President, Directors of the Dorchester & Milton Bank v. President, Directors of the New England Bank

Wilde, J. * This is an action of assumpsit; but the foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim is the alleged negligence of the defendants, in not collecting certain bills left with them for collection by the plaintiffs. The defendants proved that they placed these bills in the hands of the Commonwealth Bank for collection, the same being payable in the city of Washington, where the defendants had no correspondents. This, the plaintiffs’ counsel contend, the defendants had no right to do, on the ground, that an agent has no right to delegate his authority to a sub-agent, without the assent of his. principal. This, no doubt, is generally true; but when, from the nature of the agency, a sub-agent or sub-agents must necessarily be employed, the assent of the principal is implied. Such was the nature of the agency in the present case. It could not have been expected, that the defendants would employ one of their own officers to proceed to Washington to obtain payment of the bills. The bills undoubtedly were intended to be transmitted to Washington for collection, and if the defendants employed suitable sub-agents for that purpose, in good faith, they are not liable for the neglect or default of the sub-agents. This was so decided in Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330. The chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, “ It is well settled, that when a note is deposited with a bank for collection, which is payable at another place, the whole duty of the bank so receiving the note, in the first instance, is seasonably to transmit the same to a suitable bank or other agent at the place of payment. And as a part of the same doctrine, it is well settled, that if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a note has his residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank, that it was to be transmitted to the place of the resi [187] denSe of the promisor.” This decision of the court on both points is, we think, well founded in principle, and supported by a decided weight of authority. The only opposing decision is in the case of Allen v. Merchants Bank, which was first reported in 15 Wend. 482, and which was after-wards removed to the court of errors, where the judgment of the court below was reversed by a majority of the court of errors. This reversal is opposed to a number of decisions of great authority, and is not, as we think, well founded in principle. If the bank in that case acted in good faith, in selecting a suitable sub-agent, where the bills were payable, there seems to be no principle of justice, or public policy, by which the bank should be made liable for the neglect or misfeasance of the sub-agent. And it is admitted, by Mr. Senator Terplanck, who states the grounds of the reversal of the judgment, that the bank would not have been liable, if there had been an understanding or agreement, express or implied, that the bills were to be transmitted to another bank for collection. Now, we think, in that case, as in this, there was manifestly such an understanding. There is another view of that case, taken by the learned senator, in which we cannot concur. He makes no distinction between the neglect of the officers of the bank where the bills were deposited, and that of the bank to which they were transmitted for collection. ' We think the distinction is obvious. We agree, however, with the learned senator, that the decisive question in such cases is, what was the understanding of the parties, as to the duties the collecting bank undertook to perform. And as to this, we have no doubt of the understanding of the parties in the present case. That was, we think, that the defendants were to transmit the bills, or to cause them to be transmitted, to some suitable bank or other agent in Washington, for collection; and the questions are, whether, in employing the Commonwealth Bank to transmit the bills, the defendants acted in good faith; and if so, whether they are responsible for the failure of that bank. That the defendants acted in good faith we cannot doubt. The Commonwealth Bank, at the time, was in perfectly good [188] credit, and had great facilities for obtaining payment of bills and notes payable in distant states. The defendants were the plaintiffs’ general agents, and they had no instructions ; they were, therefore, to exercise their best judgment as to the transmission of the bills, and the remittance of the money when collected. And we see no cause to doubt that they acted in good faith, and exercised a sound judgment. It was objected that the defendants ought to have made restricted indorsements; but it is a satisfactory answer, that the defendants made their indorsements in the same mariner the plaintiffs did. Considering, then, that the defendants acted in good faith, and exercised a sound judgment in employing the Commonwealth Bank, we think there is no principle of law or equity which can subject them to any liability, by reason of the subsequent failure of that bank. In our opinion, the defendants’ responsibility was limited to good faith and due discretion in the choice of an agent to transmit the bills, and to procure a remittance of the money when paid. This case is not distinguishable from the case of Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, and the cases there cited. _ We do not think that the proof of any usage is necessary to support these decisions ; but in the present case, the usage is well proved to have been uniform, in similar cases, ever since the year 1833 or 1834, three or four years before these bills were deposited in the defendant bank. It was also proved that one bill had been transmitted in like manner, by the defendants, for the plaintiffs, and returned to them with protest, and without objection by them. This was in 1836, more than a year before the bills in this case were deposited. This would be sufficient notice of the usage or manner in which the defendant transacted such business, if any such notice were required. It seems, however, that the usage of a bank is binding on all persons dealing with the bank, whether they know of the usage or not. Lincoln and Kennebeck Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. 155; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25. That is a point, however, not necessary to be decided in this case. Plaintiffs nonsuit. Footnotes [*] The chief justice did not sit in this case.