Earle v. Arbogast

Opinion by Mr. Justice Fell, Generally in the absence of an express covenant on the sub [417] ject the law implies a covenant on the part of the lessee so to treat the demised premises that they may revert to the lessor unimpaired except by usual wear and tear, and uninjured by any wilful or negligent act of the lessee. The implied covenant does not however extend to the loss of buildings by fire, flood or tempest, or enemies, which it was not in the power of the lessee to prevent, and there is no implied covenant that the lessee shall restore buildings which have been destroyed by accident without fault on his part: Jackson and Gross’ Landlord and Tenant, in Pennsylvania, sec. 964, 965; Taylor’s Landlord and Tenant, sec. 343; Cooley on Torts, p. 335; Long v. Fitzimmons, 1 W. & S. 530; United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53. Tenants by the curtesy and in dower were responsible at common law, and tenants for life and for years whose estates were created by the acts of the parties, were responsible under statute as for permissive waste until relieved by the statute of 6 Anne, chap. 31, where the property was destroyed by unavoidable accident, not the act of God or the public enemy. The statute of 6 Anne, chap. 31, which relieved the tenant from liability for the consequences of accidental fires has never been in force in this state, and it has been formally adopted by few if any of the other states, except New Jersey. Chancellor Kent, 4 Kent’s Com. 82, says : “ Perhaps the universal silence of our courts upon the subject of any such responsibility of the tenant for accidental fires is presumptive evidence that the doctrine of permissive waste has never been introduced and carried to that extent in the common law jurisprudence of the United States.” In U. S. v. Bostwick, supra, it was held that the implied covenant of the tenant is not to repair generally, but so to use the property as to make repairs unnecessary as far as possible, and that it is a covenant against voluntary waste only. It is said in the opinion by Waite, C. J.: “ It has never been so construed as to make a tenant answerable for accidental damages nor to bind him to rebuild if the buildings are burned down or otherwise destroyed by accident.” The statement in the opinion in Long v. Fitzimmons, supra, that a tenant, where there is no covenant to that effect, is not bound to restore buildings that have been burned down or become ruinous by other accident without default on his part may be a dictum only, but it is in [418] harmony with the trend of decisions of the courts of other states and of the federal courts, and it has been accepted and acted upon by the courts of this state, and it is a correct statement of the law. There could be no recovery without proof of the defendants’ negligence, and the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff. The lease was in parol, for one year, with no agreement to repair or to deliver the premises in good order and condition at the end of the term. No new or different use was made of the building by the tenants. It was used by them for the purpose for which it had been leased, and for which it had been fitted with machinery and used by the lessor. The only new appliance used was the rendering tank which exploded. In the use of the property leased the defendants were under an implied duty not to negligently injure it. The standard of their duty was reasonable care. The mere fact of the explosion did not throw upon them the burden of proving that they were not negligent. The burden of proof was with the plaintiff throughout the trial. He was not bound in the first instance to prove more than enough to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendants. Proof of the explosion and of the attendant circumstances might have furnished sufficient ground for a reasonable inference of negligence to have made out a prima facie case, but he could not rest his case upon a bare presumption based only upon the fact that the explosion occurred. The answers to the third, fourth and fifth points affirmed these propositions and are free from error. The assignments which complain of the charge cannot be sustained. An inadequate presentation of the case, when the omission to charge leaves the jury without direction on important questions involved, or plainly tends to mislead them, is ground for reversal. In this case the charge was clear and full. The omission now complained of was in not calling the attention of the jury to some features of the case which counsel at the time did not deem of sufficient importance to mention, and which may have been discovered only by a critical analysis of the charge made since the trial. The judgment is affirmed.