Chin, K. v. Chin, K.

J-A24010-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KINGSLEY CHIN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : KIM WALKER-CHIN : No. 641 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): No. 191201586

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2022

Kingsley Chin appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his motion to strike a judgment. After our careful review, we affirm on the well-reasoned opinion authored by the Honorable Joshua H. Roberts.

Judge Roberts set forth the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter as follows:

[T]his case has had a lengthy and contentious history in the Family Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court.

[] Chin and [] Walker-Chin reached a divorce settlement on or about September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been engaged in on-again[,] off-again enforcement and contempt proceedings in the Family Court Division related to the divorce settlement. [The Honorable Holly J.] Ford presided over the

____________________________________________

• • Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A24010-21

proceedings that ultimately resulted in the judgment that [] Walker-Chin transferred to the civil judgment index.

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted [] Walker-Chin’s motion to enforce property settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford entered an order finding [] Chin in contempt for his failure to comply with her June 29, 2018 order. In her April 18, 2019 order, Judge Ford specifically stated “[a] judgment shall be entered on the $1,238,164.46 due to [Walker-Chin,] plus post-judgment interest of 6% in accordance with the statute. Execution of the judgment may commence immediately.” Further, Judge Ford stated that “[Chin] is ordered to pay [Walker-Chin’s] additional attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $3,000.00 regarding this respective petition, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.”

[] Chin appealed Judge Ford’s order to the Superior Court, which resulted in a recalculation of the amounts due. In an order dated June 27, 2019, Judge Ford noted that the applicable interest rate on the stipulated debt should have been calculated at 4.5%, and not 6%.

On December 10, 2019, [] Walker-Chin, through counsel, filed a praecipe to transfer and index the judgment against [] Chin with the Office of Judicial Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16[,] plus 4.5% post-judgment interest.

• • * *

[Chin] filed a motion to strike the judgment, which, because the judgment had been docketed on the civil judgment index, was assigned to this court for disposition. Following briefing by both parties and oral argument, this court denied [] Chin’s motion to strike on February 17, 2021. [] Chin filed this timely appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; paragraphs reordered for clarity).

Chin raises the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Chin’s] motion to strike praecipe to transfer and index judgment and strike/vacate any judgment entered thereon (“Motion to Strike”) where [Walker-Chin] filed a “Praecipe to Transfer and Index Judgment”

-2-

J-A24010-21

(“Praecipe”) and the Philadelphia Office of Judicial Records (“Office of Judicial Records”) entered judgment thereon without the authority of any rule or statute?

2. Whether the [trial] court erred in not striking the Praecipe and judgment entered thereon due to Walker-Chin’s violations of Philadelphia Family Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 (“Admin. Reg. 97-1”) (impounding Family Division Records and barring disclosure of same absent order permitting disclosure), which violations justified striking Walker-Chin’s Praecipe attaching impounded records of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Family Division (the “Family Division”), and the judgment entered upon such Praecipe?

3. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, thereby permitting an intra-county, interdivisional transfer of four Family Division orders . . . to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Civil Division (the “Civil Division”) without any authority for the transfer?

4. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, which motion asserted that the Civil Division lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [the] four Family Division orders that Walker- Chin transferred to the Civil Division, where the four orders transferred to the Civil Division arose exclusively from a domestic relations matter, over which the Civil Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction?

5. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the Motion to Strike, which motion asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction over [Chin] in the civil action Walker-Chin initiated by filing the Praecipe . . ., where the undisputed record reflects that [Chin] did not reside in Pennsylvania, had no property in Pennsylvania, and conducted no business in Pennsylvania at the time that Walker-Chin impermissibly transferred four Family Division orders to the Civil Division and entered judgment thereon in the Civil Division?

6. Whether the [trial] court erred in applying a discretionary standard in connection with denying [Chin’s] Motion to Strike, where the Motion to Strike did not implicate the discretion of the [trial] court, but rather questions of law?

Brief of Appellant, at 5-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

“A petition to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer to the record and must be granted whenever some fatal defect appears

-3-

J-A24010-21

on the face of the record.” First Union Nat. Bank v. Portside Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 827 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting PNC Bank v. Bolus, [] 655 A.2d 997, 999 ([Pa. Super.] 1995)). “When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when the judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., [] 700 A.2d 915, 917 ([Pa.] 1997) (citing Linett v. Linett, [] 254 A.2d 7, 10 ([Pa.] 1969)). “Importantly, a petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief.” City of Philadelphia v. David J. Lane Advertising, 33 A.3d 674, 677 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing First Union Nat’l Bank, 827 A.2d at 1227). Importantly, “[a] petition to strike does not involve the discretion of the [trial] court.” Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (citing Dubrey v. Izaguirre, [] 685 A.2d 1391, 1393 ([Pa. Super. 1996)).

Oswald v. WB Pub. Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793–94 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Section 2731 of the Judicial Code provides that “[i]n the first judicial district there shall be one prothonotary for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and the Philadelphia Municipal Court, who shall be known as the ‘Prothonotary of Philadelphia.’” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. The office of the prothonotary has the power and duty to . . . enter all civil judgments[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2737(3) (emphasis added). “The prothonotary shall immediately enter in the judgment index . . . a judgment, whether entered by the court, on order of court or on praecipe of a party.” Pa.R.C.P. 3021 (emphasis added). “[J]udgment means a judgment, order[,] or decree requiring the payment of money entered in any court which is subject to these rules, including a final or interlocutory order for payment of costs,

-4-

J-A24010-21

except a judgment against the Commonwealth or a political subdivision.” Pa.R.C.P. 3020 (emphasis added).

Finally, section 4303(a) of the Judicial Code provides as follows:

(a) Real property.--Any judgment or other order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general rule adopted pursuant to section 1722(b) (relating to enforcement and effect of orders and process) when it is entered of record in the office of the clerk of the court of common pleas of the county where the real property is situated, or in the office of the clerk of the branch of the court of common pleas embracing such county.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(a) (emphasis added).

Here, we have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, and the thorough and well-written opinion authored by Judge Roberts. We agree with Judge Roberts that: (1) Judge Ford entered a valid, enforceable judgment against Chin pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e)(1) (granting court authority to enter judgment where party fails to comply with equitable distribution order); (2) the judgment index for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as a whole is maintained by the Office of Judicial Records (formerly Office of the Prothonotary), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2737(3); (3) there is no fatal defect on the face of the record that would affect the validity of the judgment, see Oswald, supra; and (4) at all times, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia maintained personal jurisdiction over Chin and subject matter jurisdiction over the matter giving rise to the judgment in question. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/21, at 4-10.

-5-

J-A24010-21

We further conclude that Philadelphia Family Court Administrative Regulation 97-1 does not act as a bar to the indexing, by praecipe of a party, of a duly entered judgment, issued by a Family Court judge, on the sole judgment index maintained in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. It is apparent that the purpose of Administrative Regulation 97-1 is to prevent the dissemination of the type of sensitive, personal, financial, and/or confidential information that is inherent to domestic relations and other matters heard before the Family Court. Here, the judgment in question contains no sensitive information of the type contemplated by Administrative Regulation 97-1. Rather, it simply evidences the debt owed by Chin as a result of the judgment entered by Judge Ford. In this way, it is no different than any other judgment entered in a civil matter.

Because the trial court did not err as a matter of law, Oswald, supra, we affirm the order denying Chin’s motion to strike the judgment. The parties are instructed to attach a copy of Judge Roberts’ opinion in the event of further proceedings.

Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/2022

-6-

denied Mr. Mr Chin's motion to strike on February 17, 2021. Mr. Chin filed this timely

appeal. appeal.

On appeal, Mr. Chin complains this Court erred in denying the motion to strike because (1) the judgment was not transferrable from the Family Court Division to the Civil Division; (2) the transfer of the judgment violated Family Division Administrative Regulation 97-1 because documents ordinarily maintained

under seal in in the the Family Family Court were were transferred transferred and and filed filed of record record in in the the Civil

Division; (3) this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (4) this Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Chin; (5) the Court improperly considered Ms.

Walker-Chin's equitable arguments in denying the motion to strike; and (6) (6) this

Court improperly improperly considered considered facts facts outside the the face face of of the record.

Upon reviewing reviewing the the procedural procedural history history and the the petition, petition, this this Court concluded

that the judgment had been properly transferred to the civil judgment index, and

this Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Chin. Thus, this Court's denial of the petition petition

to strike was proper and this Court's Order should be affirmed. A. Procedural and Factual Background

It It is is clear from from the the briefs briefs and this this Court's review of Judge Ford's Ford's Orders

attached to attached to those those briefs briefs that that this case has this case has had had aalengthy lengthy and and contentious contentious history history in in

the Family Court Division and on appeal to the Superior Court (Family Court

Docket Docket No. D07038460, D07038460, Superior Superior Court Court docket No. 2118 2118 EDA EDA 2018). 2018).

Mr. Mr Chin and Ms. Walker-Chin reached a a divorce settlement on or about

September 5, 2008. Since April 2014, the parties have been engaged engaged in on-again off-

again enforcement and contempt proceedings in the Family Court Division related

to the the divorce settlement. Judge Judge Ford presided over over the the proceedings that that ultimately ultimately

resulted in the judgment that Ms. Walker-Chin transferred to to the civil judgment

index.

On June 29, 2018, Judge Ford granted Ms. Ms. Walker-Chin's motion to to enforce

property settlement. settlement. On April 18, 2019, Judge Ford entered an Order finding finding Mr.

Chin in contempt for his failure to to comply comply with her June 29, 2018 Order. In her

April April 18, 2019 2019 Order, Order, Judge Ford Ford specifically specifically stated "A "A judgment shall be entered entered

to wife plus on the $1,238,164.46 due to plus post-judgment post-judgment interest of 6% in accordance

with with the the statute. statute. Execution of judgment Execution of judgment may may commence commence immediately." immediately." Further, Further,

Judge Ford stated that "Husband is ordered to to pay wife's additional attorney's attorney's fees

and and expenses in in the the amount of $3,000.00 regarding regarding this this respective respective petition, petition, within

thirty thirty (30) days of the the date of this Order."

Mr. Chin appealed Judge Ford's Order to the Superior Court, which resulted

in in a a recalculation recalculation of of the the amounts due. In amounts due. In an an Order Order dated dated June 27, 27, 2019, Judge Ford

noted that the applicable interest rate on the stipulated debt should have been

calculated at 4.5%, and not 6.0%. 6.0%,

On December December 10, 10, 2019, Ms. Walker-Chin, through 2019, Ms. through counsel, counsel, filed filed aapraecipe praecipe to to

transfer and index index the the judgment against againstMr. Mr. Chin with with the the Office Office of Judicial

Records in the amount of $1,222,426.16 plus 4.5% post-judgment post-judgment interest.

Ms. Chin's Petition to Ms. to Strike the judgment followed, which eventually led to

this appeal. this appeal

B. Standard of Review

Mr. Chin contends that the judgment was improperly improperly transferred from from the

Family Court Division to the civil judgment judgment index.

"A A petition petition to to strike aajudgment is is aacommon law proceeding proceeding which operates which operates

Copley Qu-Wayne as aademurrer to the record." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs, Qu- WayneAssocs, Assocs,

683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. (Pa. 1996). 1996). A A motion to to strike is appropriate if the judgment that

was entered contains a a fatal defect or irregularity apparent from the face of the

record record and, and, as as aaresult, result, the the prothonotary prothonotary lacked lacked authority authority to to enter the the judgment. judgment. Id. Id

The The denial denial of a a petition petition to strike strike aajudgment is is reviewed reviewed for for an abuse of

discretion or discretion or error of law. error of law. Vogt v. Liberty Vogt v. Muut. Liberty Muut. Mut. Fire Fire Ins. Ins. Co., 900 A.2d Co., 900 912, 915 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. (Pa.

Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion in this context means that this Court, in

reaching reaching its its conclusion, conclusion, exercised exercised its its judgment in in aamanifestly manifestly unreasonable

manner, or demonstrated partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by by the

evidence or or the record. v. Morrell record. Smith v. Morrell Beer Beer Distributors, Inc., Ine., 29 A.3d Ine., A.3d 23, 25 25 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Super

C. The The Judgment Was Properly Transferred Transferred

Judge Ford entered aavalid valid enforceable judgment on on the the docket. Pursuant Pursuant to to

23 Pa.C.S. §§3502(e)(1): 3502(e)(l)

If, If, at any time, time, aaparty party has has failed comply with failed to comply with an an order of equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or with the the terms terms of an an agreement as as entered into into between between the parties, after hearing, the court may, may, in addition to to any other remedy available under this part, in order to to effect compliance with its order:

(1) enter judgment; ... ..

Thus, pursuant to Section 3502(e)(1), Judge Ford was empowered to to enter

judgment against Mr. Mr Chin. "The judgment represents aabinding judicial

determination of of the the rights rights and and duties between the parties, parties, and and establishes their their

debtor-creditor relationship for all the world to notice when the judgment is

recorded in a a Prothonotary's Office. When entered of record, the judgment also

Upset operates as aalien upon all real property of the debtor in that county." In re Upset

Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Sale, Tax of Berks County, County, 479 A.2d 940, 943 (Pa. 1984).

Thus, in order to effectuate the purpose of Judge Ford's judgment, Ms. Walker-Chin was then permitted to transfer the judgment to the civil judgment

index. See, e.g., Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. & Trust Co. v. Globalnet Intl, v. Globalnet Int'l, Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, Int'l,

1192-94 (Pa. Super. 1998) (recognizing validity of lien or judgment pursuant to to

section 3502 docketed in civil judgment index). Mr. Chin argues, without any

support, that the judgment was not transferable to to the civil judgment docket index.

Mr. Chin similarly does not cite to any authority in any statute or rule providing for

aaspecial "family court division"judgment division" judgment index that that would accomplish the same

purpose as the civil judgment index.

Instead, the maintenance by the Prothonotary (or Office of Judicial Records)

of aasingle common pleas judgment judgment docket or index dates back well over 150 years. years.

See, e.g., See, e.g., Coral Coral Gables, Gables, Inc. v. v. Kerl, 66A.2d 275, 276 (Pa. 1939); Russeck v. Shapiro,

84 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. Super. 1951) (citing Act 84A.2d Act of March 29, 1827, P.L. 154, section 3,

17 P.S. § 17PS. $ 1903, and Act Aet of April 22, 1856, P.L. 532, section 3, 17 P.S. § 17P.S. $ 1922). The

purpose of such an index is to provide notice to purchasers, subsequent subsequent

Coral Gables, encumbrancers, and others in interest. Coral Gables, 6 6A.2d at 276.

The current The current version of the version of judgment index the judgment index statute, statute, 42 42 Pa. C.S. § Pa. C.S. $ 4303(a), 4303(a),

provides

(a) Real property. Any judgment or other order of aacourt of common pleas for the payment of money shall be aalien upon real property on the conditions, to to the extent and with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general rule adopted pursuant to 1722(b) (relating to section 1722() to enforcement and effect of orders and process) process) when it is is entered of record in mn the office of the clerk of the court of common pleas of the county where the real property property is is situated, or in the office of the clerk of the branch of the court court of common pleas pleas embracing such county.

(b) Order of court as lien. Any other order of a (b) acourt of common pleas shall be aalien upon real and personal property situated within any county embraced within the judicial district on the conditions, to the extent and with the priority provided by statute or prescribed by general rule adopted pursuant to to section 1722(b). 1722().

(c) Transfer of domestic judgments and orders. An order of any court of this Commonwealth which is aalien on real or personal property situated within any county of this Commonwealth pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) (b) shall be a lien upon real or personal property situated within any a other county to to the same extent as if resulting from an order of the court of common pleas of such other county upon compliance with such transfer and filing procedures as may be prescribed by general rule.

The language in section (a) is is clear and unequivocal: "[a]ny judgment or other

order of aacourt of common pleas for the payment payment of money money shall be aalien upon upon real

property on the conditions ...." ..," The statute does not delineate between common

pleas divisions. It applies to to any judgment entered in the court of common pleas. pleas.

There is asingle, statutorily created judgment index, which provides the most is a

efficient way to provide notice of aajudgment or lien to potential creditors.

This statute is derived from the longstanding principles applicable to

judgments, and notice of judgments: Judgments,

The great The great weight weight of authority is of authority is that that the the entry of entry of judgment is a aministerial or clerical act, required required to to be done by the clerk of the court.... court, .. and consists of placing placing aa judgment previously rendered on the record, by by which enduring evidence of the judicial act is afforded. While the term "entry of judgment" judgment" is sometimes used in a a general sense so as to include rendition of judgment, it is most most often used in often used in aamore limited and more limited and precise sense as precise sense as meaning the ministerial act of spreading the judgment at large on the record as distinguished from the judicial act of giving or pronouncing judgment. There pronouncing judgment. There must bebe aa compliance with statutes or rules of court regulating regulating the entry of judgments. judgments.

A A judgment is entered when it is spread at large on the record, and under some statutes not until then.

Under some statutes, however, aajudgment is entered when a a signed copy of it is delivered to the clerk and filed by him, although not actually transcribed on the record, or when the judgment is duly signed and filed by by the clerk. So it has been held that aajudgment judgment is in law entered, at least for some purposes, at the time a a proper proper entry thereof is formulated and given to the clerk to be entered of record.

As As aageneral rule, the decisions of all courts must be preserved in writing in some record provided for that purpose. Where a astatute so requires, judgments should be be entered, and for many purposes a a judgment is not complete, perfect, and effective until it has been duly duly entered. Thus entered. Thus it it has has been been broadly broadly held held that judgments that judgments take effect only from the date of entry, and that there is no judgment until it is entered of record.

As As between between the the parties, parties, aajudgment judgment duly rendered rendered may may be be valid and and effective, although although not not entered, that is, is, the neglect neglect or failure of the clerk to make aaproper proper entry entry of the judgment, or his defective or inaccurate entry of it, at least in the absence of statute to the contrary, will not deprive it of the force of aajudicial decision. The enforcement of a a judgment does not depend on its entry, entry, or docketing, ...; and, as discussed in Executions $§9 9if the judgment judgment has has been been duly rendered, rendered, aavalid valid execution execution generally may be issued and levied, without either entry or docketing of the judgment, unless specially required by statute. statute,

In the In entry or the entry or record record of of aajudgment, judgment, a a clerical error, clerical error, misdescription, irregularity, omission, or other defect not going going to to the the jurisdiction jurisdiction ofof the the court court will not not vitiate vitiate the the judgment or or give give it it an effect effect which which it it would not not have have had if correctly entered provided provided there there is is enough in in the the entry entry or record to constitute a judgment. or record to constitute a judgment.

As As aageneral general rule, rule, entry of of aajudgment judgment must must be made in in the judgment book, journal, or other designated book of record, record, in in accordance accordance with with the the statutory provisions provisions in that that respect. Where the clerk is directed by law to to keep certain books for the entry of judgments, judgments, or toto record judgments in a a book specially designated by by statute for that that purpose, purpose, or or to to enter enter different different kinds kinds of of judgments or decrees in different books, and deviates from the course prescribed, prescribed, the validity validity and operation of the judgment judgment are not not impaired impaired thereby as between between the the parties, parties, although although it it may be otherwise as to third persons who are misled, or who fail to receive the notice which aaproper proper entry would have afforded them, and ... entry in the wrong book may and..entry may prevent the judgment from becoming aalien. lien

Federal Land Bank of Baltimore Bank of Baltimore v. v. Sustrik, Sustrik, 533 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. Super. 1987) 1987)

Lansdowne v. G. (quoting Lansdowne C. Murphy Co,, G.C. Co., 517 5IT A.2d 1318, 1318, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. 1986)

(quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments, 8$$ §§ 106, 107 & & 109 n. 97)).

In sum, the order signed by Judge Ford entering judgment in favor of Ms.

Walker-Chin Walker-Chin and and against Mr. Mr. Chin required an an additional additional step to to reflect reflect the the

judgment on the civil judgment judgment index. Ms. Walker-Chin had to transfer the

judgment to the civil judgment index. Orders entered in the family family court division

are not automatically transferred. Ms. Walker-Chin took the appropriate appropriate steps steps to

transfer the judgment, and Office of Judicial Records appropriately appropriately accepted accepted

transfer of the judgment. In the absence of these steps, the judgment would not

appear on any inquiries made by potential creditors or others with interest in any any

liens or encumbrances against against Mr. Mr. Chin. In In other other words, words, the the purpose purpose and priority priority

of the the judgment would be negated. would be negated.

Mr. Chin does not point to any defect or irregularity in in the record of the

judgment being judgment being recorded recorded that that would render the would render the judgment as invalid judgment as invalid or or leave the leave the

Office of Judicial Records Records without without the the authority to to enter enter judgment. Thus, the the Ms. Ms.

Walker-Chin properly transferred the judgment to the civil judgment judgment index and this

Court Court properly properly denied denied the the petition to to strike.

D. Mr. Chin's Mr. Chin's Other Issues Lack Other Issues Merit Lack Merit

Mr. Chin raises several arguments in in his 1925(b) 1925() statement which are not

applicable applicable and/or for for which which he he cites cites no supporting authority. no supporting authority.

As an initial matter, Mr. Chin argues that this Court lacked personal personal and

subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chin and, presumably, presumably, the judgment. judgment. A A court

must have jurisdiction over aaparty to to enter judgment judgment against him. An action taken

by a acourt without jurisdiction is a anullity. Dubrey v. Izaguirre, 685 A.2d 1391, 1393

(Pa. Super. 1996).

The jurisdictional arguments make little sense in context. Mr. Chin availed

himself himself of the the Philadelphia Philadelphia Court Court of Common Pleas Pleas when when he he initiated proceedings proceedings

in in this this court's family family division in in March March 2007. 2007. He He is is the the named plaintiff. plaintiff. When Ms. Ms.

Walker-Chin transferred the judgment from the family family division to the civil

judgment index, she never "left" the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. She

simply reduced Judge Ford's order entering entering judgment to to the only only civil judgment judgment

index maintained in Philadelphia. At all times, the Philadelphia Court of Common

Pleas, whether through Judge Ford or this Court, had jurisdiction over Mr. Mr. Chin.

And the the Family Family Court Court will will continue to to have jurisdiction over Mr. Chin in in the

domestic relations case. Thus, this Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over

both Mr. Chin Chin and the the judgment.

Mr. Mr. Chin also argues Chin also argues that that Ms. Walker-Chin violated Ms. Walker-Chin violated Family Family Division Division

Administrative Regulation Regulation 97-1 because she she filed filed documents ordinarily ordinarily maintained

under seal in the family court to the civil dockets. It is this Court's view that any any

enforcement of any alleged violation of the family family division's administrative

regulation —and this Court does not offer a regulation -- aview one way or another — -- lies lies with with the the

family division. Mr. Chin could seek the appropriate remedy remedy with Judge Judge Ford.

Whether or not not Ms. Ms. Walker-Chin Walker-Chin violated violated the the regulation transferring the regulation by transferring the

judgment to the civil judgment index, however, was not aabasis for this Court to strike the judgment.

Finally, Mr. Chin argues, without citing any facts or legal legal authority, authority, that this

Court improperly considered Ms. Walker-Chin's equitable equitable arguments arguments and/or facts

10 outside the face of the record. Because Mr. Chin does not provide any support for

these arguments in in his 1925(b) 1925(b) statement, this Court is unable to to address them. In

any event, in considering the petition to to strike, this Court only considered the face

of the judgment itself, as filed on the civil docket.

Thus, none of the other arguments raised by Mr. Chin have merit merit.

E. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court respectfully submits that its Order

denying the Petition to to Strike was not an abuse of discretion and was an

appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The Superior Court should affirm this Court's Order denying the Petition to Strike.

BY THE COURT:

Josh aRoberts, J. Joshu Dated: June 3, 2021 2021

11 II