Liu v. Garland

20-1456 Liu v. Garland BIA Poczter, IJ A200 676 335 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 7th day of July, two thousand twenty-two. — 5 — 6 PRESENT: 7 ROBERT D. SACK, 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _________________________________________ — 12 — 13 QINGYAN LIU, 14 Petitioner, — 15 — 16 v. 20-1456 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _________________________________________ — 22 — 23 FOR PETITIONER: Zhiyuan Qian, Esq., New York, NY — 24 — 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting 26 Assistant Attorney General; 27 Anthony C. Payne, Assistant 28 Director; Liza S. Murcia, 1 Attorney, Office of Immigration 2 Litigation, United States 3 Department of Justice, Washington, 4 DC — 5 — 6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 9 is DENIED. 10 Petitioner Qingyan Liu, a native and citizen of the 11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 23, 2020 12 decision of the BIA affirming a July 26, 2018 decision of an 13 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering removal following reopening 14 and termination of asylum on account of fraud. In re Qingyan 15 Liu, No. A200 676 335 (B.I.A. Apr. 23, 2020), aff’g No. A200 16 676 335 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 26, 2018). We assume the 17 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 18 history. 19 As the Government argues, Liu failed to exhaust before 20 the BIA her challenges to the IJ’s underlying decision to 21 reopen her removal proceedings and terminate a prior grant of 22 asylum. In addition to the statutory requirement that 23 petitioners exhaust the categories of relief they seek, — 24 — 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1), petitioners must also raise to the BIA 25 the specific issues they later raise in this Court, see Foster — 2 — 1 v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004). While not 2 jurisdictional, Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 3 104, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2007), this judicially imposed 4 exhaustion requirement is mandatory. “To preserve an issue 5 for judicial review, the petitioner must first raise it with 6 specificity before the BIA.” Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 7 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2007). “[G]eneralized protestations . . . 8 lack the specificity required for preservation.” Id. 9 Liu challenges the reopening of her removal proceedings 10 and termination of asylum based on fraud, arguing that the 11 preparer of her asylum application had not been convicted of 12 immigration fraud (as some paralegals at his firm had been), 13 the Government had not produced the fraudulent applications 14 that contained strikingly similar language to hers, those 15 similarities were not properly analyzed, and an immigration 16 officer’s affidavit was entitled to limited weight given that 17 she did not testify. But Liu made only a conclusory assertion 18 of error in her notice of appeal to the BIA and did not file 19 a brief. Because she raised none of these specific issues 20 on appeal to the BIA, and because the BIA did not address 21 them in its decision, they are not exhausted. See Ruiz22 Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102 , 112 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008); — 3 — 1 Steevenez, 476 F.3d at 117. Accordingly, we deny her 2 petition for review for failure to exhaust. See Steevenez, 3 476 F.3d at 118. 4 We deny Liu’s motion to supplement the record because 5 she did not submit her affidavit to the agency, and we “decide 6 the petition only on the administrative record on which the 7 order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(A). 8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review and 9 motion to supplement the record are DENIED. 10 FOR THE COURT: 11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 12 Clerk of Court — 13 — — 4 —