Tedford Auto Co. v. Thomas

Smith, J., (after stating the facts). The lease contract was exhibited with the complaint, and is the foundation of the action, and the allegations of the complaint are explanatory of its terms. Cox v. Smith, 99 Ark. 218. This lease contract makes no reference to any other lease, or the prices contained therein, and furnishes no means outside of its express terms for measuring the amount of rent, but its terms are plain and unambiguous, and requires no construction of its terms to ascertain its meaning, nor any reference to any other instrument to ascertain the amount of rent contracted to be paid. It is riot alleged that appellant was unacquainted with the terms of the lease exhibited, nor is it contended that he did not get what he bargained for, at the price he agreed to pay, except that he says his rent shouLd have been only that paid by his lessor. Notwithstanding the allegations of the complaint, as to the false representations, appellant does not ask its rescission, but only its reformation, and this is asked in the face of the fact that appellant always knew the terms of his written contract, and had paid the rent as agreed for about eighteen months. It is not alleged that appellant was deceived in regard to the property itself, or its adaptability to the purpose for which it leased it, nor that the rental value is not in fact equal to the amount agreed to be paid. In the case of Mitchell Mfg. Co. v. Kempner, 84 Ark. 349, it was said that ‘ ‘ a written contract will not be reformed except upon clear and satisfactory proof that the writing fails by reason of fraud, accident or mutual mistake, in the preparation or execution thereof, to express the agreement intended to be entered into,” and it was there further said: ‘ ‘ The pleadings and proof present no grounds for reformation of the contract. It is neither alleged nor proved that any contract, was agreed upon other than the one signed by the appellee, nor that appellant’s agent misrepresented the contents of the writings presented to appellee for their signature. The solemn written engagements of contracting parties can not be reformed or amended except upon clear and satisfactory proof that the writing fails by reason of fraud, accident, or mutual mistake in the preparation or execution thereof, to express the agreement intended to be entered into.” The case of Comer et al. v. Lehman Durr & Co., 6 So. 264, was a proceeding to reform a mortgage, and the court there said: “Equity will reform written contracts so as to make them evidence what they were intended to evidence — the pact between the parties; but it will not amend a contract entered into under a misapprehension of facts by one party, or both, so as to make of it an agreement which the parties, or either of them, did not contemplate, and which the parties, or one of them, might have declined to execute had both been cognizant of all- the facts. This would be, not to make the writing speak the true terms of the agreement, the real intent of the parties ■ — but to make a new contract, embodying terms on which the minds of the parties not only had not met, but with respect to which, in this case, according to the aspect of the evidence most favorable to the complaints, one of the parties had resorted to misrepresentation td avoid. This may have been fraud, it may have afforded grounds for equitable relief against the contract made, but it is not grounds for making a new contract between the parties.” There is nothing in the written contract of lease between appellant and appellee that requires any. reference' to any other lease, or for that matter to any other writing or transaction to' determine the amount appellant was to pay, and in the absence of any allegation of fraud, or such mistake as a court of equity would relieve against, in the execution of this lease, parol evidence will not be permitted to vary it. “Antecedent propositions, correspondence, prior writings, as well as oral statements and representations, are deemed to be merged in the written contract which concerns the subject-matter of such antecedent negotiation, when it is free from ambiguity and complete.” Barry Wehmiller Mach. Co. v. Thompson, 83 Ark. 283. There are no allegations in the complaint which would authorize the introduction of evidence to vary the terms of the written lease, and under its terms, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and rendering judgment on the cross complaint for the rent due, and the decree is therefore affirmed.