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In re N.W., J.W., L.W.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-91
No. 348A21
Filed 15 July 2022
IN THE MATTER OF: N.W., J.W., L.W.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from an order entered on
26 May 2021 by Judge William B. Davis in District Court, Guilford County. This
matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 1 July 2022, but was determined on
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Jeffrey R. Russell and Evan B. Horwitz, for petitioner-appellant mother.
Garron T. Michael, for respondent-appellee father.
ERVIN, Justice. ¶1 Petitioner-mother Kelly N., the mother of N.W., J.W., and L.W., appeals from
a trial court order dismissing her petition seeking to have the parental rights of
respondent-father Josey W., the children’s father, terminated. After careful
consideration of petitioner-mother’s challenges to the trial court’s dismissal order in
light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s order
should be affirmed.
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I. Background
¶2 Petitioner-mother and respondent-father were married in October 2006 and
separated in May 2015. All three of the children at issue in this case were born during
the marriage. ¶3 On 8 April 2016, petitioner-mother applied for an Order of Protection in
Kentucky on the grounds that respondent-father had committed acts of physical
abuse against her in the past and was currently making threats against her and
obtained the entry of an Emergency Protective Order that awarded temporary
custody of the children to petitioner-mother and prohibited respondent-father from
contacting petitioner-mother and the children. After a hearing held on 21 April 2016,
the Kentucky court entered a Domestic Violence Order against respondent-father
that prohibited him from committing further acts of abuse and ordered him to refrain
from contacting petitioner-mother and the children for a period of one year. Although
respondent-father sought appellate review of the protective order, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals upheld it on appeal. ¶4 While respondent-father’s appeal was pending, the parties agreed to the entry
of an order in June 2016 modifying the protective order so as to allow respondent-
father to have supervised visitation with the children at Sunflower Kids, Inc., a
Kentucky childcare center. Subsequently, respondent-father visited with the
children between June and October 2016, with these visits having ended as a result
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of the fact that respondent-father canceled three of them given his out-of-state work
obligations. Although respondent-father filed a motion seeking to have the protective
order amended so that he could have telephonic contact with the children while he
was out of town, petitioner-mother opposed the proposed modification and it was
never approved. As a result, respondent-father has not had any further contact with
the children since that time. ¶5 In November 2016, the parents agreed to the entry of an order allowing the
Kentucky court to appoint “The Office of the Friend of the Court” to provide them
with assistance in addressing their disputes concerning custody of and visitation with
the children. In light of that agreement, the Kentucky court appointed a Friend of
the Court in December 2016 with instructions to conduct a timesharing risk
assessment and make recommendations consistent with the best interests of the
children. In March 2017, petitioner-mother sought and obtained an extension of the
protective order from the Kentucky court until October 2020. ¶6 In November 2017, the parents agreed to a custody arrangement as part of a
Property Settlement Agreement, which was, in turn, incorporated into a decree
dissolving their marriage that was entered on 8 December 2017. In accordance with
this agreement and the resulting custody order, petitioner-mother was awarded sole
custody of the children, with respondent-father being allowed to seek review of the
custody arrangement within one year after the entry of the custody order upon his
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successful completion and implementation of the recommendations made by the
Friend of the Court and to request the right to visit with and have contact with the
children ninety days after his receipt of the Friend of the Court’s recommendations.
In addition, respondent-father was ordered to continue making monthly child support
payments of $1,500 to petitioner-mother by means of a wage assignment process. ¶7 In February 2018, respondent-father’s father filed a motion seeking
grandparent visitation with the children, with respondent-father having submitted
an affidavit in support of this request. Petitioner-mother opposed the paternal
grandfather’s motion and sought to have it dismissed. After giving notice to the
Kentucky court of her intent to relocate in July 2018 petitioner-mother moved to
North Carolina with the children in August 2018. ¶8 In September 2018, respondent-father filed a motion seeking to be allowed to
have supervised visitation with the children with the Kentucky court. Petitioner-
mother opposed respondent-father’s motion and sought to have it dismissed. In reply
to petitioner-mother’s dismissal motion, respondent-father stated that he did not
know petitioner-mother’s new address and requested to be provided with that
information so that “he c[ould] pursue timeshare in the new jurisdiction.” On 31
October 2018 and 16 November 2018, respectively, the Kentucky court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the paternal grandfather’s visitation motion and
respondent-father’s motion for supervised visitation and dismissed those motions on
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the grounds that neither the parents nor the children resided in Kentucky at that
time. ¶9 On 25 February 2020, respondent-father filed a petition seeking to have the
Kentucky child custody order registered in Guilford County. On 20 March 2020,
petitioner-mother filed a petition seeking to have respondent-father’s parental rights
in the children terminated. On 7 May 2020, respondent-father filed an answer in
which he denied the material allegations contained in the termination petition and
moved to dismiss it based upon an alleged jurisdictional defect and the petition’s
alleged failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. ¶ 10 On 14 May 2020, petitioner-mother filed a motion seeking leave to amend her
termination petition for the purpose of curing the alleged jurisdictional defect. On 15
September 2020, the trial court entered an order granting petitioner-mother’s
amendment motion and appointing a guardian ad litem for the children. ¶ 11 On 18 September 2020, petitioner-mother filed an amended termination
petition in which she alleged that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children
were subject to termination on the basis of willful abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(7) on the grounds that, since October 2016, respondent-father had not
had any contact with the children, had failed to maintain a bond with the children,
and had failed to send anything to the children or acknowledge their birthdays; that
respondent-father had failed to comply with the Friend of the Court’s
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recommendation that he seek modification of the custody agreement; that
respondent-father had not contacted or seen the children since they had relocated to
North Carolina; and that respondent-father “ha[d] withheld his love and affection
from the juveniles and ha[d] intentionally foregone all parental duties and
responsibilities with regard to the juveniles (with the exception of child support,
which is paid via wage withholding)” and on the grounds that the termination of his
parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. In a response to the
amended petition filed on 6 October 2020, respondent-father asserted that his failure
to communicate or see the children had resulted from compliance with lawful orders
of the Kentucky court and that he had paid support for the children each month since
2016. ¶ 12 The issues raised by respondent-mother’s termination petition came on for
hearing before the trial court on 11 May 2021. On 26 May 2021, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the termination petition at the conclusion of petitioner-
mother’s evidence based upon a determination that petitioner-mother had failed to
establish that respondent-father had willfully abandoned the children. Petitioner-
mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s dismissal order.
II. Analysis
¶ 13 In seeking relief from the dismissal order before this Court, petitioner-mother
argues that the trial court erred by determining that respondent-father’s parental
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rights in the children were not subject to termination on the basis of willful
abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). “Our Juvenile Code provides for
a two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings consisting of an
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94 (2020).
At the adjudicatory stage, the trial court must “take evidence, find the facts, and [ ]
adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the circumstances set forth in
[N.C.]G.S. [§] 7B-1111 which authorize the termination of parental rights of the
respondent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2021). “The burden in such proceedings [is] upon
the petitioner . . . and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2021). “Should the court determine that
circumstances authorizing termination of parental rights do not exist, [it] shall
dismiss the petition . . . , making appropriate findings of fact and conclusions.”
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(c) (2021). ¶ 14 We review orders entered by the trial court in termination proceedings “to
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence and [whether] the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P.,
372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A
trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a
contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C.
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394, 403–04 (1982)). “Unchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by the
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re R.G.L., 379 N.C. 452, 2021-NCSC-155, ¶
12. “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re
C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).
¶ 15 A parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to termination pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) in the event that the petitioner proves that “[t]he parent has
willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition or motion[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2021).
Abandonment for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) “implies conduct on the part
of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77 (2019)
(quoting In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251 (1997)). “The willfulness of a parent’s actions
is a question of fact for the trial court,” with “ ‘[i]ntent’ and ‘wilfullness’ [being] mental
emotions and attitudes [that are] seldom capable of direct proof” and that “must
ordinarily be proven by circumstances from which they may be inferred[.]” In re
K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53 (2020) (cleaned up). “[A]lthough the trial court may consider
a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility
and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the
six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at
77 (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619 (2018)). As the trial court found in
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the dismissal order, petitioner-mother filed her petition seeking to have respondent-
father’s parental rights in the children terminated on 20 March 2020, so that the
determinative six-month period for purposes of this case ran from 20 September 2019
through 20 March 2020. ¶ 16 According to the trial court’s findings of fact, respondent-father “paid current
support of $1,500.00 a month to [p]etitioner[-mother] through wage withholding.” In
addition, the trial court found that respondent-father had filed a petition seeking to
have the Kentucky custody order registered in North Carolina pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 50A-305(a) on 25 February 2020. Finally, the trial court made numerous findings
concerning events that had occurred outside the determinative period, including
detailed information relating to the proceedings in which petitioner-mother and
respondent-father had been involved in Kentucky, the entry of the Kentucky orders
that prohibited respondent-father from contacting petitioner-mother and the
children, and respondent-father’s compliance with the Friend of the Court’s
recommendations and attempts to obtain relief from the Kentucky court orders so
that he could have contact with the children. See In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 77 (stating
that “the trial court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window
in evaluating a parent’s credibility and intentions”). Based upon these findings, the
trial court stated in Finding of Fact No. 32 that “[r]espondent[-father] has not
willfully abandoned the juveniles and that [r]espondent[-father]’s acts and actions
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during the six[-]month period prior to the filing of the [p]etition indicate an intent to
support the juveniles and seek contact and reunification with the juveniles” before
determining in Conclusion of Law No. 3 that “[r]espondent[-father] ha[d] not willfully
abandoned the juveniles[.]” ¶ 17 In her initial challenge to the trial court’s dismissal order, petitioner-mother
argues that the trial court erred in the course of making several findings of fact
concerning events that occurred outside the determinative six-month period. First,
petitioner-mother contends that the trial court erred by stating in Finding of Fact No.
8 that “[r]espondent[-father] visited regularly with the juveniles at Sunflower Kids”;
that he “cancelled three consecutive visits due to having employment outside of the
State”; and that “[t]he [c]ourt finds no clear, cogent and convincing evidence as to why
the visitation ceased thereafter at Sunflower Kids.” In arguing that the trial court
had erroneously failed to determine why respondent-father’s visits with the children
had ended, petitioner-mother asserts that there was “conflicting evidence as to this
point” and that the trial court “needed to assess the credibility of the witnesses and
resolve the conflict by finding what happened.” We do not find this argument to be
persuasive. ¶ 18 Although the trial court does have responsibility for evaluating the credibility
of the witnesses, weighing the evidence, and determining the relevant facts, In re
R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 258 (2020); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), its findings of fact must
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be based upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). At the
time that it announced its decision to dismiss petitioner-mother’s termination
petition, the trial court stated in open court that:
The evidence about under what circumstances no further visits were scheduled thereafter is the area where there’s sort of some mixed evidence and the court finds that there’s not sufficient evidence to make a finding by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to the court’s satisfaction of how that came to pass so I’m not ascribing that.
In addition, the trial court stated in Finding of Fact No. 8 that the record contained
“no clear, cogent and convincing evidence as to why the visitation ceased.” In view of
the fact that this Court is not entitled to reweigh the evidence and to make its own
findings of fact, In re R.D., 376 N.C. at 258, and the fact that the trial court’s findings
must rest upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, we cannot fault the trial court
for failing to make a particular finding of fact based upon evidence that it determined
was not clear, cogent, and convincing, since it would have been error for the trial court
to have made such a finding, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). ¶ 19 In addition, petitioner-mother argues that the trial court erred in making
Finding of Fact No. 8 because “it does not give a date or a timeframe when the events
occurred” and that, in light “of the determinative six-month period, it is important for
the trial court to clearly delineate evidence that takes place within and without this
period.” Although Finding of Fact No. 8 does not specify the times at which the visits
in question occurred, the relevant information can be gleaned from an examination
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of the trial court’s other findings of fact. For example, in Finding of Fact No. 7, the
trial court found that respondent-father had been allowed to have supervised contact
with the children at Sunflower Kids pursuant to an order modifying the protective
order that was entered on 6 June 2016 and that the amended protective order was
set to expire on 21 April 2017. As a result of the fact that respondent-father’s visits
with the children took place in Kentucky pursuant to an order that was to expire in
April 2017 and the fact that the trial court stated in unchallenged Finding of Fact
No. 23 that petitioner-mother had relocated to North Carolina with the children in
August 2018, it is clear that respondent-father’s visits with the children did not occur
during the determinative six-month period. As a result, we conclude that petitioner-
mother’s challenges to Finding of Fact No. 8 lack merit. ¶ 20 Next, petitioner-mother argues that the trial court erred by making Finding of
Fact Nos. 17 and 21, which discuss the recommendations that the Friend of the Court
made and the nature and extent of respondent-father’s compliance with those
recommendations. Finding of Fact No. 17 states that
[n]o written report, instructions or recommendations were filed with the Court or provided to the parties by the Friend of the Court. No Court order was filed indicating the steps [r]espondent[-father] needed to take to request contact with the juveniles. The Court finds that the parties were notified verbally of the recommendations; and [p]etitioner[- mother] and [r]espondent[-father] acknowledge being aware of the recommendations.
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According to petitioner-mother, the trial court’s statement that “[n]o written report,
instructions or recommendations were filed with the Court or provided to the parties
by the Friend of the Court” lacks clarity given that it fails to specify the identity of
the “court” to which the finding refers and that the relevant finding is, “[a]t best,”
“misleading” given that it uses “the words ‘filed’ instead of ‘provided’ and ‘parties’
instead of ‘counsel for both parties,” since the relevant Kentucky order provided that
the Friend of the Court “shall provide counsel for both parties and the Court a copy
of her report.” In view of the fact that the clear implication of Finding of Fact No. 17
is that the parents were aware of the nature and extent of the Friend of the Court’s
recommendations and the fact that their knowledge of these recommendations is
undisputed, we are unable to see how the alleged lack of clarity in Finding of Fact
No. 17 adversely affected petitioner-mother’s chances for a more favorable outcome
at the termination hearing. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (explaining
that we only review those findings necessary to support the trial court’s
determination whether grounds exist to terminate parental rights). As a result, the
trial court did not commit prejudicial error in making Finding of Fact No. 18. ¶ 21 In addition, petitioner-mother argues that the trial court erred in making
Finding of Fact No. 21, which states that “[r]espondent[-father] completed these
recommendations of the Friend of the Court with the goal of reestablishing contact
with the juveniles and that his timing in doing so was not to the satisfaction of
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[p]etitioner[-mother].” According to petitioner-mother, this “finding is problematic
because it does not give a date or a timeframe when the events occurred[,]” with it
being “important for the trial court to clearly delineate evidence that takes place
within and without [the determinative six-month] period.” In addition, petitioner-
mother contends that the trial court failed to explain how respondent-father’s
compliance with the Friend of the Court’s recommendations “was done with the goal
or intent of reestablishing contact with the juveniles.” Once again, we are not
persuaded by petitioner-mother’s arguments. ¶ 22 In Finding of Fact Nos. 18 through 20, which petitioner-mother has not
challenged as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, the trial court found that, in
light of the Friend of the Court’s recommendations, respondent-father had submitted
to random drug screens from May to July 2016; completed a forty-four hour partner
abuse intervention program in July 2018; and obtained a mental health assessment
in November 2017. The reference to “these recommendations” in Finding of Fact No.
21 clearly relates to the information set out in Finding of Fact Nos. 18 through 20,
each of which specifies the point in time at which respondent-father complied with
the relevant recommendation. In addition, it is clear from Finding of Fact No. 16,
which petitioner-mother has not challenged as lacking in sufficient evidentiary
support, that respondent-father’s successful compliance with the Friend of the
Court’s recommendations was required before he was entitled to seek review of the
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Kentucky custody order and to resume having contact with the children. Finally,
respondent-father testified that he had complied with the Friend of the Court’s
recommendation in order to have the ability to see his children. As a result, the trial
court did not err in the course of making Finding of Fact No. 21. ¶ 23 Similarly, petitioner-mother contends that the trial court erred in making
Finding of Fact No. 22, which states that respondent-father had paid support in the
amount of $1,500 each month to petitioner-mother by means of the wage withholding
process “at all times since” the Kentucky custody order was entered in December
2017. A careful review of petitioner-mother’s brief establishes that there is no dispute
that respondent-father paid support during the determinative six-month period, with
the uncontested evidence tending to show that respondent-father made every
required support payment from 2019 through 2021. Even so, petitioner-mother
contends that the trial court’s finding that respondent-father had made all required
support payments since December 2017 is not supported by the record evidence in
light of the fact that respondent-father’s support payments had been made through a
wage withholding process because of previously difficulty in making the required
payments and the fact that respondent-father had been held in contempt for failing
to pay child support and non-compliance with other court orders. Given that the
evidence upon which petitioner-mother relies in making this argument does not
specify when respondent-father had difficulty paying child support, when
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respondent-father was found in contempt, or whether respondent-father had been
held in contempt for failure to pay child support, the record does not establish that
these portions of Finding of Fact No. 22 were made in error. On the other hand,
petitioner-mother is correct in pointing out that the record contains no evidence
addressing the extent to which respondent-father paid child support in 2018. For
that reason, we will disregard Finding of Fact No. 22 in determining whether the trial
court’s findings support its conclusion that respondent-father’s parental rights in the
children were not subject to termination on the basis of abandonment pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) to the extent that it finds that respondent-father had paid
child support in 2018. See In re L.H., 378 N.C. 625, 2021-NCSC-110, ¶ 14
(disregarding factual findings not supported by the record). ¶ 24 After addressing and resolving petitioner-mother’s challenges to the trial
court’s findings of fact, we must now address her argument that the trial court erred
in Finding of Fact No. 32 and Conclusion of Law No. 3 by determining that
respondent-father did not willfully abandon the children for purposes of N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111(a)(7). According to petitioner-mother, the trial court erred in making this
determination because Finding of Fact No. 32 “fails to delineate the determinative
six-month period or specifically find the ‘acts and actions’ [respondent-father]
supposedly engaged in.” We hold that petitioner-mother’s contention to this effect
lacks merit.
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Opinion of the Court ¶ 25 In support of this particular argument, petitioner-mother evaluates Finding of
Fact No. 32 without considering the remainder of the trial court’s dismissal order.
The trial court determined in Finding of Fact No. 31 that petitioner-mother had filed
the termination petition on 20 March 2020 and stated in Finding of Fact No. 32 that
it was considering “the six[-]month period prior to the filing of the [p]etition[.]”
Although the trial court did not precisely identify the beginning and ending of the
determinative six-month period in Finding of Fact No 32, it is evident that the trial
court considered the proper timeframe in deciding that respondent-father’s parental
rights in the children were not subject to termination on the basis of abandonment. ¶ 26 In addition, the trial court’s findings clearly reflect that, during the
determinative six-month period, respondent-father had paid child support and sought
to have the Kentucky custody order registered in North Carolina, with petitioner-
mother having failed to contend that the record did not support the trial court’s
finding that respondent-father engaged in these activities during the determinative
six-month period. Instead, petitioner-mother argues that “th[o]se acts or actions are
insufficient” to preclude a determination that respondent-father had not willfully
abandoned the children, discounting respondent-father’s attempt to register the
Kentucky custody order in North Carolina on the grounds that respondent-father had
failed to seek the right to visit with the children or to have the visitation provisions
contained in the Kentucky custody order modified as part of his attempt to have the
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custody order registered in North Carolina and discounting respondent-father’s
payment of child support on the grounds that, since it resulted from wage
withholding, those payments were not made voluntarily. ¶ 27 Although the making of child support payments as the result of a wage
withholding process and the making of an attempt to register a foreign custody order
in a particular state are not, standing alone, definitive indicators of a parent’s intent
to remain a part of a child’s life, the trial court also found that respondent-father had
the “intent to support the juveniles and seek contact and reunification with the
juveniles.” The trial court’s finding to this effect is supported by both respondent-
father’s testimony and the trial court’s findings concerning events that occurred
outside the determinative sixth-month period that show respondent-father’s
considerable, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to reestablish contact with the children
and to become involved in their lives. ¶ 28 Among other things, respondent-father testified that he did not abandon his
children; that his lack of contact with his them was not willful because such contact
had been precluded by the Kentucky court orders; that he had done everything that
he had been required to do in order to have contact with his children, including paying
child support; and that he believed that he was required to register the Kentucky
custody order in North Carolina as a precondition for seeking to have it modified. In
addition, the trial court’s findings show that respondent-father had been prohibited
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from contacting petitioner-mother and the children from April 2016 through the date
of the filing of the termination petition and that he had been found in contempt and
incarcerated as the result of violations of the protective orders that the trial court
found to have stemmed from his efforts to have contact with the children. Similarly,
the trial court’s findings establish that respondent-father had complied with the
recommendations of the Friend of the Court in an attempt to reestablish contact with
the children and that he had made various filings in Kentucky between April 2016
and November 2018 as part of an unsuccessful effort to obtain the ability to have
contact with the children. As part of his last effort to obtain supervised visitation in
Kentucky, the trial court found that respondent-father had asked to be provided with
petitioner-mother’s new address so that he could “pursue a timeshare in the new
jurisdiction.” Finally, the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact address
respondent-father’s continued attempts to be involved with the children after the
filing of the termination petition, including his decision to relocate to North Carolina
in November 2020 and his actions in contacting petitioner-mother for the purpose of
inquiring about and seeking to have contact with the children after petitioner-mother
unsuccessfully attempted to have the protective order renewed in North Carolina in
December 2020. ¶ 29 After carefully reviewing the record, we hold that this evidence and these
findings of fact support the trial court’s finding that “[r]espondent[-father]’s acts and
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Opinion of the Court actions during the six[-]month period prior to the filing of the [p]etition indicate an intent to support the juveniles and seek contact and reunification with the juveniles” and its determination in Finding of Fact No. 32 and its conclusion in Conclusion of Law No. 3 that “[r]espondent[-father] has not willfully abandoned the juveniles[.]” In view of the fact that the only ground for termination alleged in petitioner-mother’s termination petition was willful abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and the fact that the trial court did not err in determining that respondent-father had not willfully abandoned the children, we further hold that the trial court did not err by dismissing petitioner-mother’s termination petition. As a result, the trial court’s dismissal order is affirmed.