Esposito v. State of New York

SUMMARY ORDER We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the issues on appeal. The district court dismissed plaintiff-appellant Luisa Esposito’s action, along with five other related cases, on August 8, 2008. 1 See Esposito v. State of New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612(SAS), 2008 WL 3523910 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.8, 2008). Esposito filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b), which the district court denied on August 28, 2008. Order, Esposito v. State of New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008). On September 2, 2008, Esposito filed a notice of appeal of both the district court’s dismissal of her claims and its denial of her Rule 60(b) *39 motion. This Court affirmed both rulings. Esposito v. New York, 355 Fed.Appx. 511 (2d Cir.2009). On September 1, 2010, Esposito moved in the district court to reopen pursuant to Rule 60(b). The district court denied the motion in its memorandum opinion and order of October 25, 2010. Esposito v. State of New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612(SAS), 2010 WL 4261396 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.25, 2010). The district court also issued orders, dated September 17, 2010, and November 3, 2010, respectively, denying Esposito’s motion to disqualify the Office of the New York State Attorney General from representing the state defendants and Esposito’s motion to strike the district court’s memorandum opinion and order. Esposito now appeals. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. First, the motion to reopen was time barred. Although Esposito stated that her motion was brought under Rule 60(b)(6), it was in fact a 60(b)(2) motion, as the motion was based on purportedly new evidence. Rule 60(c)(1), however, provides that motions under, inter alia, Rule 60(b)(2) must be brought “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Regardless of whether the one-year period for filing the Rule 60(b)(2) motion ran from the date of the order dismissing Esposito’s suit (August 8, 2008), the date of the denial of the motion for reconsideration (August 28, 2008), the date on which Esposito filed her notice of appeal (September 2, 2008), or the date that judgment was deemed to be entered (150 days after entry of the order constituting the judgment), Esposito’s motion was untimely. Second, even assuming that Espo-sito’s motion could have been construed as a timely 60(b)(6) motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion on the merits. The new evidence she presented did not meet the high threshold required with respect to a Rule 60(b) motion. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that Rule 60(b) motions request “extraordinary judicial relief’ and are generally granted only in “exceptional circumstances”). Although Esposito’s newly presented evidence lent credence to her factual claims, the district court had presumed all of Esposito’s factual allegations were true when it dismissed Esposito’s complaint on multiple legal grounds. See Esposito v. State of New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612(SAS), 2008 WL 3523910 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.8, 2008). Third, the district court properly rejected Esposito’s attempt to assert a claim under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), Pub.L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902-59 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), because there is no civil private remedy under VAWA. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (holding unconstitutional 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the section of VAWA providing a civil private remedy). Finally, Esposito also argued that the New York State Attorney General’s office should not have been permitted to represent the state defendants in then-individual capacities. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Esposito’s motion to disqualify because Esposito failed “to offer any reasons for [the] request.” Order, Esposito v. State of New York, No. 07 Civ. 11612(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010). We have considered all of Esposito’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, *40 the orders of the district court are AFFIRMED. Footnotes [1] The district court did not enter a separate judgment dismissing Esposito's action. When a judgment is required to be set out in a separate document but is not, judgment is deemed to be entered 150 days after the entry of the dispositive order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(c)(2)(B).