Angela M. Hammock

United States Tax Court Washington, DC 20217 Angela M. Hammock, ) ) Petitioner ) ) v. ) Docket No. 5290-18L. ) Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ) ) Respondent ) ) ) ORDER Pursuant to Rule 152(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit with this order to petitioner and respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the remote trial in this case before Judge Ronald L. Buch, where the place of trial was designated as Tampa, Florida, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the remote trial session at which the case was heard. In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered for respondent. (Signed) Ronald L. Buch Judge Served 05/26/22 — 3 — 1 Bench Opinion by Judge Ronald L. Buch 2 April 29, 2022 3 Angela M. Hammock v. Commissioner 4 Docket No. 5290-18L 5 THE COURT: The following represents the Court's 6 oral findings of fact and opinion. These oral findings of 7 fact and opinion may not be relied upon as precedent in 8 any other case. This opinion is in conformity with 9 Internal Revenue Code section 7459(b) and Rule 152(a) of 10 the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Any 11 section references refer to the Internal Revenue Code or 12 the Treasury regulations in effect during the periods at 13 issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of 14 Practice and Procedure. 15 This is a collection case brought pursuant to 16 sections 6320 and 6330 challenging a notice of federal tax 17 lien and a notice of intent to levy issued to Angela 18 Hammock. We are asked to decide whether the Commissioner 19 abused his discretion when issuing a notice of 20 determination sustaining those notices, which relate to 21 penalties under section 6672. 22 Background 23 Through tragic circumstances, Angela Hammock 24 (formerly, Stopanio) inherited Scorpion Performance, Inc., 25 her family's business. Her parents, Robert, and Teresa — 4 — 1 Stopanio, founded Scorpion, an auto parts manufacturer, in 2 the 1990s. They led the company as chief executive 3 officer and treasurer, respectively, until 2011. That 4 year, they died in an automobile accident that Ms. Hammock 5 witnessed while traveling in a separate vehicle. Ms. 6 Hammock, their only child, served as the personal 7 representative of their estate and heir to their interests 8 in Scorpion. 9 Ms. Hammock also inherited a role with Scorpion. 10 At the time of her parents' passing, Scorpion had about 35 11 employees. Ms. Hammock inherited her mom's role and title 12 as treasurer. A close family friend, Luke Whalen, 13 effectively inherited her father's role in running the 14 day-to-day operations of the business. Even before the 15 Stopanios' passing, Mr. Whalen had been heavily involved 16 in running the business. At some point after her parents' 17 passing, Scorpion also hired Richard Lampen as Chief 18 Financial Officer to assist with financial matters. 19 In 2015, Ms. Hammock received a fateful call 20 from Mr. Lampen informing her of financial troubles with 21 Scorpion. The payroll had grown to roughly 50 employees, 22 although it is not clear that the business had grown 23 correspondingly. Eventually, Ms. Hammock discovered that 24 Mr. Whalen was using Scorpion to hire friends and to pay 25 personal expenses. Company minutes show that Mr. Whalen — 5 — 1 owed Scorpion over $200,000 for personal expenses he had 2 charged to the business. 3 Ms. Hammock's precise role with Scorpion from 4 the time of her parents' death until that fateful call is 5 unclear. She held stock individually and through her 6 parents' estate. She was an officer, held the official 7 title of treasurer, and was an authorized signer on 8 Scorpion's bank account. However, she signed few checks 9 relative to the total checks that were drawn on the 10 account. The directors held management meetings, some of 11 which Ms. Hammock attended. She earned wages from 12 Scorpion. 13 While Scorpion had been paying Mr. Whalen's 14 personal expenses, it had not been remitting its 15 employment taxes. Scorpion first became delinquent in 16 remitting its employment taxes in 2012 and remained 17 delinquent in 2015. At the end of 2015, Scorpion declared 18 bankruptcy. 19 In July 2016, a revenue officer with the 20 Internal Revenue Service sent Ms. Hammock and others, 21 including Mr. Lampen, a pair of letters regarding the 22 Commissioner's attempts to collect Scorpion's unremitted 23 employment taxes. In one letter, the revenue officer 24 informed Ms. Hammock that the Commissioner was in the 25 process of determining who might be personally responsible — 6 — 1 for some portion of the unpaid tax and that information 2 already obtained by the IRS indicated that Ms. Hammock 3 might be responsible. The other letter scheduled an in4 person meeting to discuss Ms. Hammock's duties and 5 responsibilities as an officer of Scorpion. These letters 6 began a series of communications and miscommunications 7 that are central to this case. 8 Ms. Hammock sought to have counsel represent her 9 before the IRS. She postponed the in-person meeting, and 10 on August 8, 2016, her counsel faxed the revenue officer a 11 Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of 12 Representative. Upon receipt of the Form 2848, the 13 revenue officer notified one of Ms. Hammock's lawyers that 14 the form was not processible because it was not completed 15 correctly. The form did not identify the tax form number 16 or tax period for which counsel was representing Ms. 17 Hammock. In response, Ms. Hammock's lawyers submitted a 18 corrected Form 2848 the following day, but that form was 19 not signed by Ms. Hammock. Instead, the new form relied 20 on Ms. Hammock's August 3, 2016, signature from the 21 previous Form 2848. The revenue officer rejected the new 22 Form 2848 for that reason. The revenue officer's 23 contemporaneous notes from August 11, 2016, indicate that 24 Ms. Hammock's lawyers were still trying to obtain Ms. 25 Hammock's signature on the new form from her. The record — 7 — 1 does not show any further activity regarding securing or 2 submitting a corrected or properly signed Form 2848 for 3 Ms. Hammock until after the revenue officer closed the 4 examination. 5 In the meantime, a parallel process was taking 6 place with respect to Mr. Lampen, the CFO of Scorpion. He 7 was represented by the same lawyers as Ms. Hammock. His 8 initial Form 2848 was rejected for similar reasons; but 9 his updated form was accepted. 10 After reviewing the available records, the 11 revenue officer determined that Ms. Hammock was among 12 those responsible for the failure to remit Scorpion's 13 payroll taxes and proposed a trust fund recovery penalty 14 under section 6672 against Ms. Hammock. On February 10, 15 2017, the revenue officer made the initial determination 16 to assess the section 6672 penalty, and on that same day, 17 the group manager approved that determination. 18 A practical consequence of the failure to 19 perfect the Form 2848 occurred on February 15, 2017. On 20 that date, the Commissioner mailed a Letter 1153 to Ms. 21 Hammock. This is the letter that notifies someone that 22 the Commissioner proposes to assess a penalty against them 23 "as a person required to collect, account for, and pay 24 over withheld taxes." In her case activity record, the 25 revenue officer observed that that a corrected Form 2848 — 8 — 1 had never been received for Ms. Hammock, whereas one had 2 been received for Mr. Lampen. As a result, the revenue 3 officer sent notices to Ms. Hammock (as to her liability), 4 to Mr. Lampen (as to his liability), and to counsel (only 5 as to Mr. Lampen' liability). No letter was sent to 6 counsel regarding Ms. Hammock's liability. 7 The revenue officer mailed the Letter 1153 8 informing Ms. Hammock of a proposed trust fund recovery 9 penalty, to Ms. Hammock's last-known address by certified 10 mail. That letter was delivered on February 18, 2017, 11 when, according to postal service records, it was left 12 with an individual. The Letter 1153 stated: "If we do not 13 hear from you within 60 days from the date of this letter 14 . . . we will assess the penalty and begin collection 15 action." It also stated: "You may appeal your case to the 16 local Appeals Office" and provided an address to send an 17 appeal. 18 Ms. Hammock claims not to have received the 19 letter in time to file an appeal. She was out of town 20 attending a rodeo when the letter was delivered. Although 21 she states that sometimes the postal service leaves her 22 mail on her fence in a plastic bag, that did not happen 23 here. The Letter 1153 was sent by certified mail, and the 24 postal service tracking information specifically states 25 that it was left with an individual. — 9 — 1 Ms. Hammock did not respond within 60 days. The 2 revenue officer received a protest regarding Mr. Lampen, 3 but not Ms. Hammock. During a phone call with counsel on 4 April 24, 2017, the revenue officer confirmed receipt of 5 the protest for Mr. Lampen and informed counsel that the 6 revenue officer never received an updated Form 2848 for 7 Ms. Hammock. The revenue officer informed counsel that 8 they could not discuss Ms. Hammock's case without a valid 9 Form 2848. See generally, section 6103. On April 25, 10 2017, the revenue officer received a fax of a valid Form 11 2848 for Ms. Hammock. On May 12, 2017, more than 60 days 12 after the Letter 1153 was sent to Ms. Hammock, her counsel 13 faxed to the revenue officer a protest for Ms. Hammock. 14 That fax included a copy of the Letter 1153 that had been 15 sent to Ms. Hammock. 16 The revenue officer rejected the protest as 17 untimely, and the Commissioner set about assessing and 18 collecting the liability. In June 2017, the Commissioner 19 assessed the penalties and mailed Ms. Hammock notice and 20 demand for payment. After the initial assessment and 21 subsequent abatements, the penalties totaled $579,043. 22 After Ms. Hammock failed to pay, the Commissioner mailed 23 her a notice of federal tax lien and notice of intent to 24 levy. 25 Through counsel, Ms. Hammock requested a — 10 — 1 collection hearing. In her request, she stated that she 2 was disputing both notices. She explained that she "was 3 not the responsible person . . . for the tax periods at 4 issue." In an attached memorandum, her attorney alleged 5 that the notices were defective because they "are not 6 supported by any facts," and that if the Commissioner had 7 fully developed the facts, he "would have learned that Ms. 8 Hammock did not engage in any willful conduct to avoid 9 paying the payroll taxes." In her challenge to the 10 collection notices, Ms. Hammock did not indicate that she 11 would like a collection alternative. 12 A settlement officer from the Commissioner's 13 Independent Office of Appeals was assigned to her case and 14 held a hearing. During the collection proceedings, her 15 attorney acknowledged that Ms. Hammock received a Letter 16 1153 at some point but argued that the Commissioner 17 violated her due process rights by failing to send a copy 18 of the letter to her attorneys. After receiving the trust 19 fund recovery penalty file, the settlement officer 20 verified that the Commissioner properly mailed a Form 1153 21 to Ms. Hammock, who filed an untimely protest. Based on 22 this information, she determined Ms. Hammock was precluded 23 from challenging the penalties. She verified that the 24 penalties were assessed more than 60 days after the Letter 25 1153 was mailed, downloaded account transcripts, and — 11 — 1 secured a Form 4183 confirming supervisory penalty 2 approval. In a February 2018 notice of determination, the 3 Commissioner sustained the proposed levy and lien. 4 While residing in Florida, Ms. Hammock filed a 5 timely petition with this Court. In her petition, she 6 alleged that the Commissioner erroneously determined that: 7 (1) "The IRS followed all legal and procedural 8 requirements, including those enumerated in the IRS 9 Manual, and the assessment was properly made for each tax 10 period"; (2) "Ms. Hammock was the responsible person for 11 the payroll liabilities under 6672"; and (3) "Ms. Hammock 12 had an opportunity to challenge [her] status as the 13 responsible person." Although other sections of the 14 petition contained headings that purported to challenge 15 whether procedural requirements were met or whether the 16 assessment was valid, they were, in substance, merely 17 reframed challenges to the underlying liability. 18 While this case has been pending, each of the 19 parties has filed motions for summary judgment, which the 20 Court has denied. We denied the Commissioner's motion 21 because the record did not show whether the settlement 22 officer verified that the applicable law and 23 administrative procedures were met. We denied Ms. 24 Hammock's motion because material facts remained in 25 dispute. The Commissioner filed a motion to remand to — 12 — 1 supplement the administrative record, which we granted. 2 The parties subsequently submitted a 3 supplemental notice of determination dated November 13, 4 2019. In the supplemental notice, the settlement officer 5 described in detail the verification procedures she 6 performed while considering available documents. She 7 confirmed that the revenue officer adequately informed Ms. 8 Hammock's attorneys of errors in the Forms 2848. She also 9 confirmed that the Commissioner never received a 10 processible Form 2848 until after the issuance of the 11 Letter 1153. The notice recites that Ms. Hammock's 12 counsel acknowledged that she received the Letter 1153, 13 but that it was not sent to counsel. Accordingly, the 14 settlement officer verified the Letter 1153 was properly 15 issued. 16 At trial, the parties' positions were fairly 17 straightforward. The Commissioner argues that Ms. Hammock 18 is precluded from challenging the underlying liability, 19 and even if she can challenge it, that she is liable under 20 section 6672. Although framed as a variety of separate 21 arguments, in substance Ms. Hammock argues that she did 22 not have a prior opportunity to challenge the liability 23 and that she is not a responsible person for purposes of 24 the section 6672 penalty. As stated in her pretrial 25 memorandum, her arguments are: — 13 — 1 "(1) Did the IRS properly assess Hammock given 2 it failed to conduct investigation or make factual 3 findings to support the underlying liability 4 determination; 5 (2) did the IRS provide proper notice of the 6 assessment to Hammock and did she have an opportunity to 7 challenge the liability determination; 8 (3) if even Hammock had an opportunity to 9 challenge the liability, did the appeals officer abuse her 10 discretion by failing to consider all the evidence and 11 refusing to hear Hammock's challenge to the underlying 12 liability; 13 (4) did the IRS follow the supervisory approval 14 requirement to verify compliance with Section 6330(c)(1)." 15 Discussion 16 In this collection case, Ms. Hammock is 17 attempting to challenge the underlying liability. The 18 underlying liability in this case includes only penalties 19 under section 6672, sometimes referred to as a "trust fund 20 recovery penalty" or a "responsible person penalty." An 21 employer has the duty to withhold its employees' share of 22 federal taxes from their wages and remit those taxes, plus 23 the employer's share, over to the federal government. 24 Kazmi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2022-13 , at *6. The 25 amounts withheld are known as "trust fund taxes" because — 14 — 1 an employer holds them in trust for the government. Id. 2 Because the government has no recourse against employees 3 if an employer fails to remit the taxes, section 6672(a) 4 provides a tool to collect the liability from those who 5 may have been responsible to withhold and pay them over. — 6 — Id. 7 Section 6672(a) allows the Commissioner to 8 impose a trust fund recovery penalty on certain people who 9 willfully fail to withhold, account for, and pay over 10 trust fund taxes. Id. Under section 6671(b), the people 11 who might be liable include officers or employees of a 12 corporation who are under a duty to collect, account for, 13 and pay over the taxes. Those people are referred to as 14 responsible persons, and who is responsible is defined 15 broadly. Id., at *7. Whether someone is a responsible 16 person is "a matter of status, duty and authority, not 17 knowledge." Id. (quoting Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 18 1151, 1156 (5th Cir. 1979). 19 The trust fund recovery penalty is an 20 "assessable penalty," meaning it is not subject to 21 deficiency procedures. Id., at *6-7. However, section 22 6672(b)(1) requires the Commissioner to provide the 23 taxpayer with notice of the penalty before assessment. 24 Letter 1153 provides a taxpayer with notice and provides 25 the opportunity for an administrative appeal. Mason v. — 15 — 1 Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301, 317 (2009). 2 Standard of Review 3 In a collection case, where the underlying 4 liability is properly at issue, we review the 5 Commissioner's determination de novo. Where the 6 underlying liability is not properly at issue, we review 7 the Commissioner's determination for an abuse of 8 discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604 , 610 9 (2000). Whether the underlying liability may be raised in 10 a collection proceeding turns on whether the taxpayer 11 received a notice of deficiency or otherwise had a prior 12 opportunity to dispute the liability. See section 13 6330(c)(2)(B). Trust fund recovery penalties are not 14 subject to deficiency procedures, so the question here is 15 whether Ms. Hammock had a prior opportunity to dispute the 16 liability. 17 Prior Opportunity 18 In a trust fund recovery penalty case, the 19 Letter 1153 provides a prior opportunity to dispute the 20 liability. A prior opportunity includes "a prior 21 opportunity for a conference with Appeals that was offered 22 either before or after . . . assessment." Treas. Reg. § 23 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2. The Letter 1153 provides 24 precisely such an opportunity. 25 If someone doesn't receive the relevant letter — 16 — 1 or notice, however, they won't know to request an appeal. 2 Thus, the taxpayer must receive the Letter 1153 or 3 deliberately refuse it for the letter to have provided a 4 prior opportunity. Mason, 132 T.C. at 317-318 . 5 For the letter to be received, it must first 6 have been properly mailed. See section 6672(b)(1). The 7 Commissioner must prove proper mailing of the Letter 1153 8 to the taxpayer's last-known address. See Mason, 132 T.C. 9 at 318, 322 . The same evidence that establishes that the 10 Commissioner mailed a notice of deficiency is sufficient 11 for purposes of the Letter 1153. Id.; see sections 6212, 12 6672(b). The Commissioner has established that a Letter 13 1153 was mailed by certified mail to Ms. Hammock's last 14 known address as required by section 6672(b)(1). The 15 Commissioner has also established delivery to an 16 individual at that address. The parties do not dispute 17 mailing and delivery. However, they dispute actual 18 receipt. 19 We determine whether a taxpayer received a 20 letter or notice based on the preponderance of the 21 evidence. BM Construction v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 22 2021-13, at *12-13. On the issue of receipt, the 23 Commissioner may be entitled to a presumption of 24 administrative regularity. Once the Commissioner proves 25 proper mailing of a Letter 1153, it is presumptively — 17 — 1 delivered to and received by the person to whom it was 2 addressed. Id. To rebut the presumption of receipt, the 3 taxpayer must present strong evidence of non-receipt. 4 Generally, a taxpayer's testimony of non-receipt, standing 5 alone, is insufficient. Klingenberg v. Commissioner, T.C. 6 Memo. 2012-292, at *12, aff'd, 670 F. App'x 510 (9th Cir.. 7 2016); Kamps, T.C. Memo. 2011-287 , 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 , 8 582; BM Construction, T.C. Memo. 2021-13 , at *16-17. 9 Because the Commissioner established proper mailing and 10 delivery, we must determine whether Ms. Hammock rebutted 11 the presumption of receipt. 12 Ms. Hammock did not rebut the presumption of 13 receipt. The facts clearly establish proper mailing and 14 delivery to an individual at her address. The only 15 contrary evidence is Ms. Hammock's statement that she does 16 not recall receiving the Letter 1153. Yet a copy of that 17 notice was eventually attached to her untimely protest, 18 and the record is silent as to how or when that copy of 19 the notice came into her or her counsel's possession. 20 Moreover, during the supplemental hearing, Ms. Hammock's 21 counsel acknowledged that she received the notice. 22 Contrast the evidence here with that in Lepore 23 v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-135 . In that case, Mr. 24 Lepore's 23–year–old son received and signed for a Letter 25 1153 addressed to Mr. Lepore. Id., at *3. Mr. Lepore — 18 — 1 "testified that he never saw the Letter 1153 or knew that 2 it had arrived at his home." Id., at *10. We accepted his 3 testimony for a few reasons: (1) Mr. Lepore credibly 4 testified that he always responded to correspondence from 5 the Commissioner (a point not disputed by the IRS) and 6 that he would have responded had he known; (2) his son 7 testified that he did not give the Letter 1153 to his 8 father personally and instead threw it somewhere in the 9 basement; (3) the basement was a multipurpose office space 10 containing Mr. Lepore's desk, the other son's desk, and at 11 least three defunct businesses' files, such that a letter 12 thrown there could easily get lost; (4) Mr. Lepore 13 received a high volume of mail; and (5) the son who 14 received the Letter 1153 did not live in the house when he 15 received it and did not speak to his father frequently. 16 Id., at *10-11. 17 A more analogous situation can be found in Orian 18 v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-234 , 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 19 356 . In that case, the Commissioner established that "a 20 proposed assessment was sent by certified mail to Mr. 21 Orian's last known address; that it was not returned; and 22 that, according to the U.S. Postal Service's Web site, it 23 was delivered." Id., at 359. The taxpayer testified "that 24 he had no memory of receiving the letter and was 25 frequently out of town." Id. Nonetheless, we found that — 19 — 1 taxpayer failed to meet "the burden of proof requirements 2 to overcome the presumption that he received the [Letter 3 1153]." Id. 4 Ms. Hammock did not establish that she did not 5 receive the Letter 1153. Because we conclude that Ms. 6 Hammock received the notice, she may not challenge the 7 underlying liability. 8 Abuse of Discretion 9 Because Ms. Hammock's underlying liability is 10 not at issue, our review of the notice of determination is 11 for abuse of discretion. See Sego, 114 T.C. at 610 . An 12 abuse of discretion occurs if Appeals exercises its 13 discretion "arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound 14 basis in fact or law." Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 15 19, 23 (1999). To answer the question of whether the 16 settlement officer abused her discretion, we consider 17 whether she: (1) properly verified that the Commissioner 18 met all requirements of applicable law and administrative 19 procedure for collecting the trust fund recovery 20 penalties, (2) considered any relevant issues petitioner 21 raised, and (3) considered whether the proposed collection 22 action is no more intrusive than necessary. See section 23 6330(c). 24 The main issues raised by Ms. Hammock involve 25 the verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1). In — 20 — 1 collection cases for trust fund recovery penalties, the 2 settlement officer must verify that the Commissioner 3 properly mailed a Letter 1153 and that the section 6672 4 penalty was properly approved under the written 5 supervisory approval requirement of section 6751. See Lee 6 v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. 40, 49 (2015); Chadwick v. 7 Commissioner, 154 T.C. 84 , 94-95 (2020). Section 6330 8 does not require the settlement officer to rely on a 9 particular document, and reliance on standard 10 administrative records is generally acceptable. Craig v. 11 Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002); Blackburn v. 12 Commissioner, 150 T.C. 218 , 222 (2018); Nestor v. 13 Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002). However, when a 14 taxpayer specifically alleges that she never received a 15 Letter 1153, an Appeals officer cannot rely solely on 16 computerized transcripts to verify mailing. See Hoyle v. 17 Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197 , 205 n.7 (2008), supplemented 18 by 136 T.C. 463 (2011). Instead, the Appeals officer must 19 examine the underlying documents. Id. 20 The record indicates that the settlement officer 21 complied with procedural requirements and gave due 22 consideration to Ms. Hammock's allegations. The settlement 23 officer verified that the Commissioner had determined that 24 Ms. Hammock was a responsible person and that a supervisor 25 approved in writing the initial determination of the — 21 — 1 penalty. The settlement officer also verified that the 2 Letter 1153 was sent by certified mail before the 3 Commissioner assessed the trust fund recovery penalty. 4 Ms. Hammock alleged at trial that she did not recall 5 receiving the Letter 1153. The administrative record 6 reflects that the settlement officer reviewed the 7 documents in the case file, including the Letter 1153, and 8 determined that the Letter 1153 had been sent to Ms. 9 Hammock's last known address by certified mail. The 10 record contains a photocopy of the Letter 1153. The 11 photocopy has the U.S. Postal Service Form 3800, Certified 12 Mail Receipt, attached, indicating that it was sent by 13 certified mail. The administrative record also includes 14 proof of delivery. On remand, the settlement officer 15 verified that all requirements of applicable law and 16 administrative procedure were met. 17 Failure to Notify Counsel 18 Ms. Hammock raises as a separate issue the 19 Commissioner's failure to send a copy of the Letter 1153 20 to her counsel. It is unclear in exactly what context she 21 raises this issue. Is she raising it as a challenge to 22 the underlying liability itself? Or is she raising it as 23 a challenge to whether the settlement officer in the 24 collection proceeding confirmed that all proper 25 administrative steps were taken? Either way, her argument — 22 — 1 fails. 2 The Commissioner did not mail the notice to Ms. 3 Hammock's attorneys because the IRS did not have a valid 4 Form 2848 on file authorizing anyone to represent her. 5 Her counsel did not submit a valid Form 2848 until after 6 the Letter 1153 was issued. But even if the Commissioner 7 had a valid Form 2848 on file, the failure would not 8 invalidate the notice or deprive her of the right to 9 timely appeal. We have repeatedly held in analogous 10 contexts that the failure to send a copy of a notice to a 11 taxpayer's counsel does not invalidate the notice or serve 12 to extend the period of time within which the taxpayer 13 must act. See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 113 , 14 117 (1957); Houghton v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 656 , 661-62 15 (1967); McDonald v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 750 , 752-53 16 (1981). 17 If Ms. Hammock raises this issue as a basis to 18 claim that the settlement officer did not verify that all 19 administrative steps were taken, that argument must fail. 20 In her supplemental notice of determination, the 21 settlement officer verified that there was no processable 22 Form 2848 on file at the time the Commissioner issued 23 Letter 1153. 24 Ms. Hammock's remaining arguments are merely 25 reframed challenges to the underlying liability. For — 23 — 1 example, in her pretrial memorandum, Ms. Hammock questions 2 "did the appeals officer abuse her discretion by failing 3 to consider all the evidence and refusing to hear 4 Hammock's challenge to the underlying liability" or 5 whether "the IRS properly assess[ed] Hammock given it 6 failed to conduct investigation or make factual findings 7 to support the underlying liability determination." These 8 go to the merits of the underlying liability and not the 9 question of whether all administrative steps were taken. 10 We have previously held that "[t]o impose the requirement 11 of a substantive review on the settlement officer would 12 allow the taxpayer to avoid [section 6330's] limitations 13 of pursuing the underlying liability . . . and apply a 14 level of detail in the verification process that has never 15 been previously required." Blackburn, 150 T.C. at 222. 16 The law simply does not require the settlement officer in 17 the collection proceeding to determine whether Ms. Hammock 18 was a responsible person as a condition precedent to 19 verifying procedural compliance. 20 Collection Alternatives 21 Ms. Hammock did not offer any collection 22 alternatives and does not argue that the settlement 23 officer failed to consider any collection alternatives. 24 Conclusion 25 The Commissioner determined that Ms. Hammock was — 24 — 1 a responsible person as to the trust fund liabilities of 2 Scorpion. She did not timely challenge the Commissioner's 3 determination and is precluded from raising the underlying 4 liabilities in this proceeding. The Commissioner verified 5 that all proper administrative steps were taken. The 6 Commissioner did not consider collection alternatives 7 because none were offered. Accordingly, we will sustain 8 the Commissioner's notice of determination. To reflect 9 the foregoing, an appropriate decision will be entered. 10 (Whereupon, at 10:29 a.m., the above-entitled 11 matter was concluded.) — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — — 25 —