State of Missouri v. Loren Burhop, Jr.

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Appellant, ) v. ) WD83735 ) LOREN BURHOP, JR., ) FILED: May 18, 2021 Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAY COUNTY THE HONORABLE LORI J. BASKINS, JUDGE

BEFORE DIVISION FOUR: CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, CHIEF JUDGE, PRESIDING, LISA WHITE HARDWICK AND W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGES

The State appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing with prejudice a criminal complaint against Loren Burhop, Jr., for failing to try him within 180 days of his request for disposition of the charges in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). The State contends that the court erred in granting Burhop’s motion to dismiss because he failed to prove that he had complied with all of the IAD’s requirements. For reasons explained herein, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2017, the State filed a complaint charging Burhop in Ray County with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. *2 On September 20, 2019, the Ray County Circuit Clerk received a packet of five documents from a correctional facility in Kansas by certified mail. The first document, labeled “UNIFORM MANDATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS ACT PURSUANT TO K.S.A. 22-4301,” indicated that Burhop was currently serving a sentence in the Kansas Department of Corrections and stated the length of his sentence, the time served, and the remaining time on his sentence. The second document indicated that Burhop had untried charges against him in Ray County. The third document was addressed to the Ray County Circuit Court and the Ray County Prosecuting Attorney and indicated that Burhop wished to have a final disposition of the charges pending against him “and placed as detainers against [him] at this institution.” The fourth document, which was signed by the records clerk and the warden of the Kansas correctional facility where Burhop was an inmate, stated that a detainer was “currently on file” against Burhop from Ray County for the charges in this case. The fifth document was a letter signed by the records clerk and the warden offering to deliver Burhop to the temporary custody of Ray County. The Ray County Circuit Clerk filed the packet of documents in the court file, and the Ray County Prosecuting Attorney received an eNotice from Case.net on September 20, 2019, that the packet of documents had been filed.

On February 21, 2020, Burhop filed a letter in the circuit court requesting an update on the status of his request to have his case disposed. On March 18, 2020, Burhop filed a motion to dismiss the Ray County criminal case with prejudice pursuant to Articles III and V of the IAD. In his motion, Burhop asserted that the *3 packet of documents received by the Ray County Circuit Court on September 20, 2019, “contained all of the information necessary to put the State and Court clearly on notice of [his] request under the IAD” and triggered the running of the 180-day time limit during which the IAD mandated that he be tried. Burhop argued that, because Ray County had taken no action to proceed with prosecuting him by March 18, 2020, the IAD required dismissal of the Ray County charges with prejudice.

The court held a hearing on Burhop’s motion to dismiss on March 24, 2020. The hearing was not recorded, so no transcript of the hearing was made. The next day, the court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing the criminal complaint with prejudice. The State appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the IAD to the facts is a question of law which this [c]ourt reviews de novo.” State v. Woods, 259 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Mo. App. 2008). “To the extent the court’s application of the law was based upon the evidence presented, we defer to the court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.” Id. When, as in this case, the circuit court does not make specific findings of fact, we “must assume that all facts were found in accordance with the result reached.” State v. Revels, 13 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Mo. banc 2000).

ANALYSIS

In its sole point on appeal, the State contends the circuit court erred in granting Burhop’s motion to dismiss because he did not show that he complied with all of the IAD’s requirements. The State asserts that, because Burhop failed to prove that he met the IAD’s requirements, his request for disposition of the charges against him did not trigger the IAD’s time limitation.

The IAD allows a prisoner in one state to request disposition of a criminal charges filed against the prisoner by a second state. State v. Morrison, 364 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Mo. App. 2012). The purpose of the IAD “is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of charges outstanding against a prisoner and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints.” Id. (citation omitted). “A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” Id. (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985)).

To invoke the IAD, the prisoner must establish the following:

(1) the person is incarcerated in one state (sending state); (2) there are untried charges against the person in a second state (receiving state); (3) the receiving state has lodged a detainer against the person on the basis of the untried charges; and (4) the person has notified both the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court of the prosecuting attorney’s jurisdiction in the receiving state of his current place of imprisonment in the sending state and his request for final disposition of the untried charges.

Id. (citing § 217.490, Art. III, § 11). “If these four criteria are met, then the receiving state must bring the person to trial on the untried charges within 180 days of the notification and request for disposition, or the charges must be dismissed.” Id. (citing § 217.490, Art. III, § 4). The prisoner has the burden of proving the four criteria were met. Id. Once the prisoner presents evidence establishing his compliance with the IAD’s requirements, the burden then shifts to the State to produce evidence showing that there was good cause to delay the trial past 180 days. Id.

Here, it is undisputed that Burhop was incarcerated in Kansas and that there were charges pending against him in Ray County; therefore, he met the first two criteria. The State asserts that Burhop failed to prove the third criterion, i.e., that a detainer was lodged against him by any criminal justice agency in Ray County, and the fourth criterion, i.e., that the Ray County Prosecuting Attorney received notice of his request for disposition of the charges pending against him.

Looking first at the detainer requirement, “Missouri courts have already decided that a detainer must be lodged against a prisoner before he can invoke the protections of the IAD.” State v. Delong, 348 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Mo. App. 2011). Indeed, “the lodging of a detainer against the prisoner is a fundamental procedural requirement of § 217.490 and must have occurred before a request for disposition of the untried charges can be effective.” Id. at 871.

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016.

One of the documents sent by the Kansas correctional facility to the Ray County Circuit Court along with Burhop’s request for disposition of the charges in this case stated that Ray County had a detainer “currently on file” against Burhop for those charges. This document was signed by the records clerk and the warden of the Kansas correctional facility where Burhop was incarcerated. Clearly, the court chose to find this document credible, and we must defer to its decision to do so. Woods, 259 S.W.3d 555. This document constituted sufficient evidence that Ray County had lodged a detainer against Burhop for the untried charges before he requested disposition of those charges.

The State next argues that Burhop failed to prove that the Ray County Prosecuting Attorney received notice of his request for disposition of the charges. The IAD provides that, when a prisoner requests disposition of untried charges, the warden or other official having custody of the prisoner must forward the request, along with other required information, to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. § 217.490, Art III, § 2. The 180-day limitations period is triggered only when the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court receive the required documents. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Mo. App. 1985).

Courts in this state have construed the IAD to “place the onus of compliance upon the officials of the incarcerating and receiving states, rather than upon the prisoner. The officials are generally in a better position to advance the case and to secure cooperation from each other than is the prisoner.” State ex *7 rel. Suitor v. Stremel, 968 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Walton, 734 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. banc 1987)). Consequently, “if the prisoner makes a good-faith effort to invoke the [IAD], and he omits nothing essential to the statute’s operation, his failure to comply strictly with its requirements will not be fatal to his claim.” Id. Written notice to both the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court of the request for disposition of the untried charges is an essential requirement of the IAD. Woods, 259 S.W.3d at 557.

The record before us indicates that the Kansas correctional facility where Burhop was incarcerated sent his request and supporting documents by certified mail only to the Ray County Circuit Clerk. The Ray County Prosecuting Attorney did, however, receive notice of the request because Case.net’s eNotice History shows that she received an eNotice on September 20, 2019, informing her that Burhop’s request for disposition and supporting documents had been filed. Supreme Court Rule 103.08 states that “[s]ervice shall be made to registered users through the electronic filing system” and that such service is “complete upon transmission.” Given that Missouri provides for service of documents through the electronic filing system and the record conclusively shows that the Ray County Prosecuting Attorney received actual notice of Burhop’s request for disposition of the untried charges through that system, we find that Burhop made a good-faith effort to invoke the IAD and omitted nothing essential to Section 217.490’s operation. Because the record established that Burhop was not brought to trial within 180 days after he properly invoked the IAD on September 20, 2019, and *8 because the State has not presented any evidence to establish good cause for the failure to bring Burhop to trial within the 180-day period, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the criminal complaint against him with prejudice. Point denied.

CONCLUSION

The order dismissing the criminal complaint with prejudice is affirmed.

____________________________________ LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE ALL CONCUR.