Way v. Abington Mutual Fire Insurance

Knowlton, J. It is conceded by the defendant that it is liable for damage caused by smoke to the same extent as if the damage had been caused directly by the fire which produced the smoke. The question before us is whether the fire in the chimney was within the contract of insurance made by the defendant. The policy purports to cover all loss or damage by fire, but the defendant contends that in all such contracts there is an implied exception of such fires as this from which the plaintiff suffered loss. The facts are not in dispute, and if the defendant’s witness had been permitted to testify as an expert, or if the jury had used their common experience and common knowledge to find the facts as the defendant’s counsel in his opening contended that they should be found, there would have been no substantial conflict between the statement of the auditor and the facts relied upon by the defendant. A chimney is not intended to be used as a place in which to kindle 'fires, or to have fires for use or enjoyment in connection with the occupation of a building. It is intended to carry off the products of combustion. One of the products of combustion in a stove or fireplace connected with a chimney is soot, which will accumulate more or less in the chimney, and will sometimes take fire from the flame in the stove or fireplace. Chimneys are constructed with a view to guard against accidents when such fires occur. Occasional fires in a chimney from the ignition of soot are to be expected. Such fires are [74] not desired. They are not maintained for any useful purpose. In a sense they are accidental, for they are not lighted intentionally, but they start from time to time without human agency when a large quantity of soot has accumulated and the circumstances chance to be favorable to ignition from the fire which is maintained in the place intended for it. The defendant’s counsel contends that the policy was not intended to apply to a fire which is lighted and maintained for the ordinary purposes for which fires are used in buildings, and which is confined within the place that is fitted for such fires. He argues that, if a stove should be cracked and spoiled by a fire kindled in it to warm the house, or if a fire in a fireplace should crack the mantel, or scorch valuable furniture left too near it, or injure property by its smoke which the chimney failed to carry off, or if a lamp should throw off soot or smoke in such quantities as to cause damage to property, in every such case, if the fire burned nothing but that which was intended to be burned for a useful purpose in connection with the occupation of the house, and if it did not pass beyond the limits assigned for it, the insurance company would not be liable. See Austin v. Drew, 4 Camp. 360 : S. C. Holt, N. P. 126; 6 Taunt. 436, 438; American Towing Co. v. German Ins. Co. 74 Md. 25 ; Scripture v. Lowell Ins. Co. 10 Cush. 356. We are not disposed to question the soundness of the general principle on which this contention is founded, and we find it by no means easy to determine whether the principle should be extended far enough to cover an occasional fire in a chimney incidental to the ordinary use of a stove, or whether such a fire should be held to be one for whose unexpected injurious consequences an insurance company should be liable. We are inclined to the opinion that a distinction should be made between a fire intentionally lighted and maintained for a useful purpose in connection with the occupation of a building and a fire which starts from such a fire without human agency in a place where fires are never lighted nor maintained, although such ignition may naturally be expected to occur occasionally as an incident to the maintenance of necessary fires, and although the place where it occurs is constructed with a view to prevent damage from such ignition. A fire in a chimney should be considered rather a hostile fire [75] than a friendly fire, and as such, if it causes damage, it is within the provisions of ordinary contracts of fire insurance. It is doubtless true that in former years in some parts of the country straw and other combustible materials have sometimes been put in chimneys and set on fire to burn out the soot. But neither at the trial of this case before the jury nor in the argument before us was there any suggestion that such a practice prevails or has ever prevailed in Boston, or that this chimney was constructed with a view to kindling fires in it for such a purpose. What our decision would be if damage was done by smoke from a fire in a chimney intentionally kindled to burn out the soot, it is unnecessary now to determine. It is also to be noted that there was an accidental obstruction of the flue by the falling of the plaster lining of the chimney, which in some aspects of the case might be deemed an important fact in favor of the plaintiff’s claim. Exceptions overruled.