Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad

Bigelow, C. J. We do not deem it necessary to consider the questions raised by the demurrer to the bill, nor to discuss the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of this court in equity over corporations, at the suit of one or more of their stockholders, in cases where there has been an excess or abuse of the power or authority conferred by legislative grants. In the view which we have taken of the merits of the case, these questions become immaterial. The case for the plaintiff mainly rests on the single proposition of law, that a corporation established by the legislature of this commonwealth, by acts which, under St. 1830, c. 81, are subject to alteration, amendment or repeal, at the pleasure of the legislature, cannot engage in any new enterprise or enter upon any new undertaking, in addition to that contemplated by and embraced in the original charter of the company, against the consent of any one of its stockholders, although such new enterprise or undertaking is of the same kind with that for — 241 — which the corporation was originally established, and is authorized, sanctioned and adopted by an express legislative grant, and by a vote of the majority of the stockholders duly ascertained according to law. In endeavoring to ascertain whether this proposition can be supported on sound legal principles, it does not seem to us to be necessary to enter upon any extended discussion of the extent of the right reserved by the general laws to the legislature to modify or repeal the charters of corporations without or against their consent. No question arises here between the legislature and the corporation. The latter have assented, in the mode provided by law, to the change in their rights, powers and duties which have been created by the act set forth in the bill, and have thereby accepted the modifications of their original contract with the Commonwealth, which result from the new provisions of law which they have thus adopted and sanctioned. Nor are we called on to determine the effect which such a legislative act would have upon a previously existing executory contract entered into with the corporation; as, for instance, an agreement to subscribe for stock and to become a member of a corporate body, created or to be established for certain distinct and designated objects. No such question arises in the present case. The plaintiff had no executory agreement with the defendants at the time the act in question was passed by the legislature, or when it was approved and accepted by a legal vote of the corporation. He was then the absolute owner of shares, and as such was a constituent member of the body corporate, clothed with all the rights and privileges and subject to all the duties and obligations of a stockholder. These, therefore, constituted the extent and the measure of his responsibility to the corporation, and of their liability and legal obligations to him. In this view, the gist of the present inquiry seems to us to embrace a much narrower range than that which was taken in the very elaborate and extended argument submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. It appears to us that when we shall have ascertained and defined with precision and accuracy the nature of the contract which subsists, under — 242 — the statutes of this commonwealth, between a corporation and one of its members, solely by virtue of his being a proprietor of shares in the capital stock, we shall have gone very far towards a final adjudication of the rights of the respective parties, so far as they are involved in the present controversy. We suppose it may be stated as an indisputable proposition, that every person who becomes a member of a corporation aggregate by purchasing and holding shares agrees by necessary implication that he will be bound by all acts and proceedings, within the scope of the powers and authority conferred by the charter, which shall be adopted or sanctioned by a vote of the majority of the corporation, duly taken and ascertained according to law. This is the unavoidable result of the fundamental principle that the majority of the stockholders can regulate and control the lawful exercise of the powers conferred on a corporation by its charter. A holder of shares in an incorporated body, so far as his individual rights and interests may be involved in the doings of the corporation, acting within the legitimate sphere of its corporate power, has no other legal control over them than that which he can exercise by his single vote in the meetings of the company. To this extent, he has parted with his personal right or privilege to regulate the disposition of that portion of his property which he has invested in the capital stock of the corporation, and surrendered it to the will of a majority of his fellow corporators. The jus disponendi is vested in them so long as they keep within the line of the general purpose and object for which the corporation was established, although their action may be against the will of a minority, however large. It cannot, therefore, be justly said that the contract, express or implied, between the corporation and the stockholders is infringed or impaired by any act or proceeding of the former which is authorized by a majority, and which comes within the terms of the original statute creating and establishing their franchise, and conferring on them capacity to exercise control over the rights and property of their members. On the contrary, the fair and reasonable implication resulting from the legal relation of the stockholder and the corporation is, — 243 — that the majority may do any act either coming within the scope of the corporate authority, or which is consistent with the terms and conditions of the original charter, without and even against the consent of an individual member. Such being the nature oi the contract which subsists between the corporation and each of its members, we have only to inquire, in the present case, whether it has been in any respect violated by the present defendants. The answer to this inquiry will be found in the interpretation which is put on that clause of the general laws of this commonwealth already cited, by which a right is reserved to the legislature to amend, alter or repeal any act of incorporation which has been established by its authority since the enactment of that provision in St. 1830. Whatever may be the extent of the authority which is thereby retained by the legislature to modify or change the charters of corporations without or against their consent, there would seem to be no reason to doubt that, with the concurrence of the corporation manifested in the mode pointed out by law, the legislature may make any alteration in or addition to the power and authority conferred by the original act of incorporation, and not foreign to the purposes and objects for which it was enacted, and which it was designed to accomplish, which may seem to be expedient or necessary. No breach of contract would be thereby occasioned. Such action would be in precise accordance with the terms on which the grant of the franchise was made. In creating a corporation, no contract is made by the legislature with the individual members or stockholders, any further than they are represented by the artificial body which the act of incorporation calls into being. They have no other rights except those which exist or grow out of the constitution of the body corporate of which they are members. To this only can we look, in order to ascertain whether there has been any breach of contract or violation of chartered rights. It constitutes, of itself, the contract by which the rights of all parties are to be governed. When, therefore, it is expressly provided between the legislature on the one hand and the corporation on the other, as part of the original contract of incorporation, that the former — 244 — may change or modify or abrogate it or any portion of it, it cannot be said that any contract is broken or infringed when the power thus reserved is exercised with the consent of the artificial body of whose original creation and existence such reservation formed an essential part. The stockholder cannot say that he became a member of the corporation on the faith of an agreement made by the legislature with the corporation, that the original act of incorporation should undergo no change except with his assent. Such a position might be asserted with more plausibility, if there was an absence of a clause in the original act of incorporation providing for an alteration in its terms. In such a case it might perhaps be maintained that there was a strong implication that the charter should remain inviolate, and that the holders of shares invested their property in the corporation relying upon a contract entered into between it and the legislature that the provisions of the act creating it should remain unchanged. But it is difficult to see how such a construction can be put on a contract which contains an express stipulation that it shall be subject to amendment and alteration. If it be asked by whom such amendment or alteration is to be made, the answer is obvious : by the parties to the contract, the legislature on the one hand and the corporation on the other; the former expressing its intention by means of a legislative act, and the latter assenting thereto by a vote of the majority of the stockholders, according to the provisions of its charter. It is nothing more than the ordinary case of a stipulation that one of the parties to a contract may vary its terms with the assent of the other contracting party. In such case, all persons claiming derivative rights or interests under the original contract, with notice of its terms, would be bound by the amendment or alteration to which the parties should agree. Take an illustration, similar to one put by the learned counsel for the defendants. Suppose a co-partnership or joint stock company, consisting of shipowners, to be formed for a specific purpose, to carry on, for instance, a series of voyages to India, with a proviso that at any time, by mutual assent of the parties, the terms of the original agreement might be modified or changed; it being also stipulated — 245 — that owners of merchandise might share in the contemplated enterprise by sending goods to the ports or places to which the ships might be sent in pursuance of the agreement. Can there be any doubt that under such a contract the shipper of goods would be bound by any alteration in its terms to which the original parties should agree, and that if, in pursuance of such alteration, the destination of their vessels should be afterwards changed by the owners, so that voyages to China were substituted instead of to India, this change in the terms of the agreement would constitute no breach of contract towards the shippers of goods ? If it be not so, then it would follow that a sub-contractor would not be bound by a stipulation in the principal contract under which he undertook to act, and of which he had due notice. It is a mistake, therefore, to say that the contract of a stockholder with a corporation established under our statutes binds the latter to undertake no new enterprise and engage in no business or operation other than that contemplated by the original charter. This interpretation puts aside the express provision authorizing an amendment or alteration of the act of incorporation, and gives it no effect as against a stockholder without his assent, although he bought his stock or subscribed for his shares subject to the legal effect of such a stipulation. The infirmity of the argument in behalf of the plaintiff is, that it admits that an amendment may be legal and valid as to the corporation, if they assent to it by a vote of the majority, while at the same time it sets it aside as against the stockholder who refuses to sanction it, on the ground that as to him it is illegal and void. But we cannot see how the amendment can be said to be legal and illegal uno et eodern flatu. If it is valid as to the corporation, for the reason that they have accepted and approved it according to the provisions of their charter, it would seem that it must also be binding on the stockholder, who has agreed that his rights and interests in the corporation shall be regulated and controlled by a vote of a majority, acting in conformity to the original constitution of the corporation, and within the scope of its corporate powers. The real contract into which the stockholder enters with the corporation — 246 — is, that he agrees to become a member of an artificial body which is created and has its existence by virtue of a contract with the legislature, which may be amended or changed with the consent of the company, ascertained and declared in the mode pointed out by law. Having, by virtue of the relation which subsists between himself and the corporation as a holder of shares, assented to the terms of the original act of incorporation, he cannot'be heard to say that he will not be bound by a vote of the majority of the stockholders accepting an amendment or alterations of the charter made in pursuance of an express authority reserved to the legislature, and which by such acceptance has become binding on the corporation. Such we understand to be the result of the adjudicated cases. In Crease v. Babcock, 33 Pick. 342, it was expressly decided that corporators, by accepting a charter, directly agree to adopt the provision reserving to the legislature the right to amend, alter or repeal the act of incorporation as a constituent part of their contract; and it has often been decided, under similar provisions in the statutes of other states, that amendments or changes, either abridging the corporate authority or enlarging and extending it so as to embrace new enterprises and to incur additional burdens and liabilities, when duly adopted by the corporation, are valid and binding on a dissenting minority, as well as on those corporators by whose votes the amending act has been accepted and approved. Buffalo, &c. Railroad v. Dudley, 4 Kernan, 336, 348, 354. Northern Railroad v. Miller, 10 Barb. 282. Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine, 547. Oldtown, &c. Railroad v. Veazie, 39 Maine, 580. Banet v. Alton, &c. Railroad, 13 Illinois, 504.\ It was urged, as a grave objection against the doctrine above stated, that it puts the minority of the stockholders of a corporation entirely within the control of the legislature and a majority of the stockholders, and that there would be no limit or restraint placed on the exercise of the power, so that corporations might be diverted to purposes and objects wholly foreign to those for which they were originally established, and stockholders might be made to participate against their will in undertakings which — 247 — they never contemplated and which they deemed inexpedient 01 ruinous. If this be so, it is a consequence of which no stockholder can reasonably complain, because it is a result -which flows from the contract into which he has voluntarily entered. But we are not prepared to admit the soundness of the objection. A restraint or limit on the power of the legislature to alter or amend a charter, even with the consent of the corporation, may perhaps be found in the doctrine recognized in some of the English cases, that the enlargement of corporate powers shall not be extended so as to authorize enterprises or operations different in their nature and kind from those comprehended within the terms of the original charter, but shall be confined to purposes and objects ejusdem generis with those for which the corporation was primarily granted. See Ware v. Grand Junction Water Works, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 470; Ffooks v. Southwestern Railway, 1 Sm. & Gif. 142. But however this may be, no such question arises in the present case, inasmuch as the additional acts, the validity of which is called into controversy by the plaintiff, do not empower the defendants to engage in any undertaking essentially different in kind from that which was embraced in the original acts by which their corporate existence under their present name was authorized and established. So far as any argument against the right of the legislature to amend or alter the charters of corporations under our statutes is drawn from the peril to which it exposes the property and interests of dissenting minorities of stockholders, we cannot deem it of any practical weight or importance. The good faith of the legislature and the self-interest of the majority will ordinarily be a sufficient protection against any wanton or oppressive use of their power. Against any dishonest or fraudulent abuses of it, a sufficient remedy can always be had in the courts of justice. It may be well to add, in order to avoid misapprehension, that we do not intend to say that the legislature have any power to change or modify an act of incorporation in such a way as to affect in a material particular a contract which they have entered into with a third person. Such an exercise of legislative — 248 — power would be unconstitutional and invalid, because it would impair the obligation of a contract. It was so decided by this court in Hamilton Ins. Co. v. Hobart, 2 Gray, 547, where it was held that an act of the legislature was void which made a new party to an executory contract of insurance without the assent of the assured. All that we mean to determine is, that the obligation of the contract which subsists between the corporation and a stockholder, by virtue of his being a proprietor of shares in the corporate stock, is not impaired by an act of the legislature which amends and alters the charter and authorizes the corporation to undertake new and additional enterprises of a nature similar to those embraced within the original grant of power, if such act is accepted by a majority of the stockholders in the mode provided by law. The only other ground on which the plaintiff seeks to maintain his bill is, that the indenture entered into by the defendants with the Newport and Fall River Railroad Company, for the lease of the road belonging to the latter company to the defendants, is a violation of the second section of the act of 1861, authorizing the extension of the defendants’ road, which prohibits them from using any part of their reserved funds to build said extension or any portion of the road in Rhode Island. But on looking at the terms of the instrument it appears to us to be a lease in regular form for a term of ten years of the road in Rhode Island to the defendants, in consideration of a stipulated rent per annum, payable in advance, and of an agreement by the defendants to perform all the transportation of persons and freight upon and over the road in Rhode Island. Such a contract seems to us to be fully authorized by Gen. Sts. c. 63, § 115; and there being no allegation or proof that it was made collusively, for the purpose of evading the prohibition of the expenditure of the surplus or reserved funds belonging to the defendants, or that such will be the effect of carrying out the stipulations in the indenture, we are of opinion that the plaintiff fails to support this part of his case. Bill dismissed.