Bond v. Houses

“Since the petition raises the question of whether the challenged determination is supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to this Court (see CPLR 7804 [g]). Nevertheless, because the record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one initially transferred here and will review the administrative determination de novo” (Matter of Blake v New York City Hous. Auth., 78 AD3d 1175, 1175 [2010]). The determination under review was supported by substantial evidence. The record supports the conclusion that the petitioner engaged in “drug-related criminal activity” (42 USC § 1437d [1] [6]; 24 CFR 966.4 [f] [12] [i] [B]) in violation of section 12 (r) (ii) of his lease (see generally Matter of Walker v Franco, 96 NY2d 891 [2001]; Matter of Bradford v New York City Hous. Auth., 34 AD3d 463 [2006]). The penalty of lease termination 731 was not “so disproportionate as to shock the conscience” (Matter of Bradford v New York City Hous. Auth., 34 AD3d at 464) or one’s sense of fairness (see Matter of Bellamy v Hernandez, 72 AD3d 814 [2010]; Matter of Kerney v Hernandez, 60 AD3d 544 [2009]; cf. Matter of Stroman v Franco, 253 AD2d 398 [1998]), thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law (see Matter of Bellamy v Hernandez, 72 AD3d at 814). Mastro, J.E, Angiolillo, Belen and Lott, JJ., concur.