Whipple v. Dutton

Morton, J. We assume, as the defendants contend, that the transactions of June 26 constituted a pledge of the bicycles received by the defendants, and that the subsequent sales as [368] made by the defendants were unauthorized. But it does not follow that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value of the bicycles thus sold. The defendants had possession of the bicycles, and had a lien on them for6 sums lent to the bicycle company which were overdue and unpaid. They had a right to foreclose the pledge in any manner authorized by law. The plaintiffs contend that they foreclosed in a manner unauthorized by law. But the only-effect, it seems to us, of the unauthorized sales by the defendants was to entitle the plaintiffs to recover any damages sustained thereby. The plaintiffs admit in substance that the defendants used good judgment and diligence in selling and that the sales were effected at favorable prices, and it does not appear that the proceeds were more than enough to pay what was due the defendants. Under such circumstances we fail to see how the plaintiffs have sustained any damage. It would be singular if, having a right to foreclose the pledge, the1 defendants should be held to have lost their lien and to be liable for the value of the bicycles, because, without inflicting any damage thereby on the pledgor, they went the wrong way about the foreclosure, or claimed a greater right than they actually had. We do not think that such is the law. See Dahill v. Booker, 140 Mass. 308; Farrar v. Paine, 173 Mass. 58 and cases cited, Halliday v. Holgate, L. R. 3 Ex. 299; Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 330. Other questions have been raised and argued which, in consequence of the views expressed above, it does not seem to us necessary to consider. Exceptions overruled.