MARSH USA, INC. v. ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER RISK MANAGMENT SERVICES, INC., etc., and THE SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 16, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0770 Lower Tribunal No. 20-4844BID ________________

Marsh USA, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Services, Inc., etc., and The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Appellees.

An appeal from the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

Greenberg & Traurig, P.A., and David C. Ashburn (Tallahassee), for appellant.

Panza, Maurer & Maynard, P.A., and Elizabeth L. Pedersen, and Virginia C. Dailey (Fort Lauderdale), Walter J. Harvey, School Board Attorney, and Jeff James, Assistant School Board Attorney, Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., and Edward G. Guedes, and Richard Rosengarten, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

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PER CURIAM.

UPON MOTION TO DISMISS

Appellant, Marsh USA, Inc., challenges a final administrative order by appellee, the School Board of Miami-Dade County, adopting exceptions to a recommended order by an administrative law judge and rejecting an award of a contract pursuant to a request for proposals. After it issued the challenged order, the School Board reopened the bidding process. Because Marsh failed to subsequently file a notice of protest in writing within seventytwo hours of the bid reopening and further failed to file a formal written protest, it has waived its right to pursue this appeal. See § 120.57(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“[T]he notice of protest shall be filed in writing within [seventytwo] hours after the posting of the solicitation. The formal written protest shall be filed within [ten] days after the date the notice of protest is filed. Failure to file a notice of protest or failure to file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under this chapter.”); see also Lund v. Dep’t of Health, 708 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“[T]he possibility of an attorney’s fee award under section 120.595(5) is not a collateral legal consequence which would preclude dismissal when the death of a party renders the appeal moot.”); Ruck v. State, Bd. of Pro. Eng’rs, 956 So. 2d 469, 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[W]e reject appellant’s argument that we *3 should decide the case on the merits for the sole purpose of determining his right to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes.”). Hence, we dismiss the appeal.

Dismissed.