James v. Willis

21-501-pr James v. Willis UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3 New York, on the 17th day of February, two thousand twenty-two. [4] 5 PRESENT: 1 MICHAEL H. PARK, 2 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 3 MYRNA PÉREZ, 4 Circuit Judges. 1 _______________________________________ [2] 3 TYRONE JAMES, MARK CROWDER, 4 JALONE DAVIS, AKA JALON SHABAZZ, 5 WAYNE HAYWOOD, KEVIN REDD, 6 KENNETH ELMORE, CHRISTOPHER 7 GRAY, TERRY WILSON, [8] 9 Plaintiffs-Appellants, [10] 11 v. 21-501 [12] 13 SCOTT WILLIS, JOHN AMATO, JEFFREY 14 BADENDYCK, DANIEL McCULLOUGH, [15] 16 Defendants-Appellees.* 17 _______________________________________ [19] 20 FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: GREGORY GETRAJDMAN, NICOLE DELMURO, 21 Law Students (Amy Jane Agnew, 22 Supervising Attorney, on the brief), Law * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. 23 Office of Amy Jane Agnew, P.C., New 24 York, NY. [25] 26 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: BRIAN D. GINSBERG, Assistant Solicitor 27 General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor 28 General, Victor Paladino, Senior Assistant 29 Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia 30 James, Attorney General, State of New 31 York, Albany, NY. 1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 2 New York (Suddaby, C.J.). 3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 4 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is DISMISSED 5 for lack of jurisdiction. 6 Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered by the district court on February 11, 2021 to the 7 extent that it dismissed their three federal claims. In early 2015, Plaintiffs were inmates 8 incarcerated at the Shawangunk Correctional Facility (“Shawangunk”), a prison operated by the 9 New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). Plaintiffs 10 are members of the Nation of Islam (“NOI”) and they used Shawangunk’s “mosque room” for 11 religious study, prayers, and other religious programming. 12 Plaintiffs allege that a few days after the attack in Paris on the French publication Charlie 13 Hebdo by an Islamic terrorist group, Correction Officer Michael Comito vandalized the mosque 14 room by trampling on the prayer rugs with muddy boots, ripping the NOI flag off the wall, and 15 removing the flag from the room. Defendants, who are correction officers at Shawangunk, are 16 alleged to have asked Plaintiffs not to report the incident, failed to report the incident themselves 17 in violation of a DOCCS directive, covered up evidence of the vandalism by having the room 18 cleaned, and confronted Plaintiffs for reporting the incident. A subsequent investigation by 19 DOCCS’s Office of Special Investigations concluded that Comito committed the vandalism. [2] 20 In August 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern 21 District of New York. They brought a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim alleging 22 that Defendants refused to follow DOCCS policies and procedures to report the incident because 23 the Plaintiffs were Muslim, as well as conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) 24 alleging that Defendants acted in concert to deny Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws by 25 preventing a full investigation of the vandalism due to animus against Plaintiffs’ religion. 26 Plaintiffs also sued Correction Officer Comito, but the claims against him were settled and 27 subsequently dismissed, and he is not a party to this appeal. The district court granted 28 Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Plaintiffs timely appealed. We 29 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and 30 the issues on appeal. 31 We first consider whether Plaintiffs have standing, even if the issue is raised for the first 32 time on appeal, because standing is required for subject matter jurisdiction. See Strubel v. 33 Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2016). We conclude that Plaintiffs lack standing, and 34 we thus vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject 35 matter jurisdiction. 36 There is no dispute that Plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact when their mosque room was 37 vandalized by Comito. That does not, however, give Plaintiffs standing to sue Defendants who 38 undisputedly did not cause that injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) 39 (holding that a plaintiff’s injury in fact must be “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 40 defendant”). The only injury Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that was caused directly by 41 Defendants’ actions and omissions is fear that they would be “further attacked” and that there 42 would be “further incidents and retaliation.” App’x at 34, 38. That is not a concrete harm [3] 43 sufficient to satisfy Article III standing to seek retrospective damages. See TransUnion LLC v. 44 Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 , 2210–11 (2021) (“[I]n a suit for damages, the mere risk of future harm, 45 standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm . . .”). 46 In their brief, Plaintiffs argue they have Article III standing because Defendants 47 discriminated against Plaintiffs by attempting to prevent an investigation into Comito’s 48 misconduct, and discrimination itself is an injury sufficient to confer standing. Plaintiffs’ 49 argument fails because they do not have a legally cognizable interest in whether Comito is 50 investigated. “[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 51 nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). At least one 52 other circuit court has concluded that this rule logically extends to the criminal investigation or 53 non-investigation of another, which, like prosecution, is a discretionary decision left to the 54 executive branch. See Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 652 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[V]ictims do 55 not have standing based on whether other people—including their perpetrators—are investigated 56 or prosecuted.”); id. at 655 (“[I]t is not the province of the judiciary to dictate prosecutorial or 57 investigative decisions to the executive branch.”). We easily make that extension here because, 58 in the matter before us, Plaintiffs styled this case as a failure to investigate a crime and failed to 59 distinguish their arguments for standing from those rejected by Linda R.S. 1 We therefore conclude 60 that Plaintiffs do not have a legally cognizable interest in whether Comito was investigated. 61 We have considered the remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments and find them to be without 62 merit. We conclude that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their equal protection and conspiracy [1] For the same reason, the cases cited by Plaintiffs holding that discrimination alone is a cognizable injury are inapposite. [4] 63 claims against Defendants. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand 64 with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [65] 66 FOR THE COURT: 67 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court