Ueon Bak v. John Potter

MEMORANDUM ** Ueon Bak appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the determination that a complaint lacks arguable substance in law or fact, and for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir.1987). We affirm. The district court properly concluded that “the face of the proposed complaint” showed that Bak’s claims had “no arguable *706 substance in law or fact.” Id. at 1370; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (establishing Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement, as well as the time for a claimant to file an administrative charge and a civil action); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 335.1, 338(d) (establishing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, and a three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims); Legg v. Ford, 185 Cal.App.2d 534, 8 Cal.Rptr. 392, 397 (Ct.App.1960) (“Subornation of perjury, being a crime and not a tort, is subject to criminal prosecution brought in the interest of the state and not to redress a private wrong.”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bak’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. Bak’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.