Singh Multani v. Garland

19-3846 Singh Multani v. Garland BIA Brennan, IJ A202 134 258 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 24th day of September, two thousand twenty-one. [5] 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 ROBERT D. SACK, 9 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ [12] 13 MALKEET SINGH MULTANI, AKA TAMIN 14 IQBAL, AKA MALKIT SINGH, 15 Petitioner, [16] 17 v. 19-3846 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. * 22 _____________________________________ [23] 24 FOR PETITIONER: Satwant Kaur, South Richmond 25 Hill, NY. [26] 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Bryan Boynton, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; Linda S. * Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted as Respondent. 1 Wernery, Assistant Director; 2 Monica M. Twombly, Trial Attorney, 3 Office of Immigration Litigation, 4 United States Department of 5 Justice, Washington, DC. [6] 7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 10 is DENIED. 11 Petitioner Malkeet Singh Multani, a native and citizen 12 of India, seeks review of an October 17, 2019 decision of the 13 BIA affirming a January 11, 2018 decision of an Immigration 14 Judge (“IJ”) that denied Singh Multani’s application for 15 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 16 Convention Against Torture. In re Malkeet Singh Multani, No. 17 A202 134 258 (B.I.A. Oct. 17, 2019), aff’g No. A202 134 258 18 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 11, 2018). We assume the parties’ 19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 20 Under the circumstances, we have considered the decision 21 of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. 22 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the 23 agency’s adverse credibility determination for substantial 24 evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 25 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). [2] 1 Singh Multani argues that the IJ erred when she found 2 his testimony to be not credible. We defer to an IJ’s 3 credibility determination “unless, from the totality of the 4 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 5 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin 6 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial 7 evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh 8 Multani was not credible as to his claim that members of the 9 Dera Sacha Sauda threatened and attacked him in India when he 10 refused to join their organization and support the Congress 11 Party. 12 The IJ did not clearly err in making her credibility 13 determination. Singh Multani’s testimony was internally 14 inconsistent and inconsistent with the documents he provided 15 to the IJ. For example, Singh Multani testified that in May 16 2014 he was attacked by a large group of people wielding 17 sticks and iron pipes for 15 to 20 minutes. But on cross 18 examination, Singh Multani stated that he was not injured in 19 that attack. When asked how he could be attacked by a large 20 group of people wielding sticks and iron pipes for 15 to 20 21 minutes and not be injured, Singh Multani changed his story 22 and said that his attackers had weapons but did not use them [3] 1 and that he was able to flee from his attackers. 2 Additionally, the IJ found that, when pressed on these and 3 other inconsistencies, Singh Multani was hesitant in his 4 demeanor and that Singh Multani’s answers were vague and 5 evasive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. 6 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 , 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing 7 that particular deference is given to the trier of fact’s 8 assessment of demeanor); Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 9 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an applicant gives very spare 10 testimony, . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the 11 testimony is fabricated.”), overruled in part on other 12 grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 13 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007). 14 Given the demeanor and the inconsistency findings, the 15 IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by 16 substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). 17 That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of 18 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based 19 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 20 F.3d 148 , 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 21 We also find no error in the BIA’s determination that 22 the IJ did not exhibit bias. Although rare, remand may be [4] 1 required “when an IJ’s conduct results in the appearance of 2 bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a meaningful 3 review of the decision below.” Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478 , 4 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53 , 5 55 (2d Cir. 2006)). The record reveals that, as was her 6 obligation, the IJ posed questions to probe for more details, 7 warned against leading questions while offering suggested 8 alternatives, and advised on her preferred procedures. See 9 Islam, 469 F.3d at 55 (holding that “IJ . . . has an obligation 10 to establish and develop the record”). 11 Singh Multani appears to argue that it was improper for 12 the IJ to question him about his testimony. But “[u]nlike 13 an Article III judge, an IJ is not merely the fact finder and 14 adjudicator;” she “also has an obligation to establish and 15 develop the record.” Islam, 469 F.3d at 55 . Accordingly, 16 “[d]uring immigration proceedings, an IJ has the authority to 17 ‘administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, 18 examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.’” [19] Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)). Having carefully 20 reviewed the record, we find that there was nothing improper 21 or biased about the IJ’s conduct in this matter. [5] 1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 3 stays VACATED. 4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 6 Clerk of Court