Middletown Machine Co. v. Chaffin

Wood, J., (after stating the facts). The contract for the sale of the engine was in writing and contained an express warranty, as follows: “The above engine will have been tested before shipment and shall develop its rated brake horsepower. We will furnish upon application a record test. We will replace or repair free of charge, f. o. b. factory, any faulty material or faulty workmanship, within one year from date of invoice.” There is no pretense that the appellant has failed to comply with this warranty; but the evidence which the appellee introduced over the objection of appellant, tended to show an entirely different warranty from that contained in the written contract. The testimony comes within the familiar rule, that “Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, qualify or contradict, to add to or subtract from, the absolute terms of a valid and unambiguous contract,” as held in Delaney v. Jackson, 95 Ark. 131. The appellee does not allege in his answer, nor does the evidence adduced, tend to prove that appellant’s agent made any intentionally false or misleading representation, by which appellee was induced to enter upon the contract. There is no pretense that the statements of McClellan to appellee were false and fraudulent — that is, made with the wilful intention of misleading appellee, to his prejudice, and the most that could be said of the statements of McClellan, as shown by the testimony, is, that they were' expressions of his opinion as to the quality of the engine that appellant was proposing to sell, and that the results of the operation of the engine showed that he was mistaken in his judgment. The defense of appellee was not based upon any tort of appellant’s agent outside of the written contract. The effect of the oral testimony adduced by the appellee was to engraft upon the written contract, a warranty by parol, contradicting the terms of the written warranty. This can not be done. Lower v. Hickman, 80 Ark. 505. See also, Bradley Gin Co. v. J. L. Means Machinery Co., 94 Ark. 130. The general rule is, that upon the sale of chattels, the law implies no warranty of- quality. That is left as a matter of contract between the parties to the sale. But as said in Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 48 Ark. 325: There are exceptions to the rule as well established as the rule itself. One of these exceptions is: “Where a manufacturer undertakes to supply goods manufactured by himself, to be used for a particular purpose, and the vendee has not had the opportunity to inspect the goods. In that case, the vendee necessarily trusts to the judg-' ment and skill of the manufacturer, and it is an implied term in the contract that he shall furnish a merchantable article, reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was' intended.” See also, Weed v. Dyer, 53 Ark. 155; Bunch v. Weil, 72 Ark. 343; Main v. Dearing, 73 Ark. 470. Appellee relies upon the doctrine of these cases to' sustain the instructions given by the trial court. But, under the facts of this record, the doctrine of the above cases is wholly inapplicable. Here the gasoline engine was a merchantable article. It was manufactured for the purpose of running machinery, and there is no pretense that it was not fit for that particular purpose. The appellee contends, and his evidence tends to show that it was not sufficient for the particular purpose for which appellee intended it, but there is no implied warranty that it should be adapated to run appellee’s machinery in a manner satisfactory to him. This was a matter to be compassed by his contract and comes within the general rule above and not the exception. If appellee desired a warranty that the engine purchased would run his machinery, he should have seen that a provision to this effect was embodied in the written contract before he accepted the same. The cause was tried upon an erroneous conception of the law and for the errors in admitting the evidence and giving the prayer objected to, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, with direction to enter a judgment in favor of the appellant for three hundred dollars dollars ($300) with interest, and for the sale of the engine, unless the judgment is paid within a time to be fixed by the court.