United States v. Isaiah Jackson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 22 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50301

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:18-cr-01805-BAS-1 v.

ISAIAH SMALLWOOD JACKSON, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2021 Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CALLAHAN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

At 9:00 p.m. on September 21, 2017, officers knocked on the door to Isaiah Smallwood Jackson’s home and when, in response, he stepped out of his home, they arrested him. The officers had probable cause to believe that Jackson had sexually exploited a minor. Jackson was subsequently convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, he argues that his confession and evidence

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

from his cell phone should have been suppressed and that the government failed to prove the interstate commerce element of the charge. We affirm.

“We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress and review the underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). Jackson is correct that, pursuant to United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016), the officers were not authorized to knock on his door without a warrant with the intent to arrest him. However, the Supreme Court has held that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the [the government’s] use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of [Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)].” New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-andannounce rule does not necessarily require the suppression of all evidence found in the search). On appeal, Jackson does not contest that at the police station he waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he met the victim and engaged in a sexual act.

Even where the government has not raised harmlessness we may consider whether an error is harmless. United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2005). We held “that sua sponte recognition of an error’s *3 harmlessness is appropriate only where the harmlessness of the error is not reasonably debatable.” Id. at 1101.

Here, excluding the evidence from the search of Jackson’s cell phone, there remained overwhelming evidence of Jackson’s guilt. The jury heard the victim’s testimony, evidence from the victim’s cell phone, testimony from the officers involved in the case, and Jackson’s confession. The victim testified to the acts for which Jackson was convicted, and Jackson admitted those acts. Both the victim and Jackson stated that, before the assault, they had communicated only by cell phone, using an Internet app. Thus, it is beyond debate that the admission of materials from Jackson’s cell phone was harmless error.

Jackson’s challenges to the evidence and jury instructions concerning the interstate commerce element of the charges are not persuasive, as we have held that the Internet is an instrument of, and intimately related to, interstate commerce. United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Costanzo, 956 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 931 (2020).

AFFIRMED.