In re Brittany K.

—In two related child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Spinner, J.), entered December 18, 2001, as, upon a decision of the same court entered November 16, 2001, made after a hearing, found that he sexually abused Brittany K. The notice of appeal from the decision is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the order of fact-finding and disposition (see CPLR 5512). Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. 586 The petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the father sexually abused his four-year-old daughter Brittany K. Contrary to the father’s contentions, Brittany K.’s out-of-court statements were corroborated by several sources, including her older brother’s independent description of inappropriate sexual conduct (see Matter of Nicole V., 71 NY2d 112 [1987]; Matter of Latisha W., 221 AD2d 645 [1995]). In addition, Brittany K.’s statements were corroborated by the medical evidence and the expert testimony that she displayed the classic symptoms of a sexually abused child, including age-inappropriate knowledge of sexual matters and the acting-out of sexual behavior (see Matter of Victoria H., 255 AD2d 442 [1998]). Once the petitioner established a prima facie case of sexual abuse, the burden shifted to the father to come forward with a satisfactory explanation for his daughter’s injuries (see Matter of Themika V., 205 AD2d 787 [1994]; Matter of Vincent M., 193 AD2d 398 [1993]). Here, the father’s self-serving denials and speculative accusations were insufficient to rebut the petitioner’s prima facie case of sexual abuse (see Matter of Philip M., 186 AD2d 462 [1992], affd 82 NY2d 238 [1993]). Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.