Litchfield v. Hutchinson

Morton, J. This is an. action of tort, in which the plaintiff alleges that he was induced to buy a horse of the defendant by representations made by him that the horse was sound, and that the horse was, in fact, unsound and lame, all of which the defendant well knew. To sustain such an action it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant made false representations, which were material, with a view to induce the plaintiff to purchase, and that the plaintiff was thereby induced to purchase. But it is .not always necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the facts stated by him were false. If he states, as of his own knowledge, material facts susceptible of knowledge, which are false, it is a — 198 — fraud which renders him liable to the party who relies and acts upon the statement as true, and it is no defence that he believed the facts to be true. The falsity and fraud, consist in representing that he knows the facts to be true, of his own knowledge, when he has not such knowledge. Page v. Bent, 2 Met. 371. Stone v. Denny, 4 Met. 151. Millikin v. Thorndike, 103 Mass. 382. Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 503. In the case at bar the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury “ that if the defendant made a representation of the soundness of the horse, as of his own knowledge, and the jury are satisfied that he might have known by reasonable inquiry and examination whether he was sound or not, and the horse was not sound as a matter of fact, and if the plaintiff relied on such representations, and was induced thereby to purchase the horse, and thereby sustained damage, then the defendant is liable.” We are of opinion that this instruction should have been given in substance. If the defect in the horse was one which might have been known by reasonable examination,-it was a matter susceptible of knowledge, and a representation by the defendant made as of his own knowledge that such defect did not exist, would, if false, be a fraud for which he would be liable to the plaintiff, if made with a view to induce him to purchase, and if relied on by him. A false representation of this character is sufficiently set forth in the declaration to constitute a cause of action, without the further allegation that the defendant well knew the representations to be false. It is not necessary that all the allegations should be proved if enough are proved to make out a cause of action. The instructions given upon the subject embraced in this prayer required the plaintiff to prove, not only that the defendant made' the false representations alleged, as of his own knowledge, but also, that the defendant knew that they were false, or that he did not honestly believe them to be true. In this respect the instructions were erroneous. Exceptions sustained.