Ford v. Harrison

Riddick, J., (after stating the facts). This is an action of ejectment, where both parties claim title under R. B. Ford, who is admitted by both parties to hare been the owner of the land. E. B. Ford mortgaged the land to Henry Moore, and afterwards conveyed it to E. F. Ford. Mrs. Harrison, the plaintiff, claims title by virtue of an execution sale of the land as the property of R. F. Ford. The defendant, M. H. Ford, rests his title upon a sale under a decree foreclosing the mortgage given by R. B. Ford to Moore. As R. B. Ford had mortgaged the land to Moore before he conveyed it to R. F. Ford, and as R. F. Ford was a party to the foreclosure decree obtained by Moore, it is evident that a sale under such decree would ordinarily cut off all interest of R. F. Ford in the land. It would cut off not only the interest of R. F. Ford, but also the interest of any purchaser or person by virtue of a sale under execution against him, when there was no attachment, and when the judgment upon which the execution was issued was recovered after the rendition of the foreclosure decree. But counsel for Mrs. Harrison contend that the sale under the decree did not have that effect in this case, for the reason, as they contend, that Moore abandoned his decree, and waived his lien, and that both he and M. H. Ford, his vendee, are now estopped from setting up such decree and sale. But we see nothing in the evidence to sustain such a contention. A man may purchase the same land from two different persons, and, if he is sued by a third person, he can rely on either or both of the titles he has purchased. The fact that M. H. Ford had purchased this land from his brother did not prevent him from purchasing it from Moore. Hor does the fact that he had recorded the deed from his brother estop him from setting up the title acquired from Moore. But counsel say that the foreclosure decree directed the commissioner to sell on the 14th of December, 1891, unless $100 were paid before that day, but directs that, if such payment was made, the commissioner should postpone the sale ior the remainder of the debt until December 14, 1892. The last-mentioned day having passed without a sale, they contend that the presumption is the decree had been satisfied by the payment of the debt. But under the facts of this ease the contention that the decree should be treated as satisfied because the land was not sold on the day named in the decree is, we think, utterly untenable, and is only noticed on account of the somewhat strenuous argument made by counsel in support of it. The next contention urged by counsel for plaintiff is that the title or lien given by the mortgage was merged in the foreclosure judgment rendered in 1891, and that the lien of this judgment, not having been revived, expired after three years, and that thereupon the judgment of plaintiff, filed in 1892, became a first lien on the land. But, while the note secured by the mortgage and sued on — in other words, the cause of action — was merged in the judgment, so that plaintiff could not maintain another action on the note or mortgage, yet the mortgage lien or title was not merged in the judgment. On the contrary, the object of the suit was to establish that title. All conflicting liens or interests adverse to the mortgage possessed by the defendants in the foreclosure suit were cut off by the foreclosure decree, and the mortgage lien or title was by that decree established as superior and paramount. After such decree Moore still held his mortgage lien or title, but he held it freed from any defects or uncertainty as to the rights of the defendants, these having been determined by the decree. The debt secured by the mortgage was no longer a promissory note, liable to be barred by statute of limitations after five years, but a judgment, which would not be barred until ten years from its rendition. The statute requiring suits to foreclose mortgages to be brought within the period of limitation prescribed for a suit on the debt for the security of which the mortgage was given does not affect this case, for the mortgage has already been foreclosed, and the land sold under the decree in less than five years after it was rendered' — long before the decree was barred by the statute, and while the lien of the mortgage was still in force. It results from what we have said that, in our opinion, the purchaser under the foreclosure sale obtained a title superior to that of the purchaser at the sale under execution against R. F. Ford, whose interest in the land was determined by the decree to be subject to the mortgage. Had plaintiff, after obtaining her judgment lien, brought suit in equity to redeem from the mortgage and decree, and to subject the interest of R. F. Ford in the land to her judgment, different questions would have been presented. But this is a suit in ejectment, not an action to redeem or set aside for fraud, and the only question presented is, which has the superior legal title, plaintiff or defendant P We are of the opinion that the title of the defendant is superior to that of plaintiff, and that the circuit court erred in its findings and judgment in favor of plaintiff. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.