGC) is an association of general contractors whose membership includes “more than eighty” firms based in Cook County. ¶ 33 Plaintiff Underground Contractors Association of Illinois (UCA) is a not-for-profit trade association that “represents more than two hundred contractors and associate member companies in the sewer, water, utility, and underground industries throughout Illinois, including in Cook County.” ¶ 34 Plaintiff Illinois Concrete Pipe Association (ICPA) is a not-for-profit trade association composed of “concrete pipe producers and affiliated companies serving the Illinois sewer and culvert market, including members based in Cook County.” ¶ 35 As to each one of these association plaintiffs, the complaint alleges that its members “are suffering economic harm due to the County’s ongoing violations of [the Amendment]”—more specifically, the County’s diversion of money that allegedly must be spent for transportation-related purposes but, instead, is being transferred into the County’s Public Safety Fund. ¶ 36 The injury the plaintiff members allege is not some “ ‘generalized grievance common to all members of the public.’ ” Alliance for the Great Lakes v. Department of Natural Resources, 2020 IL App (1st) 182587, ¶ 32 (quoting Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 494 (1988)). Their injury is “distinct and palpable.” Wexler, 211 Ill. 2d at 23. They are alleging the loss of business opportunity by virtue of a diminution in the number of projects put out to bid in Cook County. Economic harm has long been considered a sufficient injury to confer standing. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493; International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 51 (denial of unemployment benefits was sufficient injury to confer standing on individual union members). *9 1-19-0396 ¶ 37 The remaining, interrelated two prongs, whether the members’ injuries are “fairly traceable” to the County’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct, and whether a ruling in their favor is “substantially likely” to redress their injuries (Wexler, 211 Ill. 2d at 23), is where the parties do battle. We say they are interrelated because the case law, as we will see, sometimes considers them in tandem, and for good reason. Sometimes, perhaps often, the same causal link that connects the defendant’s misconduct to the plaintiff’s injury works likewise in reverse, such that judicial elimination of that misconduct would heal that injury. ¶ 38 Much of the County’s argument against standing, in fact, interweaves the traceability and judicial-redress prongs in a manner that we could summarize in one word—speculation. Plaintiffs can only speculate that, had the transportation money not been diverted, the County would have implemented public transportation projects; they can only speculate that, even if the County had announced such projects, any one of their members would have been awarded the work; they can only speculate that, if they win this lawsuit and force the County to spend all this recovered and future money on transportation projects, they will be awarded any of that work. ¶ 39 Plaintiffs’ response is that the County is weaponizing its unconstitutional behavior to insulate itself from judicial review: divert transportation funds, thereby fail to fund new transportation projects, and then claim that the firms that would have been eligible to bid on this work lack standing because … they can’t point to any projects they lost out on. Under that circular theory, say plaintiffs, nobody could ever challenge the County’s alleged unconstitutional diversion of funds. And if anyone would be motivated to force the County to comply with the constitution and sequester transportation tax revenue for transportation purposes, who more so than the firms that would financially profit from the resulting transportation projects? *10 1-19-0396 ¶ 40 We agree with plaintiffs’ view of standing. To be sure, standing cannot be founded on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013). But neither is certainty required. Particularly when the injury to a plaintiff is the loss of opportunity to obtain a benefit due to the government’s failure to perform a required act— here, sequestering transportation funds—it is rarely possible to know with any confidence what might have happened, had the government performed that act, much less what precisely will happen in the future if the improper conduct is corrected. If such certainty were required, the doctrine of standing would substantially reduce, if not altogether eliminate, entire categories of lawsuits. And, as we explain below, that is not how we read the case law. ¶ 41 For example, in West Virginia Ass’n of Community Health Centers, Inc. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1572-73 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the plaintiffs—a hospital association and one of its members—sued the federal government, alleging that its formula for awarding block grants to states under a federal statute “unlawfully deprived the State of West Virginia of monies to which it was entitled,” to the tune of nearly $300,000. The governmental defendant claimed the plaintiffs lacked standing, as they “failed to demonstrate that a judicial decision mandating an increase in West Virginia’s [block grant] funding would redound to their benefit.” Id. at 1574. The court flatly rejected that argument, holding that “once appellants demonstrated that they would qualify to receive these funds, they need not shoulder the additional burden of demonstrating that they are certain to receive funding.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 1576. ¶ 42 Likewise, in National Ass’n of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the plaintiff, a national organization of community health centers, sued to force the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to recover money that the department allegedly spent in violation of a federal statute. On appeal, HEW argued that the *11 1-19-0396 plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the allegedly illegal transfers because the plaintiff did not allege “ ‘that [the] illegal transfer of funds affected any of its members.’ ” Id. at 329. The court rejected that argument:

“The less that is recovered in the four disputed states, the less will be available to the

present applicants, including the [plaintiff] members; these members are directly hurt by

*** the sharp curtailment of their opportunities for funding. *** While it is not certain

that [the plaintiff] members would be funded due to the extra recovery from their claim

here, it is probable that the prospect of funding, itself substantial relief, would be

enhanced.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 43 The probability that judicial relief would result in an economic benefit was likewise sufficient to support standing in American Iron & Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 182 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999). There, the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (hereinafter, Doctors) challenged a regulation promulgated by the defendant, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), that enabled nonphysician health-care providers to perform federally mandated medical evaluation services that, prior to the enactment of the regulation, could only be performed by physicians. Id. at 1266-67. The court held that the Doctors had standing, reasoning that the Doctors suffered an economic injury due to the “loss of patients and income[ ] inflicted by the lack of a requirement that medical evaluations be performed only by physicians” and reasoned that “this injury is redressable through judicial review” of the regulation. Id. at 1274 n.10. ¶ 44 Finally, plaintiffs cite United States Women’s Chamber of Commerce v. United States Small Business Administration, No. 1:04-CV-01889, 2005 WL 3244182 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2005). At issue there was a federal law that established a preferential procurement program for women-*12 1-19-0396 owned small businesses (WOSBs). Id. at * 1. But first, the Small Business Administration (SBA) was required to conduct a study to identify industries in which WOSBs were underrepresented and then, armed with that information, to propose procedures to implement the program. Id. at

• 2. ¶ 45 But for four years, the SBA had failed to conduct that study or propose implementation procedures, thus stalling the program’s launch. The associational plaintiff, representing WOSBs, sued to compel the SBA to implement the study and issue proposed procedures. The government claimed the plaintiff lacked associational standing. First, said the government, the plaintiff members’ injuries could not be fairly traced to the SBA’s conduct, because plaintiff could not identify a single member in its association that failed to obtain a government contract because of the lack of the WOSB procurement program. Id. at * 8. ¶ 46 The district rejected that argument. To satisfy the traceability prong, the court wrote, the plaintiff need only show that “ ‘it reasonably could be inferred that’ had the defendants conducted the study and adopted the procedures called for by the [federal law] ‘there is a substantial probability’ that one of its members would have benefitted.” Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 504). ¶ 47 The government also claimed the plaintiff members could not show that judicial redress would benefit them, that none of the plaintiff members could show they belonged to an industry eligible for the WOSB preference—because the SBA hadn’t yet identified which industries were program-eligible. Id. The district rejected this “circular reasoning” and agreed with the plaintiff that the government’s argument “ ‘imposes a “catch-22”: illegally refusing to implement the mandates of the Act, while claiming that its refusal to implement the Act insulates its actions from review.’ ” Id. *13 1-19-0396 ¶ 48 We are persuaded by these federal decisions, cognizant that the very doctrine of associational standing comes from the (obviously federal) United States Supreme Court decision in Hunt, 432 U.S. 333. See International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 51-52. Indeed, “to the extent that the State law of standing varies from Federal law, it tends to vary in the direction of greater liberality; State courts are generally more willing than Federal courts to recognize standing on the part of any plaintiff who shows that he is in fact aggrieved by an administrative decision.” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491; see Alliance for the Great Lakes, 2020 IL App (1st) 182587, ¶ 32 (“our supreme court has recognized that Illinois standing law is more liberal than federal law”). ¶ 49 In any event, we agree with these decisions that, when association members can demonstrate an opportunity for financial benefits or contracts, the opportunity for which was denied due to the government’s improper conduct, and the opportunity for which would be restored if they prevail in this lawsuit, those members have standing. ¶ 50 Here, then, the member plaintiffs’ injuries are fairly traceable to the County’s conduct in that they were denied the chance to bid on construction projects that inevitably would have come, and would continue to come in the future, if the County followed its (alleged) constitutional mandate and kept transportation dollars in a pot dedicated only for transportation. Likewise, this injury is capable of redress through judicial relief; if plaintiffs prevail in this lawsuit, the County will be required to claw back transportation tax dollars improperly diverted and will be prevented from diverting them going forward. That means a large pot of tax revenue that can only be spent for one purpose—transportation. It is more than substantially probable—it is a near certainty that the County (or for that matter, any government unit), given that money with only one purpose for it, would spend it for that purpose, all to the benefit of the members of the plaintiff associations. *14 1-19-0396 ¶ 51 Under these circumstances, it would defy logic and fundamental fairness to deny plaintiffs standing simply because they cannot demonstrate with certainty that they would have received in the past, or will receive in the future, a particular contract—particularly when the reason they cannot demonstrate it is the very (alleged) misconduct of the government at issue in the lawsuit. The opportunity to seek that benefit is more than enough to show that these plaintiffs are litigants with skin in the game, with “ ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kluk v. Lang, 125 Ill. 2d 306, 318 (1988) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). ¶ 52 We are not moved by the County’s citation to I.C.S. Illinois, Inc. v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 211, 231 (2010), on which the circuit court relied to deny standing to plaintiffs here; that case was decided under markedly different circumstances. That lawsuit did not involve a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against the government, seeking to correct alleged government misconduct that denies financial opportunities to scores of private companies. I.C.S. involved a class action brought by private firms against a private contractor, sounding in tort and seeking lost profits for the failure to pick one of the plaintiffs for a subcontracting job. Those facts, alone, puts I.C.S. miles away from this case. ¶ 53 The two named plaintiffs in that purported class action were firms certified by the City of Chicago as a minority business enterprise (MBE) or women-owned business enterprises (WBE) who were thus eligible for procurement preferences with the city. Id. at 215. The defendant contractor, Waste Management, procured a contract with the city and, instead of hiring a truly certified MBE or WBE firm for a subcontractor, hired three firms who fraudulently claimed to be *15 1-19-0396 MBE/WBE contractors. Id. The plaintiffs did not and could not allege that the subcontracts were let for competitive public bidding; that they would have secured those contracts, had they been so bid; or that they were anything more than private contractors upset that a private firm gave the contract to someone else, while violating city ordinances governing MBE/WBE preferences. ¶ 54 We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing. We held as follows: “a subcontractor has no standing to challenge the award of a contract to a competitor after a bidding process has been completed unless it can show that it would have won the contract but for the defendant’s fraud. In the absence of such an allegation, a subcontractor does not suffer an injury to a legally cognizable interest that is distinct and palpable.” Id. at 231. ¶ 55 I.C.S. thus addresses an entirely different situation, concerning a private companies’ suit against another private company for monetary damages over a single lost job. The court analyzed numerous “disappointed bidder” cases in reaching its conclusion (see id. at 221-31), but ours is not a case involving a disappointed bidder seeking a single contract or damages for lost profits. Ours is an action seeking to declare government conduct unconstitutional and to enjoin that conduct in the future. The concept of “lost opportunities to bid” is relevant to standing in a materially different way here than it is in a tort action over a single construction job. ¶ 56 We thus hold that plaintiffs have established associational standing. As such, we need not consider the alternative claim of taxpayer standing. ¶ 57 B ¶ 58 The circuit court also reasoned that there were justiciability problems with this lawsuit, that deciding this case would embroil the judiciary in policy choices over spending decisions and require judges to decide things better left to legislators. We see no such problem. *16 1-19-0396 ¶ 59 We are not being asked to construe constitutional language so ambiguous and ill-suited to judicial determination as what it means for the State to provide for “ ‘an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1996) (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1). That was particularly inappropriate given that, as our supreme court noted, a review of the constitutional convention debates revealed that “the framers of the 1970 Constitution did not intend to formulate any specific definition of ‘high quality,’ nor did they anticipate that the concept would be defined by the courts.” Id. at 27. The language of the Amendment before us is complex, as we will see, but far from incapable of judicial determination. ¶ 60 In discussing its justiciability concerns, the circuit court also cited Glisson, which involved constitutional language providing that “ ‘[e]ach person has the right to a healthful environment.’ ” Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 224 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 2). The words in the Amendment before us are not so vague, aspirational, and subject to policy-driven debate as the definition of a “healthful environment.” And more to the point, the citation is inapt, in any event. It is true that the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in Glisson, but not because it was non-justiciable; the court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing because the plaintiff was trying to enforce the right to a “healthful environment” not on his own behalf, but on behalf of two species of fish. Id. at 231. ¶ 61 As will be shown, interpreting the Amendment will be no simple chore. But courts interpret difficult language all the time. In the end, this lawsuit makes one simple claim—the Amendment requires the County to sequester all revenues generated from transportation-related taxes and to spend that money only for transportation purposes. We must determine whether the Amendment does or does not do that very thing. It requires no policy judgment, no fiscal *17 1-19-0396 decisions, no embroilment of the judiciary into the everyday affairs of the legislature or a unit of local government. We must merely decide what the law is and enter judgment accordingly. ¶ 62 As we hold that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the County’s actions, and we see no barriers to justiciability, we turn now to the merits. ¶ 63 II ¶ 64 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018). We accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, ¶ 20. Our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 65 Our analysis requires a review of the Amendment. We apply the same principles to the construction of a constitutional provision as we would a statute. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Our goal is to determine “the common understanding of the citizens who adopted” the Amendment. Id. We do so, first and foremost, by examining the Amendment’s language, “the most certain route to determining the framers’ intent.” Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 47. If the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we give the Amendment its intended effect without resort to extrinsic information. Id. ¶ 35. ¶ 66 The Amendment consists of six subsections. The first two subsections command the bulk of the parties’ arguments and our analysis, so we start there:

“(a) No moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or

license taxes relating to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, or related to the

use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports,

airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles, or derived from taxes, fees, excises, or

license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation *18 1-19-0396

operation, shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and

(c).

(b) Transportation funds may be expended for the following: the costs of

administering laws related to vehicles and transportation, including statutory refunds and

adjustments provided in those laws; payment of highway obligations; costs for

construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, and betterment of highways, roads,

streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or other forms of

transportation; and other statutory highway purposes. Transportation funds may also be

expended for the State or local share of highway funds to match federal aid highway

funds, and expenses of grade separation of highways and railroad crossings, including

protection of at-grade highways and railroad crossings, and, with respect to local

governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law.” (Emphasis added.) Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a), (b). ¶ 67 Subsection (c) provides a further description of the first category of funds described in subsection (b), “the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportation.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(c). ¶ 68 Subsection (d) prohibits the diversion of transportation funds “to any purpose other than those described in subsections (b) and (c).” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(d). Subsection (e) envisions future modes of transportation currently unknown and provides that “[i]f the General Assembly appropriates funds for a mode of transportation not described in this Section, the General Assembly must provide for a dedicated source of funding.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(e). Subsection (f) exempts federal funds from the Amendment entirely. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(f). *19 1-19-0396 ¶ 69 The County argues that the Amendment “is only applicable to situations involving governments’ use of transportation-related monies as specified by an applicable statute and is thus inapplicable to the County under the circumstances of the instant case.” (Emphasis added.) That is to say, because the Amendment only sequesters revenues whose expenditures are governed by a statute, it does not sequester the revenues from the Cook County Transportation Taxes at issue here, whose expenditures are authorized by home-rule power, not a state law. ¶ 70 Plaintiffs’ view is that the Amendment applies to the spending of any transportation-tax-related revenues whatsoever within the State of Illinois, no matter the authority under which that money is spent—statute or local ordinance. ¶ 71 Before we go any further, it would be prudent to outline the various ways that a unit of local government may receive and spend tax revenues. ¶ 72 A ¶ 73 Federal funds aside, a home-rule unit may receive revenues in one of three ways: (1) from State-imposed taxes; (2) from taxes that the General Assembly authorizes the unit of local government to impose itself; or (3) in the specific case of home-rule units, from taxes the home-rule unit generates under its independent constitutional authority to tax. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a) (home-rule units have power to tax). ¶ 74 As to the first category, when the State imposes a tax and distributes some of the revenues to units of local government, a statute will typically specify how local governments must spend that money. For example, the State imposes a motor fuel tax and distributes some of that revenue to counties, municipalities, and road districts. See 35 ILCS 505/2, 5, 8 (West 2018). A statute then dictates the purposes for which the relevant unit of local government may spend that revenue. Counties, for example, must spend that motor fuel tax revenue for such purposes as *20 1-19-0396 construction and maintenance of county and State highways, subdivision roads, county garages, grade separations and approaches, and bicycle markings and paths; paying principal and interest on road bonds; and allotting funds for retiring certain construction-related debt, bonds for superhighways, local mass-transit districts, and the like. See generally 605 ILCS 5/5-701 to 5-701.16 (West 2018). ¶ 75 As to the second category, the General Assembly may grant a unit of local government the power to tax an item or transaction that the unit of local government would not otherwise have the power to tax. For non-home rule units, that means every tax, as non-home-rule units lack any constitutional authority to tax and only have that taxing power granted them by statute. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 7 (“[c]ounties and municipalities which are not home rule units shall have only powers granted to them by law,” with exceptions not relevant here). And even home-rule units have limits on their constitutional taxing authority; for example, they may not tax income or occupations unless the General Assembly provides them that power by statute. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(e). (Or, of course, the home-rule unit may have the independent authority to tax, but the General Assembly preempts that power and imposes its statutory will. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(g).) ¶ 76 When the General Assembly provides a unit of local government statutory authority to impose a tax, the legislature may, if it chooses, likewise dictate the purposes for which that tax revenue is spent. For example, non-home-rule municipalities may impose a retailers’ occupation tax, but they must spend that tax revenue on “public infrastructure” or “property tax relief” (with one caveat allowing some of them to spend it for general “municipal operations” until the year 2030). See Pub. Act 101-47, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (amending 65 ILCS 5/8-11-1.3). And because the General Assembly always retains the constitutional authority to preempt home-rule powers, *21 1-19-0396 nothing would stop the General Assembly from enacting a statute that authorized a home-rule unit to impose a tax and mandating how that tax revenue could be spent. ¶ 77 But that’s up to the General Assembly, which could also choose to authorize a home-rule tax but remain silent on how the home-rule unit spends that tax revenue. For example, the General Assembly allows home-rule municipalities to impose a retailers’ occupation tax, but that statutory grant of authority contains no mandate on how the home-rule unit may spend that money. See 65 ILCS 5/8-11-1 (West 2018). When a home-rule unit is not mandated by statute to spend tax revenue a certain way, it may spend the revenue as it pleases, under its general home-rule power. See Allen v. County of Cook, 65 Ill. 2d 281, 288 (1976) (“the manner in which the defendant county appropriates funds *** is a matter ‘pertaining to its government and affairs’ ” within county’s home rule powers (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a))). ¶ 78 The third category of revenues, as mentioned, are revenues specific to a home-rule unit— revenue from taxes a home-rule unit imposes by virtue of its independent constitutional authority to tax. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a). That is, the home-rule unit does not look to a statute for taxing authorization. Typically, in this situation, the home-rule unit does not look to a statute for spending authorization, either; it spends that tax revenue under its general home-rule power to do so. See Allen, 65 Ill. 2d at 288. (Theoretically, of course, a statute could mandate a home-rule unit’s spending of its home-rule-generated tax revenue without tinkering with its taxing authority. Plaintiffs claim that happened recently; more on that later.) ¶ 79 To summarize, and putting aside federal funds, as they are not relevant here, a home-rule unit like Cook County may receive revenue from one of three sources: (1) revenues from taxes imposed by the State, which are distributed to units of local government, the spending of which is typically dictated by statute; (2) revenues from taxes the home-rule unit, itself, imposes, but by *22 1-19-0396 virtue of statutory authorization, that may or may not contain a statutory mandate on how that tax revenue may be spent; and (3) revenues from taxes imposed by the home-rule unit by its own constitutional taxing authority, not a statute, which typically does not involve any statutory mandate on how that tax revenue may be spent, either. ¶ 80 With that in mind, we turn to the substance of the parties’ arguments about the meaning of the Amendment. ¶ 81 B ¶ 82 Plaintiffs’ position, again, is that Amendment applies to revenue generated from any transportation-related tax imposed by any government within Illinois, be it the State or a unit of local government like Cook County, regardless of whether a statute or a local home-rule ordinance governs the spending of that tax revenue. In other words, plaintiffs argue that the Amendment covers all three of the revenue sources that we have mentioned immediately above, insofar as those revenues come from transportation-related taxes. ¶ 83 The County, on the other hand, argues that the Amendment applies only to the spending of transportation-related tax revenue that is controlled by a statute—which, they say, excludes the six Cook County Transportation Taxes at issue here. ¶ 84 A reading of subsection (a) of the Amendment, alone, would support plaintiffs’ argument. Again, subsection (a) provides:

“(a) No moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or

license taxes relating to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, or related to the

use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports,

airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles, or derived from taxes, fees, excises, or

license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation *23 1-19-0396

operation, shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and

(c).” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a). ¶ 85 That language is broad. It contains no limitation on the types of “taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes” (id.) to which the Amendment applies. It contains no language or term of art that we would associate exclusively with acts of the General Assembly. It makes no attempt to differentiate between taxes and fees generated by operation of a statute versus those generated by operation of a municipal ordinance. ¶ 86 But of course, we don’t isolate passages in our interpretation; we read the Amendment as a whole. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 527 (1990). And subsection (b) contains language suggesting that our task is not so simple. Again, that subsection, concerning the purposes for which transportation-related taxes may be spent, reads as follows:

“(b) Transportation funds may be expended for the following: the costs of