Hall v. Wellman Lumber Co.

McCulloch, J., (after stating the facts.) 1. It has been held by this court in a number of cases that equity will not grant relief by injunction against the cutting of timber unless it be shown that an irreparable injury to the property will result, that the destruction of the timber will render the freehold less susceptible of enjoyment, or the acts of trespass are of a nature to constitute a nuisance, or unless it is obvious that the defendant is insolvent, and can not be compelled to respond in damages. Ellsworth v. Hale, 33 Ark. 637; Myers v. Hawkins, 67 Ark. 413; Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Newport Land Co., 75 Ark. 286; Haggart v. Chapman & Dewey Land Co.; 77 Ark. 527. Appellants invoke this doctrine against the decree in this case. There may, however, be other grounds existent for the exercise of jurisdiction to grant the relief, and we are of the opinion that they sufficiently appear in this case. This is not a suit by a landowner to restrain a trespass or trespasser upon the land. It is a controversy between rival claimants to the title to the timber, and the plaintiff alleges and proves, not only that defendants' have no valid and subsisting right to cut the timber, but that, by abandoning their previously asserted claim to the timber, and by remaining silent and failing to assert a claim thereto, they induced the plaintiff to purchase the timber from the owner of the land, and to erect, at great expense, a mill on or near the land to manufacture the timber into lumber. Plaintiff also shows that recovery of damages at law to the extent of the market value of the timber would not, under those circumstances, afford full compensation for the injury, and that there is, therefore, no adequate remedy at law. We think that contention is sound, and that the‘ distinction is plain between this case and those cited above holding that equity jurisdiction will not be exercised to restrain a mere trespass. It is unnecessary in this case to go to the extent of holding, as in the case of Wadsworth v. Goree, (Ala.), 10 So. 848, cited by counsel, that, merely because the plaintiff has purchased the timber and erected a sawmill in the vicinity of the land on which it is situate for the purpose of sawing it into lumber, the jurisdiction of the court of equity may be invoked to enjoin other persons from trespassing by’Cutting the timber; but when to this element is superadded the other found in this case that the defendants, or one under whom they hold, have, by their conduct in failing to reassert an apparently abandoned claim, induced the plaintiff to erect a mill at great expense, and when it is shown that reimbursement to the extent of the market value of the timber would not fairly compensate for the injury which will be done by the threatened trespass, we think the jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent it by injunction is plain. The loss, is, under those circumstances, irreparable, and the remedy at law for recovery of damages is inadeqxxate. 2. Appellants contend that, under the terms of the consent decree, there being no limit of time fixed within which the timber should be removed, Smith and his grantees could remove it at his or their own pleasure or convenience. On the other hand, appellee contends that the right of Smith and his grantees to cut timber expired January 1, 1900, the time limit of his occupancy of the lands in cultivation; or, that, being without time limit fixed by the decree, the law implies the right to remove the timber within a reasonable time. The recent decision of this court in the case of Liston v. Chapman & Dewey Land Co., 77 Ark. 116, settles the question in favor of the latter contention of appellee. The court there said: .“In the absence of something in the instrument itself, or in the proof aliunde, showing a contrary intention, a deed to merchantable timber which specifies no time for its removal conveys a terminable estate in the timber, which ends when a reasonable time for the removal of such timber, after the execution of the deed, has expired.” The authorities on both sides” of this question are fully collected in that opinion, and need not be cited or discussed again. The same rule of construction applies to a decree of court, especially a consent decree, which is a contract as well as a judicial decree. We need not determine whether the decree passed the title to the timber to Smith, or whether it operated merely as a privilege or license to cut the timber, as contended by counsel for appellee. The rule would, in either event, exclude the right of the grantee or licensee to cut and remove the timber after a reasonable time had elapsed. The evidence in this case establishes the fact that the timber could, with reasonable diligence, have been removed long before appellants asserted their right to cut it, and no excuse is given why it was not cut and removed earlier. The chancellor found that a reasonable time had long since elapsed, and we see no ground upon which his findings should be disturbed. Other grounds are assigned by counsel for appellee why the decree of the chancellor should be sustained; but as those already discussed are decisive of the case, we need not pass upon othérs. Decree affirmed.